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This dissertation aims to find the life in hagiography.  That is, this 
project breaks with traditional readings of medieval saints‘ lives in 
order to examine what constitutes ―life‖ in these narratives.  While 
medieval hagiography has been mined by contemporary scholars for 
political, social, and ecclesiastic content, little attention has been paid 
to the genre‘s relationship to philosophical and organic categories of 
life.  I argue that not only do these lives engage in philosophical 
wranglings about ontology but that their literary inclinations also 
attach hagiographic forms to a kind of presence that resists 
transcendence while still acknowledging a theological tradition.  
Although the vast corpus of medieval life-writing seems potentially 
universal in scope and content, this study organizes around the idea 
that medieval life narratives prove flexible enough to permit 
speculation about living energies and bounded enough by genre, 
convention, and doctrine to develop the idea of vitality carefully and 
intentionally.   
  
 
The first part of this project addresses the living being through a 
literary-historical lens that endeavors to trace the evolution of this 
concept as it is connected to a trajectory of holiness in post-Conquest 
England.  The injunctions and caesurae of monastic living highlight 
the medieval sense of the instability both of the living being and of a 
working understanding of it.  The lives of saints native to the British 
Isles whose legends feature encounters with animals reveal how 
animal lives can map spaces in the vita for other living beings. 
Studying next the means by which Geoffrey Chaucer and the Pearl-
poet attend to the difficulties in locating and representing the space 
and dynamism of life, I explore how vital objects, landscapes, and 
minerals affirm the place of nonhuman life in the human life.  Finally, 
a look at Piers Plowman illustrates that the later fourteenth-century 
life grows through its connections to the problems of knowledge, 
imagination, and spiritual histories to create a type of ecological 
entanglement.  The medieval life, I conclude, is not merely concerned 
with exemplary living, but rather imagines the living being as 
constituted in a network, as patched together with materials, 
nonhuman beings, other human beings, ideas, and histories.  
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Introduction 
Augustine of Hippo in the eleventh book of De Trinitate writes, 
―[W]e are not bodies but intelligible beings, since we are life‖1.  At first 
blush, this statement seems definitive and peremptory: humans, in 
particular ―we‖ humans, find our essence not in bodies, just in spirit, 
in a vaporous cognitive impulse, in an implied soul.  This tract that 
imagines Trinitarian doctrine as a universal and immanent principle 
sets up in this sentence, maybe out of habit, maybe on purpose, 
maybe as an accident of syntax, maybe with a nod to immanence, 
another trinity: body, sentient being, and life.   Augustine‘s causal 
qualification, ―since we are life,‖ does not offer an elucidation of the 
properties of life, nor does it define life against intellect or spirit, 
identify it as an earthly or divine spark, but rather life in Augustine 
relies in this ontological parsing on a big and hazy category.  But life is 
an important concept, for Augustine and for later medieval writers 
whose works this project examines, and not just a throw-away term, a 
catch-all notion, or a flexible genre.  While it is hard to define, to 
locate, and to visualize, neither Augustine nor medieval hagiographers 
or secular poets like Geoffrey Chaucer and William Langland could 
keep from doing so.  My question is not ―what was it like to live in 
                                                 
1 Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, ed. Gareth Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 61. 
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medieval England?‖, but rather ―what does a genre that comments on 
methods for proper living reveal about medieval ideas of the fact of 
being alive?‖.  What this project delivers, then, is not a definition or 
exposition of a concept of life or being, but rather a map of the 
branches of a medieval conception of vital energy that charts the 
diverse means by which the problem of life is approached in the genre 
that purports to inscribe it.  If life is the anchor, this project endeavors 
to reveal it by tracing its attachments, by unbinding life from the 
spiritual, corporeal, and psychic processes to which it can be found 
fastened.  I attempt to pause at the textual interstices where 
something vital and dynamic comes into focus and especially where 
vitality becomes the focus in narratives that assume the mantle of 
sacred biography or that confront the question of lived experience.  
This study attempts to enter into the trinity that Augustine posits in 
order to explore the life side of the equation, to consider medieval 
vitalities as a concept separable from spirit and body, as separable 
even from human bodies.   
One approach to thinking through vitality is to look at the 
accounts of the lives of those people who seem to have an extra 
helping of life.  While other types of biographies certainly do appear 
occasionally in medieval literature, the lives of saints achieve a 
prominence and popularity that implies an exceptional felicity of 
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expression when it comes to the concept of life.  An acute interest in 
the notion of life – the living energy that is held in common and is 
always strange, demanding, and strangely pleasurable – dominates the 
Latin life of Saint Catherine of Siena.  As a Dominican Tertiary active 
during the second half of the fourteenth century, Catherine was not 
compelled to remain within the precinct of a convent, but rather was 
permitted to engage in public acts of charity and devotion, which even 
led to Catherine‘s involvement in the political intrigues of the Great 
Schism.  Yet, in his account of her life, Raymond of Capua, the holy 
woman‘s confessor and first biographer, devotes only a handful of 
chapters to her ambassadorial endeavors, and omits entirely many of 
Catherine‘s more distinguished public successes which came toward 
the end of her life2.  According to Raymond, his subject‘s social and 
civic accomplishments beyond a particular date bear little significance 
because Catherine‘s living purpose had been fulfilled well before her 
physical death.   
In a section which sets out to review the highlights of 
Catherine‘s young adulthood and the development of ―her sublime 
virtues,‖ Raymond notes that ―before [Catherine] reached the end of 
her life she had all but achieved her aim within the world of time, 
                                                 
2 In an essay that considers the historical and authorial contexts of Raymond‘s life of 
Catherine, see Karen Scott, "Mystical Death, Bodily Death: Catherine of Siena and 
Raymond of Capua on the Mystic's Encounter with God." Gendered Voices: Medieval 
Saints and Their Interpreters. 136-167. Philadelphia, PA: U of Pennsylvania P, 1999. 
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having run forward with the utmost speed to gain the heavenly 
reward.‖ 3  Quite the temporal and spiritual athlete, Catherine seems 
to owe her immoderate virtue in part to an outpacing and overcoming 
of her living being, a life that has been separated from living.  In 
asserting this divide, the hagiographer implies multiple fissures in the 
narrative and the actual manifestation of Catherine‘s life.  This split 
effectively places Catherine beyond the life of being and outside of 
time; it is as if the time of her life has shed earth-bound, cosmological 
constraints.  Something in Catherine is at once on hyper-drive, 
sprinting ahead of her own body, and already very still, like a rock or 
soul in Paradise, because she is outside of time as humans experience 
it.   Even so, Raymond remains constrained by linear and logical 
conventions, and so must compose her life as if she were attached to 
worldly agendas, as if she were still here.  
This interest in dividing temporalities and Catherine‘s time-
hopping brings up for Raymond what it is that animates Catherine 
following her transition out of earthly time.  While the hagiographer 
never explicitly locates the moment when Catherine surpasses earthly 
measures, he does recount twice an especially vivid anecdote about 
                                                 
3 Raymond of Capua, The Life of Catherine of Siena, trans. George Lamb (Rockford, 
IL: Tan Books, 2003), 392. Hereafter all citations to Catherine‘s Life will refer to this 
edition and will be cited parenthetically. 
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Catherine‘s care of another devout laywoman sick with breast cancer4.  
Because the disease had so advanced that tumors eroded this ailing 
woman‘s flesh, no one but Catherine would approach her for the odor.  
While changing Andrea‘s dressings one day, Catherine herself falls 
prey according to her confessor to passing weakness, or possibly 
demonic instigations, and suffers a momentary bout of queasiness.  
This lapse provides the saint with an opportunity to defy her frail 
stomach and to mete out an especially stringent penance: to teach 
herself a lesson, despite her patient‘s protests, she ―put her mouth and 
nose to the horrible sore and remained there until the Spirit had 
conquered the rebellious feeling of nausea‖ (141).   
 Later, Catherine‘s constitution fails again in response to her 
charge‘s degenerating condition, but this time she releases ―holy anger 
against her own body…[a]nd she collected up into the bowl the fetid 
stuff that had been used to wash the sore, along with all the pus, and 
going away a little, gulped it all down.  When she had done this, the 
temptation to feel repugnance passed away‖ (Raymond 147).  While 
these encounters establish a decided rift between bodily impulse and 
spiritual will, Catherine‘s gruesome self-punishment seems to redirect 
the narrative to concentrate on Andrea‘s disease.  It is unclear from 
this incident what the dying body gains by this emphasis, but its 
                                                 
4 For an insightful comparative reading of this type of activity, see Molly Morrison, 
"Ingesting Bodily Filth: Defilement in the Spirituality of Angela of Foligno." Romance 
Quarterly 50.3 (2003): 204-216.  
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importance is certified by a vision of Jesus in which the ―abhorrent 
drink‖ taken as penance from Andrea is countered with a taste of the 
divine chest wound: ―And she, finding herself thus near to the source 
of the fountain of life, put the lips of her body, but much more those of 
the soul, over the most holy wound, and long and eagerly and 
abundantly drank that indescribable and unfathomable liquid‖ 
(Raymond 148).   
 Even as Catherine‘s ascetic performance intends to join her to 
Andrea and Jesus‘s suffering bodies and to represent her victory, as 
Raymond repeatedly puts it, over corporeal need, it also denies the 
reducibility of human life, the living being and the most fundamental 
subject of the hagiographic form, to the body or the soul.  Although 
Raymond makes sure to identify as repugnant the strange drink 
Catherine concocts from Andrea‘s dressings, he includes as an aside 
that Catherine had confided in him that she had ―never…tasted any 
food and drink sweeter or more exquisite.‖  Likewise, Raymond 
discovers among the papers of Catherine‘s previous confessor that she 
had described her inhalation of Andrea‘s wounds as the most pleasant 
scent she had ever smelled.  For Catherine, then, these are not 
uncomplicated conquests.  It is not Catherine‘s own body that through 
suffering and alienation establishes a site of sanctity, but instead 
Andrea‘s affliction, which Catherine internalizes in such a way that 
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she is affected at levels both physical and spiritual.  But these effects 
cannot quite be called suffering, at least according to Catherine‘s 
report of the experience.   Moreover, it is Catherine‘s consumption of 
Andrea‘s diseased flesh that opens up the possibility of an intimate 
encounter with both the divine and the energy of another human 
being.  In the time following this incident Catherine‘s appetite 
disappears and she never again allows herself to digest food.  The text 
emphasizes these double wounds as the origin of Catherine‘s new, 
more abstemious life, but instead of figuring Catherine‘s post-
nutritional life as a practice of repeatedly denying a hunger or a need, 
the saint seems to have been energized in an ultimate way by drinking 
in all this biomatter.  And the two wounds, while clearly hierarchized 
in their effects5, provide a point of contact that throws into relief 
questions surrounding the source and conceptualization of a living 
vitality.   If Catherine‘s vision of Christ as capable of performing both 
male and female bodily activities, as both nursing mother and 
Heavenly Bridegroom, may be understood to disrupt the idea of rigid 
gender binaries, so too the two wounds that nourish Catherine seem 
to render more fluid the categories and spaces of biological and 
                                                 
5 In her article, Morrison claims that ―Catherine consumes filth to prove herself 
worthy to drink Christ‘s blood‖ (211); while I do not disagree with this assertion, it 
does seem important that the narrative devotes at least as much attention to the 
filth-eating as to the incorporation of divine fluids. 
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spiritual life6.  This double dose of stuff organic and spiritual seems to 
fill the saint up for good.  Raymond uses the episode to signal the end 
of the saint‘s connection to her material existence, but Catherine‘s 
description, which slips into the Life only in fragments and asides, 
indicates that organic life does not launch only disgust and disavowal, 
but enriches Catherine to a point beyond need.   
 As fascinated as Raymond‘s story of Catherine‘s pus 
consumption is with extreme penance (which in contemporary culture 
might be likened to extreme sports - those dangerous but exuberant 
activities that push human bodies and psyches to their limits and are 
widely regarded as the pursuits of the healthiest people), these 
encounters bear witness to an interest in an animating force that is 
not spiritual.  Excretions like blood and tears might be sublimated or 
transformed into signs, but something about pus resists such 
recuperation.  It is also a fluid that unlike blood does not seem to 
make anything or keep any part of the body functioning, but rather is 
a nuisance, an indicator of trouble or excess, something to be gotten 
rid of.  This corporeal flow and Catherine‘s treatment of it also 
conveniently draw together and problematize the vital energies whose 
development I trace in this project.  Pus is uncontrollable and impure, 
a dark image for vitality, but still its ingestion so energizes Catherine 
                                                 
6 This passing reading follows Caroline Walker Bynum‘s influential discussion of 
similar episodes.  See Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and 
the Human Body in Medieval Religion. New York: Zone Books, 1991.   
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that she never eats again.  Animating energies sometimes do not look 
like life, and the life force is not simply the picture of health, the image 
of impenetrable bodies or seamless unions.  Vitality in medieval life 
writing and poetry has an uncanny knack for looking a lot like death 
and decay, or at least for snuggling up close to the end of life.7  While 
this adjacency appears to be an issue of negative definition – what is 
life if not death? in more ancient terms, what is life if not motion 
before stillness? in more humanist terms, what is human life if not 
animal life, if not vegetal life? – it is worth considering, and I do so in 
almost every chapter, that the question of what life is tends to emerge 
most urgently just at the point of its loss, just as it fizzles out.  For 
Saint Catherine of Siena, vital energies and the decaying organic first 
repulse and then powerfully attract her, and these affective responses 
in conjunction with her intimacy with this ghastly biomatter allows 
Catherine to live more and to live more strangely, more inexplicably.  
The mystery of life does not grow more defined by getting close to 
death, but deepens.  In her book, Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett notices 
the violent potential in the Deleuzian notion of life as immanence, 
suggesting that despite its generative properties, vitality should not be 
limited to a vision of a splendid overflowing: ―A life thus names a 
restless activeness, a destructive-creative force-presence that does not 
                                                 
7 In fact this project started out as an attempt to trace subjectivity in rituals and 
narratives of mourning in medieval hagiography, but the prospect of long-term 
research into death seemed a little too gloomy so I backed up a little into life. 
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coincide fully with any specific body.  A life tears the fabric of the 
actual without ever coming fully ‗out‘ in a person, place, or thing‖8.  In 
this pair, Catherine and Andrea, it is not a given that Catherine is the 
more vital simply because her body is not diseased or because she has 
a reputation for spiritual austerity.  And that Catherine relies on the 
fluids from Andrea‘s sores confers a certain vitality to the dying 
woman and assigns a certain destructive potentiality to this 
representation of an animating entity. 
 Sorting out life is a mixed up business, and in this important 
moment of Catherine‘s life, ethics, eating, mastery, and things 
intermingle.  On the most obvious and probably most relevant level, 
Catherine‘s intense care of Andrea stages the relationship of vitality to 
ethics.  Catherine steps in when no one else can bear to change the 
suffering woman‘s dressings, rendering the saint unsurprisingly on the 
moral high ground.  But Catherine‘s nausea complicates and 
challenges this predictable good deed: the saint is not allowed to be 
masterful or aloof.  To avoid these ethical pitfalls, the episode suggests 
that intimacy, even an aggressive and unwelcome kind of intimacy, is 
necessary.  Putting her face against Andrea‘s wounds forces Catherine, 
and Raymond‘s audience, to pay attention to a common vitality, to the 
sharedness of life.  What makes these exchanges so intriguing, 
                                                 
8 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010: 54. 
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however, is that they, and presumably Catherine if this biography is to 
be believed, go farther.  This intimacy is not only about an intellectual 
or a superficial recognition; it imagines instead the power of digestion 
as a part of the ethical attachment.  Catherine‘s eating of the rags 
used to dress Andrea‘s sores is a grand gesture, but there is something 
very small in the act, too, that seems to suggest that this event is not 
only about human bodies in touch with each other.  Excretions, 
fragments, and bite-sized pieces of organic and inorganic matter are 
relevant to both the notion of vitality and of ethical action.  As we are 
swept up into an ecstatic vision of Christ, we are also tacitly 
encouraged to process what it means to digest this strange 
combination of things, what is happening in the saint‘s gut, what this 
meal has to do with nutrition and the vitality absorbed from food, what 
is implied when things are substituted for food.  In this very intimate 
exchange is also something impersonal – the rags, the digestion, the 
pus – which underscores the non-human element of vitality.  Despite 
the focus on pus and blood, the narrative of Catherine‘s life does not 
hint at vitalism, the idea that a gelatinous entity invigorates bodies 
and circulates somewhere between organs, skin, and soul (nor is this 
concept something I am very interested in examining in this project).  
It is of course not the pus itself that animates in this scenario.  
Instead, Catherine‘s experiences with Andrea repeatedly figure the 
 12 
breaking down of boundaries and so seem to imagine vitality as 
something more than attached to a subject or a body but something 
not really concomitant with the soul either. 
* 
 
Writing not about hagiography but the history of ontological and 
epistemological formulations, particularly those that define humanity 
against a notion of animality, Giorgio Agamben theorizes: 
In our culture, man has always been thought of as the 
articulation and conjunction of a body and a soul, of a living 
thing and a logos, of a natural (or animal) element and a 
supernatural or social or divine element.  We must learn instead 
to think of man as what results from the incongruity of these 
two elements, and investigate not the metaphysical mystery of 
conjunction, but rather the practical and political mystery of 
separation.9 
 
Although it is certainly true that the Middle Ages contributes to the 
history of envisioning the human as a union of body and soul, it seems 
that medieval hagiographers and other poets had already learned to 
―think of man…as what results from the incongruity of these two 
elements.‖ Body and soul were never a perfect fit.  Because saints‘ 
lives were so popular, ranking second only to romances, and were so 
regularly reproduced in the Middle Ages, it is clear that these 
narratives must have achieved more than mere commentary on 
spiritual election and proper living.  Hagiography with its constant 
turning over of the idea and the narration of life is particularly well 
                                                 
9 Agamben, Giorgio. The Open: Man and Animal. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2004: 16. 
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poised to undermine the notion of the living being as a seamless whole 
or a product of mystical conjunction.  It is my belief that medieval lives 
have quite a lot to tell about the vital energy that animates living 
beings, and so in this project I pursue the question of life in medieval 
hagiography and its inheritors, that is, in poems that embrace and 
revise hagiographic forms.   
As exempla, as narratives of lives that not only illustrate 
superior earthly deeds but also point to a transcendent reward, these 
texts bear considerable normative authority.  Unlike the modern 
biography and memoir market open to any extrovert with a 
confessional penchant, medieval lives describe not only a life of 
exceptional virtue, but also how to live; and so these lives intersect 
with and reify sets of social and doctrinal standards, becoming thereby 
part of secular and ecclesiastical power networks.  One might 
presume, then, that the conventions of the devotional vita would 
impede manifestations of the living being in an effort to promote 
ideological orthodoxy.  Undeniably, the life genre does indeed function 
to teach and promote such lived perfection and to reinforce the power 
of ecclesiastic institutions.  Even so the ideological imperative that 
produces these texts repeatedly calls attention back to life as 
something that, in its earthly actualization, occupies an important, if 
troubled position in the hagiographic form.  Moreover, because 
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exemplary lives seem to defend against a predetermined or singular 
definition of life, hagiography does not foreclose the possibility that 
these narratives have something to tell us about the fact of being alive.  
This energy can be recognized as distinct from the soul because it is 
not unique to the human.  From the ―dead stones,‖ whose modification 
presumes a once living condition, that the antagonists of martyrs 
worship to the lives of objects, like the holy cross, that appear in 
legendaries, medieval writers were also able to imagine and represent 
life as non-uniform and multiple10.   
In examining what constitutes life in these narratives, my 
project separates from traditional readings of medieval saints‘ lives.  
While medieval hagiographic materials have been mined by 
contemporary scholars for political, social, ecclesiastic, and literary 
content, little attention has been paid to the genre‘s relationship to the 
philosophical and physical category of life.  Even so, this study not 
only considers the idea of life in ontological terms, but also looks at 
what literary and theologically-inclined texts have to say about the 
ethical and relational commitments of ontology.  In medieval life-
                                                 
10 One example of such imaginings can be found in Augustine‘s seminal reasons, or 
rationes seminales, which figured the vitality of matter as seeds planted in the 
materials both organic and inorganic.  How seed-like this potency was – that is, if the 
notion of the seed was a philosophical placeholder, a way of thinking through the 
problem of material potential or was a breed of vitalism – has long been debated.  
Most important, however, is that Augustine‘s interest in these rationes seminales was 
well-known in the Middle Ages and instructed medieval thinkers in a kind 
materialism passed down from Stoic and Platonic philosophies.  For an extensive 
consideration of Augustine‘s use of this idea, see Michael J. McKeough‘s dissertation, 
The Meaning of the Rationes Seminales in St. Augustine (Washington, D.C, 1926). 
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writing, vitalities are almost never alone, and so my reading of this 
literature evaluates the life in a world of lives.  Looking at the 
disregarded vitality that pulses at the fundaments of sacred literature 
in its various permutations exposes the complications and the 
incongruities that arise from the effort to imagine this enigmatic force 
and its implications.  This investigation also points up the means by 
which the genre releases some of its ideological pressures, laying bare 
what happens when sanctity comes into contact with an array of living 
beings, from the animal to the vegetal.  As it is redefined and 
repositioned, the medieval life, as genre and entity, increasingly opens 
up a rhetorical and narrative schema that allows, and even 
encourages, the organic to saturate it.    
This pursuit is complex because life seems never to be one thing 
alone, especially in holy biographies which attach it to a multitude of 
related concepts.   The vital energies of these stylized holy biographies 
depend on the representation of a life that is often seemingly 
disinclined to account directly for the life itself, the organic, living 
being.  In passion narratives, the martyr‘s living being is typically 
eclipsed by the magnitude of a spectacular death.  In lives of 
confessors, doctors, hermits, and other unmartyred saints, life is 
almost never to be found precisely where one looks for it.  The 
narration of a life goes on often without explicit recognition of the 
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living being to which it attaches and from which it springs so that 
medieval lives often appear to trace serial encounters with the forces 
outside and beyond the life in question  – spiritual marriages and 
blessed visions or cruel prefects and monstrous demons.  The life as 
an object of inquiry in the medieval genre that purports to record it is 
arrived at obliquely.  This is a problem of the philosophy, and 
presumably the literature, of life more generally.  In the preface to his 
recent study of a particular philosophical genealogy of vitality, Eugene 
Thacker highlights this issue, formulating what he calls a critique, 
rather than an alternate ontology, of life around the claims that 
―[e]very ontology of ‗life‘ thinks of life in terms of something-other-
than-life‖11. Life is either lost in transcending it with metaphysical 
vocabularies, or life is omnipresent and becomes a cipher for just 
about everything as a result of its polyvalence:  
life means so many things that it does not mean any one thing.  
If the concept of life encompasses everything from the physical 
organism, to socioeconomic living conditions, to the life that is 
subject to ethical and legal decision-making to the entire plant 
itself, then there is a sense in which almost nothing is excluded 
from life.12  
Writing about life – and writing about life-writing – risks the 
meaninglessness of overmeaning or the emptiness of abstraction.  As 
Thacker observes, ―‗Life‘ is not only a problem of philosophy, but a 
                                                 
11 Thacker, After Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
12 Thacker, 4. 
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problem in philosophy.‖13  The lives and secular re-interpretation of 
lives that I study in this project confront this challenge.  Medieval life 
writing, in addition to participating in sacred history and in spiritual 
instruction, grapples with this problem; and it is my contention that 
not only do these lives engage in philosophical wranglings about 
ontology but that their literary inclinations help to work out and to 
attach the life to a kind of presence that resists transcendence while 
still acknowledging and participating in a theological tradition.  Life in 
medieval lives does not naively mean everything thereby nothing.  
Although the vast corpus of medieval life-writing seems, looking at it 
from the outside, viewed as a collection, potentially universal in scope 
and content, medieval lives in general are not magnets for every 
possible cultural symptom.  Instead, this project organizes around the 
idea that the medieval life proves flexible enough to permit speculation 
about living energies and bounded enough by genre, convention, and 
doctrine to develop the idea of vitality carefully and intentionally, in 
ways that are implicated rhetorically, historically, and ethically.   
In considering writers as apparently different as Walter Daniel, 
Chaucer, Langland, and the poet of the South English Legendary, this 
project commences with a monastic life that is part private elegy and 
part institutionalized vita and concludes with narratives that, while 
indebted to hagiography, do not announce themselves as hagiographic 
                                                 
13 Thacker, x. 
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exemplars.  What these writers share is an awareness of and 
commitment to the life as a flexible rhetorical space, a place to 
experiment with the life as literary form and with the life as 
philosophical category.  And the chapters that follow are structured as 
case studies of lives drawn from these writers‘ oeuvres that take up 
this problem and foreground at once vitality itself as a topic worthy of 
inquiry and a vision of life that challenges the anthropocentrism of a 
genre dedicated to exceptional humanity.  This study examines both 
specific figurations and a general interest in models of vitality to 
understand the rhetorical consequences of attention to this problem 
and the medieval ideas of life.  
In Chapter 1, ―Animated Attachments: Kaleidoscopic Living in 
Walter Daniel‘s Life of Aelred of Rievaulx,‖ I address the living being 
through a literary-historical lens in order to trace the evolution of the 
notion of the life as it is connected to a trajectory of holiness in post-
Conquest England.  Beginning with the injunctions and caesurae of 
monastic living as represented in Walter Daniel‘s Life of Aelred of 
Rievaulx, I highlight the medieval sense of the instability both of the 
living being and of a working understanding of it.  Though admitting 
the vulnerability of human lives and relationships seems at odds with 
a hagiographic project that endeavors to reify a version of living, we 
discover in the life of Aelred numerous appeals for such an admission.  
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A close reading of this life and its appended documents suggests that 
twelfth-century monastics sought ways to comprehend what kindles 
the bare fact of living. For Walter, as well as Aelred, the vital principle 
is bound up in a communal awareness, which implies that the living 
organism is not delimited by the body, but rather a force that reaches 
through and beyond it.  Although this organic dynamism may not be 
produced by communal attachments, it is certainly, in Walter Daniel‘s 
estimation, most perceptible in the affections and interconnections of 
the monastery.    
Moving outside the abbey walls, Chapter 2, ―‗More Life‘: Animal 
Encounters in the South English Legendary,” I build on the communal 
and political implications of the life outlined in Aelred‘s vita by 
exploring these topics in Middle English lives.  Setting the life of the 
saint alongside the life of the animal, I make a case for the significance 
of contact between hagiographic rhetoric and vital life forces that are 
not strictly human or not human at all.  Examining in particular the 
lives of saints native to the British Isles whose legends feature 
encounters with animals, I argue that animal lives map spaces in the 
vita for other living beings, fixing our attention on a vitality that may 
be shocking in its sharedness.  These animals are not just for food, for 
pedagogy, for work or power.  Instead, writing animal lives into the 
saint‘s life moves the narrative away from a conventional 
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understanding of the life and moves the story out of spaces in which 
the human living being alone determined what counts as a life. 
 The second part of my project takes up fourteenth-century 
secular deployments of the hagiographic forms to investigate how 
relieving the life of its exemplary responsibilities ushers in different 
concerns and involvements and to discover what other lives are 
allowed to emerge in these decontextualized, repurposed lives.  In my 
third and fourth chapters, I experiment with the notion of making 
―textual neighbors‖14.  This section parallels the structures of vitality 
that I claim develop in the narratives, and posits, without too 
positively insisting on, contact and exchange between these 
neighboring textual projects and geographically neighboring authors.  
In reading Chaucer‘s Second Nun’s Tale alongside Pearl in Chapter 3 
and in putting Zenobia and Piers together as roommates in Chapter 4 
a textual current is sparked, and narratives that envision life as a 
common force, an energy shared across the boundaries of body, 
species, and matter, enjoy a kind of emergent agency. And in Chapter 
                                                 
14 In positioning these texts and my readings of them in this configuration, I follow 
George Edmondson‘s recent work on the relevance of neighbors in medieval literary 
scholarship.  According to Edmondson, ―[n]eighboring thus speaks to a different logic 
of textual relationality than that assumed by traditional genealogical models of 
literary history, a logic much closer in spirit to the miscellaneity – those semmingly 
random juxtapositions of spells with saints‘ lives, recipes with fabliaux, animal fables 
with penitential guides – that characterized medieval manuscript culture‖ (The 
Neighboring Text: Chaucer, Boccaccio, Henryson, Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2011: 20).  While the idea of genealogy is a structure that might seem 
indispensible to a study of life and lives, it seems to me that the concept of the 
neighbor could help to dehumanize vitality, to remove the question of an animating 
force from an anthropomorphic rubric.  After all, a neighbor could be a dog, a pig, a 
cave wall, a book, or a stairwell. 
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3, ―Thing Power in Literary Lives: Vital Materials in Pearl and The 
Second Nun’s Tale,‖ by studying the means through which the 
anonymous author of Pearl and Geoffrey Chaucer in Second Nun’s Tale 
attend to the difficulties in locating and representing the space and 
dynamism of life, I explore how vital objects, landscapes, and minerals 
become agents and affirm the place of nonhuman life in the human 
life.   
Finally, Chapter 4, ―Entanglements: The Monk’s Tale, Piers 
Plowman, and the Mesh,‖ focuses on narratives that do not record the 
acts of saints or even exemplary figures and do not outwardly seem to 
adopt a hagiographic structure.  Even so, Chaucer‘s The Monk’s Tale 
and Langland‘s Piers Plowman manage to include lives unsanctified 
and to stress, in productive ways, the divisions and varied 
attachments that constitute evolving concepts and representations of 
life.  Turning to the problem of living as propounded in Piers Plowman, 
I contend that the poem‘s inquest into life and the living being grows 
its connections to the problems of knowledge, imagination, and 
spiritual and individual history creating a type of ecological 
entanglement.  The medieval life, I conclude, is not simply concerned 
with exemplary living, but rather the living being is understood in 
Langland‘s poem and other works in the Middle English canon as 
constituted in a network, as patched together with materials, 
 22 
nonhuman beings, other human beings, ideas, histories, and 
narratives.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Animated Attachments: Kaleidoscopic Living in Walter Daniel’s Life of Aelred of 
Rievaulx 
  
 
Aelred of Rievaulx, a Cistercian abbot who was born and ministered in 
Northumbria, died in 1167.  Shortly after his death, Walter Daniel, a 
fellow resident at Rievaulx Abbey, was commissioned to compose the 
abbot‘s vita.  While Walter‘s life sticks to hagiographic convention, 
following Aelred from childhood but concentrating on his conversion 
and monastic career, appended to this text is an unusual lament in 
which Walter allows himself to observe the inclinations of his grief over 
his lost mentor and friend.   Largely ignored by contemporary scholars 
(and perhaps also by those who preceded them) this condensed 
expression of Walter‘s struggle to comprehend the death, or more 
precisely the extinction of the life, of Aelred illuminates some of the 
blind spots of the traditional rhetorics of sacred biography.  In the 
Lamentacio, Walter not only rehearses his grief, but wonders too where 
the life of his companion could have gone.  And so the Lamentacio, as 
a reflection on the vita and the life of Aelred, develops a very pointed 
concern for the living being and an embryonic consciousness of the 
force that animates a person while he lives.   
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Although the feeling behind Walter‘s lament reads as genuine, 
his introduction to this epilogue strains to rationalize the place of his 
project and loads up his odd elegy with overly formal explanations of 
the project.  Presumably to prevent any misreading of this rare form of 
conclusion for a text meant to fall within the parameters of the 
hagiographic genre1, Walter begins his lamentacio with an attempt to 
summarize and rhetorically situate his project:   
In the prologue, in the development, and at the conclusion of my 
lament – lest I appear ridiculous by supplying to authorities first 
a rationale and a descriptive picture of those things that I am 
offering in the report – I will attempt to expedite things, setting 
down a clear likeness by accurate assertion of the matter at 
hand, and I will then press home to you the truth.2   
 
With such a preface, it seems Walter intends for his readers to take 
seriously the content of his lament.  No afterthought or transposed 
marginalia, this colophon should be understood as both relevant to 
the text which precedes it and as a worthy exemplar of the lamentation 
                                                 
1 Although Aelred was never canonized, Walter Daniel‘s vita follows the hagiographic 
outline rather faithfully. In her introduction to F.M. Powicke‘s translation of this text, 
Marsha Dutton argues that the vita is both a saint‘s life, in form and generic content, 
and an apology or defense against accusations that Aelred participated too eagerly in 
the political world outside Rievaulx Abbey.  (Walter Daniel, The Life of Aelred of 
Rievaulx, introduction and translation of Lament Marsha Dutton [Kalamazoo, 
Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1994], p. 75-79.)  What does this imply about the 
organic or living content, then?  On the one hand, it suggests that Walter does not 
offer an unbiased record of Aelred‘s life, nor does he aim to produce the fullest 
reflection of Aelred‘s various activities.  But on the other hand, it does, in a way, 
avoid the traps of convention into which most hagiography falls. Walter is intent to 
separate Aelred from his public persona, to isolate the kernel of his sanctity and his 
personality, to show his teacher and advisor in a detailed and authentic light.   
2 Dutton, 1994, p. 140.  Because the Latin original of Walter‘s Lamentacio, first 
translated for publication by Dutton, exists in a single manuscript held at Jesus 
College, Cambridge (MS Q.B. 7 [f. 74r-v]), I will only be able to reproduce and rely 
upon in the translated version for this study.   
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genre, which certain informed authorities would surely recognize.  One 
such authority would have been Aelred himself, who composed Lament 
for David, King of Scots toward the end of his career.  Writing a lament 
for Aelred, then, allows Walter to eulogize and emulate his teacher; 
and it further accentuates the importance and complexity of this 
undertaking, since Aelred‘s lament complicates the genre by acting at 
once as history, tribute, admonition (or perhaps a mirror for princes as 
the narrative‘s first audience is the newly crowned Henry II), and even 
vita3 on a miniature scale.  Likewise, the objectives and genres of 
Walter‘s ostensible expression of grief ramify: while the stated subject 
of the text is ―the death and passing of my friend, the grief of my mind, 
the witness of his end‖4 to which Walter has already devoted the 
                                                 
3 At the end of the English Civil War around 1153 Aelred begins work on a text now 
published under the title, Lament for David, King of Scots.  This lament, which is 
significantly more comprehensive in biographical scope than Walter‘s narrative for 
Aelred, was composed to register Aelred‘s grief at the death of his patron, King David, 
and to serve as a political and ethical guide for the soon-to-be crowned Henry II.  
Given these purposes, Aelred refers to this project as ―lamentatio‖ and ―planctum,‖ 
yet two manuscripts in which this text survives – BL MS Cotton Vitellius F.iii and BL 
MS Cotton Vespasian A.xviii –  name it ―vita.‖  (For more, see Marsha Dutton‘s 
introduction to Aelred of Rievualx, Aelred of Rievaulx:The Historical Works, trans. 
Jane Patricia Freeland, ed. with intro. and annotations by Marsha Dutton 
[Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cisterician Publications, 2005], p. 13.).  Even Walter Daniel 
follows this naming convention, writing in a section of the Vita Aelredi that examines 
Aelred‘s literary pursuits that his mentor ―published a life of David, king of Scotland 
in the form of a lamentation, and added to it a genealogy of the king of England, the 
younger Henry‖ [Walter Daniel, The Life of Aelred of Rievaulx, ed. and trans. F.M. 
Powicke (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1994), p. 120-1.  ―…uitam 
Dauid Regis Scocie sub specie lamentandi edidit cui genealogiam Regis Anglie 
Henrici iunioris uno libro comprehendens adiunxit.‖ Walter Daniel, The Life of Ailred 
of Rievaulx, ed. and trans. F.M. Powicke (London: Nelson, 1950), p. 41.].  So we begin 
to see how Walter comprehends both the propriety of connecting a lament to a life 
and the various levels – social, hagiographic, historical, and personal – at which 
such a plaint might resonate. 
4 Dutton, 1994, p. 140-1.   
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thirteen concluding chapters of the Vita, the lamentacio quickly bleeds 
into allegory, which seems a suitable vehicle for the ―truth‖ that Walter 
promises to bring home. 
As the allegory develops, Walter appeals to his Tears to assist 
him in his mourning, for despite a low opinion of demonstrative 
mourning among his peers, Walter confesses that he must discover 
some remedy for the pain he is experiencing, the ―inexplicable 
madness of [his] attachment,‖ as he describes it.  Rather awkward to 
visualize, Walter‘s address to his tears, which flow in response to a 
vision of Aelred ascending into the clouds while exhorting the lamenter 
to grieve more explicitly5, is slow to arrive at the crux of the matter.  
Again, Walter seems anxious to position his endeavor in the annals of 
laments6 despite the passage‘s pathos.   
Slowing the progress of the narrative, this difficulty in avoiding 
the editorial approach, though delaying the actual lament, in fact 
draws attention to Walter‘s technical interest in the operations of the 
body.  Instead of allegorizing a mental capacity or abstract concept, 
Walter animates his tears, which separates the author from his body, 
or at least that which seeps out of it, as well as renders him 
                                                 
5 Dutton, 1994, p. 141. 
6 ―O tears, I shall content you with the plaint of my voice, seek to furnish a testimony 
that you may see how such a man, so kind, so sweet, is adequately lamented.  I am 
speaking of general, common, spiritual lamentations; I say, I am speaking of 
universal as well as particular lamentations.  Like the Song of Songs, like middling 
and simple songs, so I know are the best, the mediocre, and the worst [songs].‖  
Dutton, 1994, p. 141. 
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inordinately aware of the body‘s impulses.  Keeping with this 
physicality, Walter soon specifies that the heartache which inspires 
the lamentacio stems not from an attachment to the soul of Aelred, 
which he must acknowledge has joyfully returned to its creator, but 
rather ―because life has deserted me, that spirit of my life by which my 
spirit was living well‖7.  Upon Aelred‘s death, life has abandoned 
Walter, too, and this loss compels the man left behind to rethink the 
source and stuff of living.  As we shall see, in ways both subtle and 
explicit, Walter shows himself to be profoundly aware of his 
belatedness, that is, that he remains behind and follows after Aelred.  
Following Aelred, and in the Lament, following after the life of Aelred, 
comes to inform Walter‘s ideas about the living being as it emerges in 
networks and communities. 
The author clarifies, ―I grieve, in fact, because as a physician [I 
cannot provide] medicine for myself.  My physician was my abbot.  
Who? Aelred – someone than whom there is nothing sweeter, nothing 
more effective, nothing more curative for my illness.  How?  He was 
equal in soul as well as in body to many a great saint‖8.  The absence 
of Aelred causes Walter even to question his own profession, which is 
fittingly concerned with human health.  While it remains unclear how 
                                                 
7 Dutton, 1994, p. 142. 
8 Dutton, 1994, p. 142. 
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extensive Walter‘s training as a physician was9, his statement here 
corroborates the distinctive attention to illness and corporeal oddities 
shown in the vita.  But Walter‘s expressed helplessness also mistrusts 
his expert knowledge; not only has his vitality waned, but his 
relationship to what he knows best has grown weaker with the death 
of his friend.   
On the one hand, this plaint permits Walter to right the 
imbalance that he seems to perceive, and that contemporary scholars 
too are quick to note10, in the Vita Aelredi; because Walter primarily 
draws upon his memories of Aelred‘s habits and encounters which he 
accumulated in the seventeen years he passed under the guidance of 
the abbot of Rievaulx and those recollections of Aelred‘s pre-monastic 
life recounted presumably by the abbot himself, the vita approaches 
the category of autobiography due to its dependence on Walter‘s own 
experiences and knowledge.  Although Walter does not seem 
                                                 
9 ―Walter had spent seventeen years at Rievaulx during Aelred‘s abbacy and was 
familiar with the intimate details of the abbot‘s life during his last decade.  He 
identifies himself in the Vita as Aelred‘s scribe…and refers in the Lament to his 
service to Aelred in officio medicus.  While these words need not mean that he was 
the monastic infirmarian, his detailed discussion of Aelred‘s various illnesses and of 
the symptoms of some of the people Aelred miraculously healed shows his knowledge 
about and interest in human illness and its treatment.‖  Dutton, 1994, p. 9. 
10 Dutton argues that it is impossible not become acquainted with Walter‘s prickly 
personality through the Life, that he continuously exposes his intention to remain at 
the center of the text not only as dutiful observer, but also as a subject worthy of 
recognition.  But I think this doubling of the Life‘s interests has more to do with the 
idea of inseparability – and possibly even a broader Cistercian concern for the 
interconnectivity of all humanity.  Foregrounding the intimacy between Walter and 
Aelred provides more evidence that for Walter, and possibly Aelred, too, given his 
work on spiritual friendship, life is not reducible to a single organism, impulse, or 
force.  It operates and emerges in the presence of others, even as a textual entity.   
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particularly anxious about his omnipresence in the vita11, he is alive to 
his arrogation of the conventional role of saint or holy person as 
healer.  Whereas it is the subject of a vita who is counted on to restore 
to health the body and soul of both the hagiographer and the vita‘s 
audience, as Aelred‘s physician, Walter knows he has usurped this 
position to a certain extent.  Yet, aside from this brief reversal, Walter 
does not appear too terribly concerned that his relationship with 
Aelred has not conformed to the hagiographic pattern, and this 
realignment seems also to stress rather than chastise Walter‘s 
enduring interest in the healing arts.  Having already departed without 
consequences too dire from the hagiographic norm, Walter begins 
through his allegorizing to open up the Lamentacio to purposes outside 
those stated, that is, to theorize – or at least to begin to examine – the 
root of human vitality.  For, although it is clear here that Walter hopes 
by both the vita and the lament to register his subject among the 
ranks of the sanctified, it is also at this point that Walter begins to 
distinguish and to disconnect the different elements of Aelred‘s being, 
separating history and body from the source of the living being.   
                                                 
11 In fact, despite the modern irritation at Walter‘s perceived commandeering of 
Aelred‘s story, readers coeval with the Vita‘s subjects did not find his presence 
authoritative enough.  In the Letter to Maurice, another textual appendage, Walter 
responds to critics who have called him to task for his lack of legitimate sources, 
particularly for the passages that involve miracles and ascetic practice.  
Begrudgingly, Walter adds to the Vita‘s cast of characters by providing the names 
and testimonies of the requested witnesses.  For the roots of this controversy and 
Walter‘s barbed response to his detractors, see Powicke, 1994, p. 147-9. 
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Walter extends his reassignment of Aelred to healer status to 
depict the abbot as father and mother to his fellow monks, noting that 
the abbot‘s charity, humility, prudence and so on made him ―father to 
many,‖ not just his closest associates.  What is more, Aelred‘s special 
concern for teaching his brothers charity ―was so close to us that it 
approached the richness of a mother‘s milk for her sons and 
undeviatingly displayed the grace of a responsible father‖12.  At first, it 
appears that Walter wants to erase difference through his lament: 
Aelred‘s body, serving as mother and father, collapses gender 
distinctions and his exemplary virtue earns him a place alongside even 
martyrs.  Yet soon enough, Walter turns his attention to the question 
which is the particular source of his pain: Where is Aelred?   
Careful that this question not be deemed meaningless or 
absurd, Walter explains that his intent is not to exhume Aelred‘s 
personal history, since ―the years and months and days and hours of 
his past life…have all passed away like a shadow‖13.  Nor is Walter 
inquiring about the body of Aelred, which, Walter writes, ―lies in a 
coffin in consecrated ground.‖  Instead what Walter misses is the life of 
the abbot; it is, he writes, the absence of ―the life by which that body 
lived, and lived as well as Aelred lived‖ that disquiets the hagiographer.  
                                                 
12 Dutton, 1994, p. 142. 
13 Dutton, 1994, p. 143 
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In a striking, if perplexing, move, Walter pauses here to distinguish the 
type of life he wishes to locate and understand from animal life:  
 
A beast of burden lives what I would call a commercial life, 
because when it quits the body, [that body] ceases to belong to 
it.  A dying cow leaves its body behind it, not so much its life as 
a life [not its own], what I called a commercial life, because once 
the cow is purchased, the buyer makes its life to be nothing.14 
 
In light of this passage, it becomes clear that Walter‘s seeking after the 
life of Aelred, the vital element that caused him to be alive, is no mere 
effect of grief or product of generic conventions, but rather the writer 
seems genuinely invested in discovering the reason for a life‘s 
disappearance.  As Walter points out, the only mark left by an animal 
after its death is its carcass, since no discernible life – at least not one 
recognized by its human counterparts – remains or is remembered.  
But this lack of life owes less to the nature of the animal, the absence 
of language or reason, than to its having been acquired as an asset.  
That is, the cow has no life to speak of after it has died on account of 
its status as object from its human owner‘s point of view.  Certainly a 
bum exchange from the purchased object‘s perspective, but further, 
one wonders about animals without commercial standing: is an 
animal‘s life blotted out upon its introduction into the system of 
exchange?  Or is the ―commercial life‖ the only life, however ephemeral 
and contingent, afforded to an animal?  Perhaps because these 
                                                 
14 Dutton, 1994, p. 144. 
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questions are somewhat outside the purview of a lament, Walter leaves 
his concept of the commercial life rather impressionistic, returning to 
Aelred: ―Yet there is reason to say where Aelred is, for I care much less 
about the life of cattle.  I am asking about the man who sought me 
out, formed me, established me, cherished me, nourished me, taught 
me, and loved me‖15.    
And in fact, as opaque as the idea of animal life remains here, 
Walter‘s theorizing does begin to shed some light on what he means by 
human life or more generally a vital energy unattached to any species.  
In identifying life, even for the poor cow, as distinct from the body, 
Walter also intimates life‘s relationship with corporality as one 
characterized by ownership.  Whereas once the cow dies, its carcass 
does not belong to any particular or identifiable cow, one assumes that 
the reverse is true in the case of a human.  Even though the dead 
person‘s life has expired, there remains a connection between the 
cadaver and the life that animated it.  Yet, what marks this life as 
different from other lives, from the cow‘s life?  If it is tethered to a 
single body, how can vitality vanish so irrevocably?  For a human life, 
a biographical record – a person‘s actions, habits, and demeanor – 
might index its singularity, except Walter already has insisted that 
personal history is not what he is after.  Nevertheless, this brief foray 
into natural philosophy suggests that for Walter, life emerges not as a 
                                                 
15 Dutton, 1994, p. 144. 
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discrete entity, but rather in the presence of body, history, and other 
lives (―I am asking about the man who sought me out, formed me, 
established me…‖ etc.), since as Walter says, his interest is less in 
bovine dynamism than in the life that formed him.   
To address the disappearance and lingering influence of Aelred‘s 
life, Walter invites Reason to engage him in debate.  This discussion 
leads to the conventional admonishment of the mourner and the 
expected justification that Aelred‘s shedding his bodily prison is more 
to be celebrated than bemoaned.  As the dialogue continues, Reason 
asserts that Walter is simply confused; he has conflated the life of 
Aelred with his soul, even though the lamenter already has conceded 
(using rational thinking, as Reason cleverly points out) that it has 
found eternal rest and glory.  If not guilty of this error, then Walter has 
mistaken life for the body, which Reason stresses is buried, ―lying 
withered and dead, covered with stone and constricted by a mass of 
earth‖16.   During this exchange, Reason not only dodges Walter‘s 
original question, but offers an explanation – the imprisonment of the 
flesh and the debility of human life – that importantly cannot account 
for the vital presence that Aelred represented in the evolution of 
Walter‘s own identity.   
None of Reason‘s explanations quite satisfies Walter, who 
continues to inquire after the place of Aelred, a place that seems 
                                                 
16 Dutton, 1994, p. 144-5. 
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―wholly inaccessible‖17 to him.  As Walter repeatedly underscores in 
this lament, upon Aelred‘s death, he comes to recognize a reversal in 
their ostensible roles: Aelred is the true physician and without his 
restorative presence Walter, a physician by trade, grows infirm.  The 
interconnection of the lives of these men renders the issue of Aelred‘s 
ephemeral life intensely relevant to Walter.  And Reason‘s platitudes 
aren‘t cutting it.  When she finally dispenses with the evasion and 
does take up the life question directly, Reason implores Walter to live 
well rather than to lament the loss of Aelred.  This living well, which 
again sidesteps the problem of ―life,‖ will according to Reason permit 
Walter to reunite with Aelred after death.  Exhausted by these detours, 
all the despondent Walter can muster at the conclusion of the lament 
is to admit that he does wish to ―be brought back to moderation‖18.  
Walter‘s concession conspicuously does not endorse as adequate 
Reason‘s substitutions for the Lament‘s primary question which 
remains: where is Aelred, where is his life? 
In articulating these unresolved issues, Walter Daniel draws 
attention to life as an authentic category for hagiographic inquiry.  
Walter does not want the living being, the living networks of Aelred to 
suffer erasure or repression in favor of orthodox topics like soul, 
proper living, and sanctity.  Even so, the location and the definition of 
                                                 
17 Dutton, 1994, p. 145. 
18 Dutton, 1994, p. 146. 
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organic life escape Walter.  Relegating this subject to the Lament, 
which lies at the margins of the official text of the Life, spotlights this 
slippery problem and its unconventionality.  And Reason‘s inability to 
answer Walter‘s questions directly further marks as irrational the 
subject of Aelred‘s life.  Organic life, it seems, cannot be submitted or 
even acknowledged by Reason.  The soul, the body, and the history of 
Aelred can all be accounted for, but the force that animated these – his 
vital energies, his biology – resists inclusion. 
It is not difficult to see that this resistance compounds Walter‘s 
loss. Disavowing the importance of Aelred‘s life, however eternal his 
soul, has concrete implications for Walter, whose own life cannot be 
disentangled from that of his spiritual advisor.  Although admitting the 
fragility of human lives and relationships seems at odds with a 
hagiographic project that endeavors to inscribe and reify a particular 
version of living, an awareness of the interdependence of human lives 
provides the rationale for the lion‘s share of written legends.   Very 
often hagiographers, especially of martyrs and other ―big name‖ saints, 
weave prayers for a saint‘s intercession, either for the author or the 
audience, or both, into their narratives; and countless other incidents 
of intercession are written into the lives in the form of miracles 
performed at various stages in the saint‘s career.  While miracles 
associated with a saint‘s relics rely upon the presence of a saint‘s 
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energy that persists even after the holy person has died, the power 
that works these wonders is typically understood as an effect of the 
soul, and of the force of a divine entity that reanimates the remains of 
an especially worthy candidate, rather than as a property of an energy 
attached to the earthly organism.  This distinction has acute emotional 
and philosophical consequences for Walter.  Walter‘s despair at 
Reason‘s refusal to accommodate the living being – that part of his 
friend that was neither body, nor soul, neither intellect, nor spirit – as 
an aspect of his loss insists on the need for a better definition, a better 
understanding of the animating energy that operates in connection 
with, but remains distinct from both body and soul.  Revising the 
boundaries of what is worthy of mourning and worthy of being called 
life, Walter‘s lamentacio affords an opportunity to reconsider the 
relationship between the bare fact of living and the genre that purports 
to record it. 
*   *   *   *   *   *  *   * 
Given the resistance that Reason shows to this category of 
inquiry in the Lament, it is not surprising that Walter only expressly 
raises the issue of Aelred‘s other energies in the vita‘s afterthought, 
leaving his remarks on the energy that animated his teacher and 
friend cloudy and finally silenced by a double dose of Reason‘s 
misapprehension and insistence.  But a sustained interest in the 
organic living being also develops in the official portion of Walter‘s 
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narrative, which responds both to Walter‘s uncommon question and to 
the problem of isolating, either spatially or rhetorically, life.   
In his depiction of Aelred‘s worldly youth, Walter dedicates a 
sizeable chunk of his narrative to an explanation of his subject‘s 
fosterage with King David of Scotland.  While it remains somewhat 
unclear the role that Aelred performed at court, Walter indicates that 
he was ―steward of the royal household‖19 and other sources attest 
that Aelred held a position of some esteem as he established alliances 
with the king‘s sons as well as a closeness with King David himself 
sufficient to warrant Aelred‘s composition of a lament following the 
Scottish ruler‘s death.  Valuable not only for its social historical 
insight, these opening chapters depart from the often rather cursory 
account of a saint‘s childhood in favor of moments of conversion, 
confession, or trial.  Though he does not emphasize the abbot‘s 
administrative or management proficiency later in the text, Walter, 
finds reason to explain the first twenty-four years of Aelred‘s life, 
noting his habits in secular dress, his effect on the king, and his 
potentially illustrious career, suggesting that King David would have 
promoted him to ―the first bishopric in the land‖20 should Aelred not 
                                                 
19 Powicke, 1994, p. 91.  ―Erat tamen cum eo echonomus domus regalis…‖ Powicke, 
1950, p. 3-4.  As Powicke notes in connection with this line, economus had come to 
mean ―steward‖ or seneschal by the time Walter writes the Vita.   
20 Powicke, 1994, p 91. 
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succumbed to the charms of Rievaulx21.  Walter even goes so far as to 
feature an encounter in which a particularly aggressive knight, who, 
out of indignation at Aelred‘s advancement at court, publicly attacks 
and accuses the young courtier of deeds ―too foul for [Walter] to speak 
or for others to hear‖22.  In the midst of lavish dinners and scurrilous 
nobles, however, Aelred was already ―looked upon rather as a monk 
than as given to the service of the world and the display of office‖23, so 
one wonders what dubious actions, then, prompted the knight‘s 
vituperation.  After the quarrel, which Aelred gracefully defuses by 
seconding his rank as an average sinner, the young man‘s emerging 
holiness becomes clear to all involved.  The vicious knight later that 
same day seeks forgiveness from the humble steward and the king 
begins to turn to Aelred for guidance:   
The king saw very clearly that such wholesome outpourings of 
rare humility and other graces could have no other source than 
in streams of exceptional prudence and wisdom. The great 
counselor had a fitting name, for the English Alred is in Latin 
totum consilium or omne consilium.  Well is he placed in the 
counsels of an earthly king, whose very name gives forth the 
sound, ‗all counsel‘, he who was afterwards to be father, 
                                                 
21 Although the details of Aelred‘s early life remain a bit cloudy, Aelred Squire‘s 
biography attempts to fill in the gaps.  (Aelred Squire, Aelred of Rievaulx: A Study 
[Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1969].)  For a more recent discussion 
of Aelred‘s early education at court and beyond, see Chrysogonus Waddell, ―The 
Hidden Years of Aelred of Rievaulx : The Formation of a Spiritual Master,‖ Cistercian 
Studies Quarterly, 41:1 (2006), 51-63.  Aelred, too, offers some insight into his 
childhood at Hexham in The Saints of the Church of Hexham and Other Miracles 
collected in Aelred of Rievaulx, The Lives of the Northern Saints trans. Jane Patricia 
Freeland, ed. Marsha Dutton (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 2006). 
22 Powicke, 1994, p 93. 
23 Powicke, 1994, p 91.  ―…monachus putaretur quam secularis potencie et 
pompatici ministerii officialis discipulus…‖.  Powicke, 1950, p. 4. 
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counselor, judge and protector of manservants of God, first 
showing an example of justice to his companions in the world, 
then in loftier regions of a more exacting life the pattern even to 
spiritual men of perfection and inward humility.24  
 
These chapters allow Walter not only to compare the temptations and 
vicissitudes of life outside the cloister with monastic tranquility, but 
also set up a duality that worried even the youthful Aelred.  Although 
the etymological implications of Aelred‘s name make use of a 
widespread hagiographic device, Walter moves beyond the convention 
in this analysis.  Claiming that Aelred is ―all counsel‖ associates the 
fortuitously named man with wisdom, to be sure, but also with 
language, as if he were a mass of letters or at best a library.  While this 
foresight impresses the monarch and seems also to excite Walter, 
there is a hint of possible contrivance in this accolade which requires 
multiple translations to convey its significance, translations which 
cause the living Aelred to shrink from view.  Sensitive to the 
consequences of such a substitution, Walter closes the passage by 
separating Aelred from his earlier consular self by pointing out that 
after his conversion he becomes a father before all else.  This more 
                                                 
24 Powicke, 1994, p 94.  ―…uidens pro certo non nisi ex preclare prudencie 
spiencieque riuulis eximie tam salubres humilitatis ceterarumque graciarum 
haustus profluere potuisse.  Congruit eciam eius omini interpretacio magni 
consiliarii, quod uersum in Latinum totum consilium uel omne consilium facit.  
Etenim Alred Angicum est, illudque quod diximus exprimit in Latino.  Et bene ad 
consilia Regis terreni assumitur cuius nomen omne consilium sonat, qui uidelicet 
postmodum futures erat pater et consiliarius iudex et patronus multorum seruorum 
Dei, quatinus primo inter seculars conuersans illis ostenderet exempla iusticie, 
demumque ad alciora conscendens uite arcioris eciam spiritualibus uiris foret 
exemplar perfeccionis et humilitatis interne.‖  Powicke, 1950, p. 8. 
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organic relationship with his brethren seems to postulate that it is not 
until Aelred enters the Rievaulx that his living being truly surfaces.  If 
he is the image of an abstract principle like justice while in the secular 
sphere, Aelred evolves into a more expansive model of perfect living 
once professed.   
As expected, Aelred becomes increasingly aware of the artifice of 
the aristocratic life, and decides that the ―way of quiet and holiness‖25, 
that is, monastic life might offer him the solace which he has 
discovered he seeks.  Walter is vague about what prompts this 
newfound consciousness of the perils of serving ―a prince of flesh and 
blood‖26, mentioning only that it must have been God who planted the 
idea; yet that the chapter that outlines this resolution follows so 
closely on the conflict between Aelred and the knight hints at some 
connection between these events.  Compounding this uncertainty is 
Aelred‘s own hesitation before executing this transition, which obliges 
him to keep his plans secret to physically ruinous ends: ―In the 
meantime the heat of his desire invades his heart, fills his mind, takes 
possession of his soul, stays all his senses in the effort not to seem the 
man that he is, and wishes to be and to become.  His bones stiffen as 
his marrow melts away, his flesh withers, the pulse beats slow, his 
whole body trembles and his spirit grows faint in the wretchedness of 
                                                 
25 Powicke, 1994, p 95. 
26 Powicke, 1994, p 96. 
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suspense.‖27 Here Aelred‘s method of social survival jeopardizes his 
physical and spiritual well-being.  Remaining a member of the Scottish 
court zombifies Aelred, renders him a dead letter.  What is striking 
about this account is that although it seems to follow the typical 
conversion narrative that charts a deadening to social exigencies and 
pleasures, Aelred‘s desire to alter his way of life becomes the condition 
of his living at all.  That is, Aelred does not simply die to the world, but 
would disintegrate were he to remain in it, which assumes an 
important relationship between the living being and devotional 
exercise.  Although this unhealthy stillness besets Aelred only when he 
finds himself in the ―wretchedness of suspense,‖ once he settles on 
contemplation as the path toward redemption he appears to have 
passed a point of no return mentally and physically.  The biographer‘s 
literalizing of this trope of conversion narrative highlights Aelred‘s vital 
dynamism, or the waning of it in the face of inaction.  Following the 
contraction of his bones and flesh as well as the slackening of his 
internal rhythms, the weakening of his ―spirit‖ may allude to both 
Aelred‘s soul and some kind of animating energy, particularly since we 
read that his heart, mind, and soul were ablaze with devout fervor.  All 
of this encourages the reading that it is not just proper living that is 
                                                 
27 Powicke, 1994, p 96.  ―Interim ardor desiderii cor eius inuadit, mentem occupant, 
animum optinet, sensus omnes miro suspendit artificio  ne uideatur homo esse quod 
est, quod uult uelle, quod uult efficere.  Ossa illius euanescentibus medullis 
regescunt, marcescunt carnes, uene pulsus lentescit, omne contremescit corpus et 
anima ipsa miserabili expectacione languescit.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 10. 
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gained upon entering the cloister, nor only guarantee of the soul‘s 
eternal life, but the restoration and possible salutary effects for the 
living being, too. 
Walter Daniel‘s report of the incidents leading to Aelred‘s 
admission to Rievaulx Abbey in 1134, which is likely embellished to 
suit the demands of genre, provokes further questions about the 
relationship of life itself to a form of living.  The story goes that sent on 
royal business to Archbishop Thurstan of York, Aelred learns from a 
―close friend‖ about the habits of ―certain monks…come to England 
from across the sea‖28.  The anecdote provides Walter the opportunity 
to wax eloquent about the practices and ideological motivations of the 
Cistercian order in an extract that reads more like recruitment 
material than hagiography.  In addition to outlining the white monks‘ 
positions on virtuous poverty, communal property, and social parity, 
Walter describes the deliberate fixedness of Cistercian meals (―A pound 
of bread, a pint of drink, two dishes of cabbage and beans.‖) as well as 
the tranquil homogeneity of the community which is maintained by 
excluding women, hawks, and dogs ―except those barkers used to 
drive away thieves from houses‖ 29.  After explaining the Cistercian 
rule, Aelred‘s friend apparently turned to Rievaulx‘s natural setting.  
So moved by these accounts, the would-be monk immediately mounts 
                                                 
28 Powicke, 1994, p 96. 
29 Powicke, 1994, p 97. 
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his horse and rides to Helmsley Castle, home of his acquaintance and 
the founder of Rievaulx Abbey, Walter Espec.  The next day Walter 
Espec brings Aelred to tour the abbey and meet some of the 
monastery‘s eminent brethren, which so stirs the visitor that the 
following morning as he and his party make their way back to the King 
of Scotland, Aelred casually wonders if any of his companions would 
enjoy a second call at the abbey.  This time, suspecting Aelred‘s 
intentions, the prior and others convince him to stay at Rievaulx as a 
novice.  Although there is convincing evidence drawn from Aelred‘s 
own writing that this episode was considerably less spontaneous than 
his vita indicates, Walter Daniel seems determined to portray this 
conversion as free of any machination or ambition30.  And the 
flourishing valley of Rievaulx as recounted by the nameless friend 
points up Walter‘s intent, representing the abbey‘s surroundings as a 
pastoral utopia:  
The spot was by a powerful stream called the Rie in a broad 
valley stretching on either side…High hills surround the valley, 
encircling it like a crown.  These are clothed by trees of various 
sorts and maintain in pleasant retreats the privacy of the vale, 
providing for the monks a kind of second paradise of wooded 
delight.  From the loftiest rocks the waters wind and tumble 
down to the valley below, and as they make their hasty way 
through the lesser passages and narrower beds and spread 
themselves in wider rills, they give out a gentle murmur of soft 
                                                 
30 Dutton claims that Aelred‘s conversion does not manifest any change in the man 
himself, but simply a change of career and energy (Dutton, 1994, 55).  While such a 
view of the conversion may be defensible, it certainly does not reflect Walter‘s 
position, which produces something akin to the pathetic fallacy by projecting the 
naturalistic changes in Aelred‘s career and spiritual orientation onto the Rie Valley. 
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sound and join together in the sweet notes of a delicious melody.  
And when the branches of the lovely trees rustle and sing 
together and the leaves flutter gently to the earth, the happy 
listener is filled increasingly with a glad jubilee of harmonious 
sound, as so many various things conspire together in such a 
sweet consent in music whose every diverse note is equal to the 
rest.31 
 
One begins to understand Aelred and Walter‘s love for Rievaulx from 
such a lush description.  This extract, furthermore, develops the 
notion that monastic life releases, and perhaps enlarges the devouts‘ 
sense of being alive, for the abbey‘s environs seem poised to 
counteract the corporeal desiccation Aelred suffered while suspended 
between secular and spiritual living – something akin to a Cistercian 
spa where ―wooded delights‖ await the novice rather than the 
anticipated strictures and sacrifices imposed by adherence to the 
Benedictine rule.   
More believable, however, is the way in which Rievaulx‘s 
backdrop mirrors the archetype of communal harmony: the sounds of 
the Rie‘s waters and the valley‘s trees produce a music in which one 
                                                 
31 Powicke, 1994, p 98.  ―…torrentem Rie nomine planicie uallis latissime hinc inde 
circumiacente casas fixere suas.  Habitaculi autem sui nomen et loci eiusdem ex 
duobus composuerunt, uidelicet ex ipsius torrentis uocabulo et ualle, unde Rieuallis 
nuncupatur.  Quam uallem excelsi montes circumambient et instar corone 
circumcingunt, qui arborea uarietate uestiuntur amenisque secessibus uicinia 
secreta ministrant et monachis nemorose deicie alterum quodammodo exhibent 
paradisum.  Crispantes fonts ex eminentissimis rupibus labuntur ad inferiora uallis 
dumque per fibras minores et strictiores decurrunt uenas terre patulosque riuulos 
ac riuas prominentes leni murmure suauiter sibilant et  sonis duclibus melos 
delectabile concinunt.  Set et ramose collision pulcherimarum arborum foliis in 
humum / conuolantibus molli collapse in carmineos conueniunt (sic) modos, fitque 
gratum audientibus nimis nimisque iocundum iubilium tam concordantis armonie, 
dum perdulci concentu tantarum diuersitatum concitatarum ad sonos uarios set 
equipollentes in musica…‖  Powicke, 1950, p. 12-3. 
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perceives simultaneously the individual rivulets and leaves and the 
collective tones of river and trees together.  The account, taken in 
conjunction with the anonymous friend‘s summary of Cistercian 
principles that directly precedes it, set up the idyllic locale as the echo, 
but also the model, of the pious living recently introduced to North 
Yorkshire.  Life here, natural and constructed, seems undivided even 
in its oscillation between singular to collective.  Re-establishing a vital 
balance in such a venue should be effortless. 
 While Aelred acclimates quickly, as one might expect, to the 
routines of the cloister, as the Vita progresses beyond the vivid 
conversion, Walter tempers, or at least complicates his depiction of the 
relationship between the living being and monastic discipline.  Not 
only does the novitiate Aelred perform his duties well enough to 
impress his instructors, but even in these rigorous early years, before 
he was promoted to various offices exempting him from the more 
labor-intensive of monkish activities, Aelred maintains a glow of 
health.  On the day of his profession, ―he was, like David, somewhat 
‗ruddy, and with all of a beautiful countenance and goodly to look 
to‘‖32.  Heartiness in body and spirit help Aelred to advance at 
Rievaulx, and within the decade, Aelred had risen to the post, Master 
of Novices, which position‘s metaphorical content is not lost on Walter 
                                                 
32 Powicke, 1994, p. 102.  ―Et quoniam aliquantulum rufus erat ut Dauid, pulcher et 
decorus aspectu plurimum delectacionis intuencium oculis inferebat.‖ Powicke, 
1950. p. 18. 
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who writes that the students who were introduced to monastic life by 
Aelred ―seem to bear blossoms more dazzling white than the white 
flowers about them‖33.  Presaging Walter‘s synthesis in the Lament of 
Aelred into a mother and father figure, the abbot‘s generativeness, his 
propensity for guidance but also formation, return the text repeatedly 
to a focus on life and the living energy in human and institution.   
Explaining Aelred‘s transfer to Revesby Abbey to serve as founding 
abbot, Walter imagines his subject in several roles: ―The house of 
Rievaulx conceived a third daughter in her womb and showed signs 
that the time of her labor was drawing near.  And when she gave birth, 
the midwives chose Aelred as bearer and nurse of the latest lusty 
addition to the family, declaring that, nourished by the milk of his 
solicitude, it would quickly grow into a stout child‖34.  Although 
Rievaulx itself functions as the surrogate, Aelred as ―bearer and nurse‖ 
seems equally involved in the mothering and certainly the nurturing of 
the new abbey in Lincolnshire.  This vitality, however, does not seem 
to be reducible to what one might call a biological impulse, since 
Walter clearly does not intend for his readers to envision Aelred 
                                                 
33 Powicke, 1994, p. 107.  
34 Powicke, 1994, p. 110.  ―Domus igitur Rieuall‘concipiens in uteru terciam filiam 
genitiui tumoris distensione partum propinquum minitauit.  Que uero cum 
peperisset, obstetrics Alredum nostrum ad prolem recenter fusam gerulum et 
nutricium elegerunt, affirmantes cito grandiusculam futuram, si eius sollicitudinis 
lacte nutriretur.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 27. 
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actually breastfeeding, nor even an ambiguously gendered abbot.35  
Even so, the fertile dynamism which the monastic life and Aelred as a 
superior exemplar of it boasts equally cannot be attributed entirely to 
the biographer‘s hyperbole.   
These repeated brushes with an emerging concept of the living 
organism suggest that life is not simply a fiction of the hagiographic 
genre; that is, the living being is not assumed by the hagiographer as a 
given condition or fixed entity.  Instead the fact of being alive, and the 
author‘s and holy subject‘s awareness of it, becomes an important 
category for understanding the origins and effects of sanctity and 
devout living.  For Walter Daniel, this living being – the part of Aelred 
that is not quite his soul or his body -- takes on, moreover, a 
significance of its own and is interrogated not only for what its 
apprehension might add to a manual for virtuous living, but also for 
its own sake.  Revesby Abbey does not flourish autonomously, nor is it 
by Aelred‘s prayer or properly concentrated will that it prospers.  
Representing Aelred as a nursing mother, Walter Daniel draws 
                                                 
35 As Caroline Walker Bynum explains, maternal imagery in 12th-century monastic 
writings most often seeks to suffuse with affect a paternal authority that primarily 
depended upon discipline and rule.  Images of conception, birth, and nursing 
highlight the unifying and secure aspect to cloistered life instead of the commonly 
imagined alienation and separation from the world.  For a broader discussion of the 
12th-century attachment to maternal imagery, see Caroline Walker Bynum, ―Jesus as 
Mother and Abbot as Mother: Some themes in twelfth-century Cistercian writing‖ in 
Medieval Religion: New Approaches ed. Constance Hoffman Berman (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 20-48.  For a look at the use of maternity in Aelred‘s own 
writings, see Susanna Greer Fein, ―Maternity in Aelred of Rievaulx‘s Letter to His 
Sister‖ in Medieval Mothering ed. John Parsons and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: 
Garland Pub, 1996), p. 139-156. 
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attention to something nutritive about the subject, reasserting the 
presence of a vital, metabolic energy into his pious history.   
*   *   *   *   *   *  *   * 
Although imagining hagiographic heroes as icons of reproduction 
or, more broadly, fertility, is not uncommon to the genre, Walter‘s 
insistence on this property‘s relevance to the biography of Aelred is 
noteworthy, to say the least.  This emphasis underscores Aelred‘s 
special and exceptionally Cistercian animatedness, and perhaps his 
particular suitability for canonization, but it also testifies to Walter‘s 
sensitivity to his audience. 
  As much as he identifies the restorative and alimentary 
possibilities of monastic life, Walter also addresses various points of 
resistance, which anticipate the likely response to this representation 
by his primary reading audience, fellow monks.  While life in the 
monastery offered certain protections, luxuries, and charms, it was by 
no means a guarantee of perfect physical health.  What‘s more, 
Walter‘s account of one secular clerk‘s divided loyalties attests that 
Rievaulx was not necessarily a spiritual panacea either.  This pivotal 
episode broadens an understanding of life as a more incongruous 
concept for Walter‘s audience than the hagiographic Aelred is 
permitted to exemplify.   
One of the more prominent anecdotes in the Vita for its miraculous 
content and its detail, the story of the unstable monk spans three, 
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non-consecutive chapters and sketches the most animate character, 
after Aelred, in the narrative36.  Aelred first meets this monastic 
aspirant while he is serving as master of novices.  Immediately 
dismayed by the recruit‘s changeability, Aelred prays that he be given 
care of the capricious man‘s soul.  Shortly thereafter, the novice 
entreats his teacher for release from the abbey; although Aelred 
advises against his return to the secular realm, the wayward student 
heads off nonetheless.  But we realize that Aelred‘s prayers have been 
heard because the impulsive monk can only travel in circles: ―All day 
long, after he had passed through the outer enclosures of the 
monastery, he wandered aimlessly about the woods until, shortly 
before sunset, he came to the road by which he had left and suddenly 
found himself again within the monastic wall‖37.  Perhaps this botched 
flight is to be expected from so fickle a clerk, but, even so, Aelred 
rejoices when he discovers his prodigal pupil has returned.  Though 
we are not privy to the thwarted novice‘s feelings about his 
reinstallation, this incident achieves more than bearing witness to 
                                                 
36 As Dutton argues, the rhetorical accretion of these anecdotes points up not only 
the education of Walter‘s prose, but also that the episodes involving the unstable 
monk hold meaning for Aelred‘s life beyond that of the marvelous.  ―When he tells of 
three prayers at three different stages of Aelred‘s monastic career, all for the same 
man‘s salvation and stability in monastic life, he shows them as all equally effective 
but each in succession more physically powerful.‖  Dutton, 1994, 11. 
37 Powicke, 1994, p. 108.  ―Ut autem exteriora monsterii claustra pertransiit per 
deuia saltus tota die uacabundus oberrat et parum ante solis occasum ad uiam 
ueniens/per quam exitum fecit subito infra muralem monsterii ambitum se sensit 
transpositum.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 25. 
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Aelred‘s first official miracle38 insofar as it validates the struggle of 
cenobitic commitment.  This concession seems to acknowledge his 
readership‘s expectations not only about what a saint‘s life looks like 
but also what life less exemplary entails.   
Discussion of the non-exemplary life extends into two later chapters 
wherein Aelred has been elected abbot of Rievaulx.  Once again, the 
itchy-footed monk, who appears to have progressed beyond the 
probationary stage, begs Aelred to allow him to give up the monastery:  
‗Lord, my inconstancy is not equal to the burden of the Order.  
Everything here and in my nature are opposed to each other.  I 
cannot endure the daily tasks.  The sight of it all revolts me.  I am 
tormented and crushed down by the length of the vigils.  I often 
succumb to the manual labor.  The food cleaves to my mouth, more 
bitter than wormwood.  The rough clothing cuts through my skin 
and flesh down to my very bones.‘39  (112-3) 
 
While this complaint owes much to convention -- recalling the 
anticipated protest of a disgruntled monastic, a hagiographer‘s 
vocalization of the antithesis of saintly virtue, or the allegorist‘s 
portrait of Body‘s objection to Soul‘s devotions, its report of the bad 
monk‘s physical failings is particularly fine-tuned.  No mention is 
made of a crisis of faith, though it is possible that spiritual discontent 
                                                 
38 We learn later in the Letter to Maurice which Walter composes in response to the 
Vita‘s earliest commentators that this event is not, in fact, Aelred‘s first attested 
miracle.  According to the Letter, Aelred‘s very first miracle occurred in his infancy 
when a visitor noticed a special radiance in the child‘s face (Powicke, 1994, p.151).  
39 Powicke, 1994, p. 112-3.  ―‗Domine, grauitatem ordinis leuitas mea non sustinet.  
Res omnes contrarie sunt mee nature, diuturnos labores non fero, nam rebellia 
michi uniuersa conspicio.  Angor et crucio in mora longa uigiliarum, laboribus 
frequenter succumbo manuum, esce abscinthio in ore herent amariores, 
uestimentorum asperitas cutem et carnes penetrans ad ossa usque nuda pertingit.‘‖  
Powicke, 1950, p. 30. 
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is assumed in a brother so fixated on the twinges of the body.  Even 
so, the unstable monk‘s reaction to life enclosed in the monastery 
centers on the sensible discomforts of the Cistercian rule: exhaustion 
from the early morning masses, wounds from the coarse dress, 
digestive distress from the meals.  The inconstant monk‘s resistance, 
his revulsion emerges from a non-spiritual place.  Indeed, the needs of 
the soul are nowhere mentioned in this passage, perhaps because 
Aelred had earlier taken possession of it, though the afflicted monk‘s 
refusal of Aelred‘s offer to mollify his aversions by loosing the 
restrictions placed on diet and habit suggests that something more 
than physiological misery solely is afoot.  Moreover, the narrative 
reasserts the import of the living being in these negotiations with 
Aelred‘s response: the abbot vows not to eat, despite the disapproval of 
his brethren, until the renegade is restored to Rievaulx.  Fortunately, 
the hunger strike is forestalled by supernal intervention.  When the 
fugitive monk makes to leave the abbey, it seems as if a ―wall of iron‖ 
impedes his desperate and repeated attempts at escape40.  Not 
deterred by either the gathering crowd, or the thickening atmosphere, 
―in intense rage he takes hold of the hinges of the gate with both 
hands and, stretching out his leg, tries to put one foot forward, but in 
                                                 
40 Powicke, 1994, p. 113. 
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no way did he contrive to reach even the boundary‖41.  And after this 
last ditch effort, the monk concedes his defeat and goes back, contrite, 
to seek forgiveness from his abbot.   
Elsewhere we have seen that Aelred‘s early conversion experiences 
were conjured from a fertility that energized his spirit, body, and a 
vital, animate element distinguishable from these attributes, yet with 
this extended anecdote, the Vita revises to a certain extent our 
understanding of the effect of piety on the living being by 
acknowledging the possibility of genuine resistance to the deprivations 
of devout practices.  In contrast with the propagandistic tenor of the 
accounts of Rievaulx Abbey and its environs, the lengthy story of the 
unstable monk very likely strikes a chord with the Vita‘s clerical 
audience42.  These passages open up a complex identification for 
readers aware that the proper example and focus for their textual 
devotions is Aelred, yet empathetic toward the ill-disciplined brother.  
While Walter Daniel certainly does not endorse this connection, the 
space and detail he dedicates in the narrative to the wayward brother 
invites his audience, at the very least, to recognize the probably 
prevalent anxieties about the toll of ascetic practice, not to mention 
                                                 
41 Powicke, 1994, p. 113.  ―Tandem iratus acriter sibi ipsi cardines ianue utraque 
apprehendit manu et pedem unum producta tibia extendens in longum nullo modo 
illum uel ad medium limitis dirigere preualebat.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 31. 
42 Here I agree with Dutton who remarks that the unstable monk becomes a rounded 
character in the vita and also claims that the unstable monk in this dimensionality 
comes to represent all the monks in the abbey.  This dilation establishes the general 
nature of this episode, but also underscores its role as a plausible vehicle for Aelred‘s 
and Walter‘s philosophies.  (Dutton, 1994, p. 59.) 
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monastic enclosure.  Even the comic image of the monk straining to 
reach his leg out of the abbey‘s gates does double duty to endear the 
hapless deserter to his audience as much as it sets him up for 
derision.   
A worthy reader, however, would censure himself for such an 
impious affiliation, and perhaps even be moved to contrition for the 
cause of the identification, his own indulgence of constitutional frailty.  
Serving in theory as grounds not only for introspection, contrition, and 
reverence, the chief purposes of this encounter seem to be, on the one 
hand, to register a decided rift between exemplary and average, or 
slightly less than average, lives and on the other, to insist on the 
importance of establishing connections to other monks, other men, 
other living beings in the first place43.  Though Aelred‘s holiness ought 
to be the principal interest in the Vita as a whole – and this anecdote 
is, after all, the extension of his first certified miracle – empathy for the 
insubordinate cleric redistributes the audience‘s focus to the 
                                                 
43 According to John Sommerfeldt, what Aelred‘s own work adds to an understanding 
of the soul was a property the abbot called, ―affectus,‖ which implies emotion or 
attachment.  ―And thus Aelred‘s soul is gifted with a faculty that goes beyond the 
traditional triad of intellect, will, and memory.  To the rational, volitional, perceptive, 
and imaginative powers of these faculties Aelred adds the powers of emotion and 
feeling.‖  (John Sommerfeldt, ―The Roots of Aelred‘s Spirituality: Cosmology and 
Anthropology,‖ Cistercian Studies Quarterly, 38:1 (2003), p. 23.)  Elsewhere in the 
article, Sommerfeldt argues that, for Aelred, love serves as the connective tissue not 
only in the mind or soul, but also in the natural and animal world.  It seems as 
though Walter Daniel‘s representations of the living being in moments of extremity 
owes its subtle reliance on the value of community networks in part to his mentor‘s 
sermons and treatises.   
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relationship between these modes of living and perhaps also to 
consider what lies between these counterpoised lives44.   
The polarized structuring of this account, the problem of 
identification and the implicit critique of the enclosed life, carves up 
more than contrary styles of religious conduct.  Already Aelred has 
gained guardianship of the soul of the unruly monk, who is left to 
contend with his appetites and his psychological turbulence.  Their 
second exchange complicates the outlaw‘s relationship to his will, as 
the abbot and the monastery act in concert to prevent the monk‘s 
escape.  Though the monk remains intent on indulging the pressures 
of his sundry disinclinations, his failure to get past the monastery‘s 
walls, to execute his desires, signals the limits of his agency.  With the 
troublemaker‘s soul and agency now attached to Aelred, a rather 
stripped down version of the monk‘s being remains.   
                                                 
44 Although what develops between the unstable monk and Aelred can hardly be 
called a friendship at least in any simple sense, these returns to a discourse of lively 
affiliations bring to mind Aelred‘s own writings on monastic friendships.  In what is 
probably his most influential work, De Amicitia Spirituali, Aelred revises (to 
understate the case) for a medieval monastic audience Cicero‘s De amicitia.  Walter 
does not elaborate upon his master‘s theories  in the Vita, but I would argue that his 
foregrounding of the importance of relationships, both concrete and abstract, is 
indebited to Aelred‘s valorization of monastic affect.   
For readings of the influence of Aelred‘s De Amicitia Spirituali, see Jan Ziolkowski, 
―Twelfth-century Understandings and Adaptations of Ancient Friendship‖ in 
Mediaeval Antiquity, edited by Andries Welkenhuysen, Herman Braet, Werner 
Verbeke (Leuven, Belgium : Leuven University Press, 1995), Constant Mews, ―Cicero 
and the Boundaries of Friendship in the Twelfth Century,‖ Viator, 38:2 (2007), 369-
384, and Patricia Johnson, ―Phenomenology of Spiritual Friendship and Discourse 
about God,‖ New Black Friars, 88:1017 (2007), p. 549-563.  For an evaluation of the 
Augustinian influence on Aelred‘s tendency to forge friendships, see Brian Noell, 
―Aelred of Rievaulx‘s Appropriation of Augustine: A Window on Two Views of 
Friendship and the Monastic Life,‖ Cistercian Studies Quarterly, 37:2 (2002), p. 132-
34. 
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The concluding chapter of Aelred and the unstable monk‘s 
relationship comes at the juncture between life and death.  By now 
promoted to abbot, Aelred sends the changeable monk with a group of 
ostensibly more reliable brothers, including Walter‘s own father, 
Daniel, on an errand to a nearby abbey of Swineshead ―to illuminate it 
with the Cistercian way of life‖45.  During the night before the 
contingent is expected to return, Aelred experiences a vision in which 
a ―man of venerable appearance‖ foretells the unstable monk‘s 
imminent death.  Extending the displacement of the monk‘s life, the 
prophecy declares that the turbulent life will end in Aelred‘s very own 
hands.  When the party arrives as predicted at the day‘s first light, 
Aelred seeks out the fickle monk and welcomes him warmly, but in a 
remarkable moment of consistency, the wayward monk responds to 
Aelred‘s reception by asking further leave: ―What, shall I enter again 
on that death without end which the cloistered always endure?  No, by 
your leave, I go at once for a month to visit my kindred to enjoy with 
them for just a little while the good things of this present world, and so 
return to you again‖46.  Unmoved by this plea to enjoy a few good 
things, even knowing what the coming days hold for this man, Aelred 
denies the request, cryptically explaining to his charge: ―I live no 
                                                 
45 Powicke, 1994, p. 116. 
46 Powicke, 1994, p. 117.  ―‗Ut quid,‘ inquiens, ‗intrabo ad mortem illam 
interminatam quam simper paciuntur claustrales?  Immo uel saltem per unum 
mensem licencia tua uisito parents meos et cum eis uel tantillo tempore fruor bonis 
presentibus et sic iterum ad te redeo.‘‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 36. 
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longer without you, and you shall not die without me‖47.  Within a 
week, the vision‘s prediction is fulfilled: the unstable monk falls ill, 
bleeding continuously from the nose.  Once Aelred recognized the 
―pangs of death‖ in man, he begins the litany for the dying, but 
without touching the monk as prophesied.  After repeating the prayer 
twice, Aelred suddenly remembers the vision and, taking the man‘s 
head into his own hands, calls out, ―‘Saint Benedict, pray for him‘‖48, 
which releases the unstable monk from his life. 
While this anecdote both parallels and raises the stakes of the 
previous encounters with the erratic monk, it also departs from those 
narratives in several striking ways.  Unlike the preceding episodes, 
this one can be dated historically49 and Walter here even takes pains 
to inform that his own father had contact with the unstable monk, 
indicating that these events and the brother in question do not serve 
simply as theoretical or narrative devices.  Situating the unstable 
monk in time social and historical underscores the living, vibrant 
authenticity of the incidents associated with his presence at Rievaulx, 
but also sends out a web of connections with the fickle monk at the 
center50.  His life is thereby linked, and of course in this case also 
                                                 
47 Powicke, 1994, p. 117.  ―…sine te diucius non uiuo nec tu sine me morieris.‖ 
Powicke, 1950, p. 36. 
48 Powicke, 1994, p. 117. 
49 For Swinehead‘s relationship to its founding house, Rievaulx, see Dutton, 1994, 
p.162, n.74. 
50 For an evaluation of the Augustinian influence on Aelred‘s tendency to forge 
friendships, see Brian Noell, ―Aelred of Rievaulx‘s Appropriation of Augustine: A 
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unlinked, to Aelred as well as to Walter‘s own family, the other 
Rievaulx brethren, and even as far afield as the inhabitants of 
Swineshead.  And the vita‘s audience is reconnected with the unstable 
monk by the extension of his complaint, even if this passage is meant 
in jest as has been claimed51.  The monk‘s resistance, it seems, 
originates and defines these associations; although we expect such a 
disruption to be banished from the idyllic, peaceful Rievaulx earlier 
introduced, it nevertheless seems very important that the aggressive 
opinions as well as the living body of the unruly brother are contained 
in the monastic community.   
Luckily, Aelred is shown to have the power to soften any disorder 
the inclusion of such protest might arouse.  The spiritual prowess that 
twice detains the volatile postulate coupled with the foreknowledge of 
the man‘s fate offered by Aelred‘s vision implies a rather heady 
approach to monastic management.  And forcing the monk to live out 
his final days in the austerity that he found objectionable – ―death 
without end‖ – seems to invalidate entirely life outside the monastery, 
as if dying at Rievaulx were preferable to living uncloistered among 
family.  Yet Aelred‘s touch redirects the narrative toward the 
perceptible.  Now the abbot has gained more substantial power with 
                                                                                                                                            
Window on Two Views of Friendship and the Monastic Life,‖ Cistercian Studies 
Quarterly, 37:2 (2002), pp. 132-34. 
51 Dutton cites Powicke‘s claim that this repartee might in fact be a signal that the 
unstable monk has now recovered enough from his lapses to be counted on to make 
such a journey.  (Dutton, 1994, p.162, n.76.) 
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regard to life, since it is only his touch that liberates the dying monk.  
As the resistant monk seemed to become a hub of connections for 
Rievaulx Abbey, Aelred here transitions these associations into a 
vertical alignment calling upon the saints and Benedict, the emblem 
and designer of communal monasticism, in particular.  By holding the 
dying monk‘s head, Aelred brings about balance both spatially and 
spiritually, suggesting through this gesture that life and its extinction 
must be understood as complex forces, not independent entities that 
may be isolated in material or theory, but rather impulses that 
emerge, operate, and withdraw in the presence of and in connection 
with other living beings.   
*   *   *   *   *   *  *   * 
An insistence on a balance and dependence as crucial to 
understanding the organic, animating energies of life comes to bear 
upon Walter‘s treatment of illness in Vita Aelredi.  As is often noticed 
about Walter‘s biography, the narrative owes much of its content to 
detailed reports of Aelred‘s infirmities.  Of the 59 chapters that 
comprise the Vita, thirty discuss the last ten years of Aelred‘s life, a 
period during which the abbot‘s health begins to deteriorate; twenty of 
the thirty chapters cover Aelred‘s last four years; and thirteen of the 
twenty concentrate on Aelred‘s final year and death.52   But in addition 
to cataloguing his subject‘s health, Walter also reports on Aelred‘s 
                                                 
52 Dutton, 1994, p51. 
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encounters with unwell members of surrounding communities.  
Indeed, many of the abbot‘s miracles recounted by Walter involve the 
healing of uncommon afflictions and diseases.   
Walter‘s interest, which perhaps borders on fixation, in illness has 
been read as a mark of his medical learning as well as a manifestation 
of his incompetence as a biographer53.  Marsha Dutton argues that the 
bottom-heavy narrative structure of the Vita favors the time in Aelred‘s 
life that would have found Walter near at hand54.  Emerging as a 
subtle theme in the narrative, the balance between health and illness, 
and this balance‘s relationship to spiritual and intellectual practice, 
reasserts the interdependence of living beings, particularly in a 
monastic setting.   
The miracles that Walter attributes to the later part of Aelred‘s life, 
immediately preceding the last four years of the abbot‘s life which so 
preoccupy his biographer, revolve around bodily healing.  After curing 
two monks, one with stomach troubles that suggest an ulcer of some 
kind and the other with heart failure, and a shepherd with an 
unexplained bout of muteness, Aelred‘s therapeutic energy takes an 
                                                 
53 And perhaps his professional status as a physician, see above. 
54 Dutton, not unjustly, labels Walter‘s vita something other than biography in the 
modern sense.  She claims it is the incompleteness and the subjective approach of 
the text that distance it from the modern genre.  While this may be a reductive claim, 
focusing on what Walter omits from his account supposes that a thorough or even 
comprehensive biography could be achieved.  But Dutton hits on something when 
she identifies the cross purposes of a narrative about the historical persona as 
opposed to narrative about the ―spiritual reality,‖ or in this case an organic reality.  
(Dutton, 1994, p. 84)   
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unlikely turn: the saintly man curses a fellow abbot who, on a visit to 
Rievaulx, insulted Aelred.  Although Aelred does not explicitly wish the 
man dead, he does pray that the offending abbot ―speedily suffer an 
end to his malice‖55, a plea that appears to cause the man‘s death only 
a week later.   
These acts of healing showcase both Aelred‘s sanctity and his love 
for his brethren56.  That Walter later questions the efficacy of his 
abbot‘s curse, remarking in the Letter to Maurice, which follows the 
Vita and acts as a rebuttal to some of the Vita‘s earliest critics, that ―it 
is possible that the abbot about whom the story is told did not die for 
the reason for which it seems he died‖57, further underscores the 
importance of affect to both Aelred and Walter‘s agendas.   
Even more striking is the development of the relationship between a 
spiritual power and the living organism.  A short chapter prefaces 
those that recount Aelred‘s healing miracles, noting that what follows 
will demonstrate the abbot‘s shining virtue of spirit, rather than his 
administrative or scholarly acumen; yet the undeniable physicality of 
these accounts, coupled with Walter Daniel‘s affinity for medical detail, 
engross the reader, leaving him to meditate less about the sacred 
display and more on the ailments of the human body.  This interest in 
                                                 
55 Powicke, 1994, p.124. 
56 Discussing another incident in which Aelred meets a man who has become gravely 
ill after swallowing a frog, Dutton suggest that ―Aelred‘s ability to cure in this 
instance comes precisely because of his compassion, which Walter sharply though 
tacitly contrasts with his own horror at the sight‖ (Dutton, 1994, p. 61). 
57 Powicke, 1994, p. 149. 
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the exchange between spiritual power and bodily pathology extends, 
however, beyond the biographer‘s professional curiosity.  Unlike 
Aelred‘s early interventions, as in the case of the unstable monk, 
which made use of prayer alone to achieve his will, these encounters 
find Aelred cheek by jowl with the afflicted.  Each miracle, excepting 
the confrontation with the visiting abbot, concludes with Aelred 
touching the sick man to work his curative wonders: the monk with 
stomach pains and the speechless shepherd are touched on the mouth 
and for the young monk with heart failure, Aelred holds relics and the 
Gospel of John to the debilitated man‘s chest.  While none of these 
gestures is especially out of the ordinary in the canon of miracle 
healings, their repetition and the keen attention paid to each disorder 
allows the living body, at the moment of its probable extinction and its 
exhibition of great strength, to become at least as important as 
Aelred‘s sanctity. 
This trend repeats, and is epitomized, in the final and most 
memorable of Aelred‘s therapeutic miracles.  Distinct, in many ways as 
we shall see, from the previous miracles that involve monks or local 
Rievaulx valley inhabitants, this anecdote transpires by chance, as 
Aelred returns from Galloway on a diplomatic errand.  In his travels, 
the abbot crosses paths with a man who appears to be suffering 
terrible internal distress:  
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He was so distended that he seemed to be carrying a cask.  His 
natural form was disgracefully misshapen.  You could see the poor 
wretch wilting under the burden, now falling to the ground, now 
trying to rise and sinking back again, unable to stand or sit or lie.  
His face was drawn, his eyes bloodshot, his pupils dimmed.  The 
hairs of his head were like those of a goat rather than of a man, 
and his head itself was sunk into his monstrous body without any 
sign of a neck.  In his swollen condition the man appeared like a 
very fat ox or sheep, except that in its natural state this gives 
general pleasure, whereas he was a terrifying object to everybody.58  
 
Here Walter permits his fascination with illness free rein, but even so, 
this report differs notably from the others, which seek to diagnose and 
draw on Walter‘s familiarity with medical authorities to fill out his 
observations.  In this miracle story, Walter makes no attempt to 
diagnose the blighted body, since these symptoms invite marvel rather 
than analysis.  As the description unfolds, the reader, and presumably 
the witnesses to this event, loses track of exactly what it is he is meant 
to examine.  While the body in pain served as a centerpiece for each of 
the preceding healing miracles, the human figure disappears in this 
last scenario, transformed into objects and animals.  Not even its 
motion seems recognizable.   
                                                 
58 Powicke, 1994, p. 125.  ―…et tergo uidelicet et uentre horribiliter tumidum, qui 
tanquam dolium quoddam gesetabat uiscera interius tumencia humore superfluo, 
que cutis naturalis inuolucio non capiens modum extensione nimia omnis 
competentis forme turpieter execedebat.  Videris nunc misellum sub onere 
deficientem cadere, nunc surgere conari et iterum relabi post modicum in terram, 
nec stare posse sedere nec iacer; faciem informem et sanguineos oculorum orbes et 
pupillam obscuram non fulgere; totum capud instar hircine pellis pilos non capillos 
producere atque hoc sine collo monstruoso insidere corpori; pectus in tantum 
intumescere media et posteriora uentris ut pecus appareat pinguissiumum homo, 
nisi quod pecus in natura placeat miserum gnus moralium!‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 46-7. 
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 The horror of the scene is alleviated when the biographer 
intervenes to explain the cause of the man‘s condition: it seems he had 
by mistake swallowed a tadpole while drinking water ―which had 
grown in his belly and eaten away his entrails day by day, gathering 
there the wherewithal to live‖59.  Somehow Aelred senses this; and 
after he is petitioned for help by the afflicted man, the abbot places his 
fingers into the man‘s mouth and utters a brief prayer.  Instantly, ―the 
frog within climbed up on to the fingers which the father had inserted 
into the man‘s mouth.  When he withdrew his finger joints, the 
quadruped issues through the door of the mouth and falls to the 
ground.  Its departure is followed all that day by glutinous humors 
and pus horrible beyond measure…‖60.  Despite the various 
expulsions, the man reverts immediately to his former, healthy self 
and Aelred finishes his journey to Rievaulx.   
 More explicitly than in the earlier miracles, the swallowed frog 
account employs bodily fragility as a means to explore Aelred‘s saintly 
powers.  Instead of the average heart and stomach problems that 
appear in the other tales, Aelred‘s final healing scene removes both the 
holy man and the victim from the realm of the ordinary illness, which 
                                                 
59 Powicke, 1994, p. 126.  ―…que creuerat in uentre illius et uiscera corrodens 
diebus singulis indie carpebat quo uiueret.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 47. 
60 Powicke, 1994, p. 126.  ―…rana inclusa ad digitos ascendit patris quos iniecerat in 
os hominis.  Articulis igitur extractis quadrupes per oris ianuam egrediens cadit in 
terram.  Qua exeunte ab homine sequuntur tota die illa glutinosi humores et 
putredines horribiles supra modum.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 47-8. 
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concentrates the anecdote‘s focus on the strange, bloated body of the 
patient, a body that cannot be classified yet remains ostensibly alive.   
In fact, although the chapter that contains this episode is attached 
rhetorically and materially by the biographer to the miracles that come 
before, its formal differences from these are striking.  Not only does the 
anecdote conclude the section that concerns Aelred‘s medical miracles, 
but it also falls after an interjected chapter that describes a visit that 
the abbot makes to Galloway, which seems to isolate the frog 
phenomenon, and perhaps further to call attention to it, from its 
kindred accounts.   
The content of the tale, too, sets it apart: in particular, the vivid 
narration of the healing act, Aelred‘s reaching into the throat of the 
afflicted young man, and the extensive commentary that Walter adds 
to this miracle alone.  This commentary stems, it seems, first from the 
biographer‘s enchantment with the event as a medical oddity.  In the 
excessive portrayal – so much so that translators more than once have 
truncated Walter‘s narrative – of the ailing man‘s appearance, followed 
by the grisly details of the frog‘s expulsion, Walter‘s captivation by the 
spectacle is palpable.  Beyond this delight, however, lies a more 
orthodox agenda, which permits Walter to advance some ideas about 
the powers of sanctity over the living being. 
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Walter begins with rather pointed remarks on the wretchedness of 
the living being, especially this one that defies categorization.  
Explaining that the man‘s distress and distention are owed to the 
inadvertent swallowing of a tadpole, Walter deplores humanity‘s 
impotence even over our own bodies: ―Behold, O man, how a little 
worm, soon to die, cuts into your vitals and you have no power to 
pluck it out with your hand!  Consider what a poor wretch you are.  
Such are your sons, O Adam.  Here kings are powerless; even if they 
feel them there, they cannot eject frogs from their bellies‖61.  Here it 
becomes clear that this anecdote deviates dramatically from the typical 
account of miraculous healing, for Walter‘s interest tends toward 
weakness and mystery of the human animal.  Rather than imagining 
the belly-frog as a punishment for some secret sin, it is a sign for 
Walter of the permeability and complexity of the living being.  After all, 
the frog is consumed not during an illicit act, but when the man, 
minding his own business, simply intended to quench his thirst62.  
And indeed, Walter‘s point seems to be not that something has gone 
                                                 
61 Powicke, 1994, p. 126.  ―Ecce secat, o homo, interiora tua uermiculus moriturus 
et manu eum non uales extrahere.  Cogista miser quis sis.  Tales sunt filii tui, o 
Adam.  Nec re reges in hac parte potencie imperant, ut ranas eiciant a uentribus 
suis et si eas ibi senserint.‖ Powicke, 1950, p. 47. 
62 It is possible that the story is a veiled reference to the sin of gluttony and a 
warning that one ought to be ever vigilant, especially with regard to the senses, not 
to allow impurities to slip in.  As Dutton notes, there is an Irish analogue to this 
narrative that involves the consumption of a hunger demon, which validates to a 
certain extent such a reading.  (Dutton, 1994, p. 167, n. 114.)  Even so, Walter is 
(predictably) rather too preoccupied with the literal sense of the account to construe 
it as a preacherly conceit. 
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terribly awry in this situation, but rather that finding a foreign element 
in a body is only to be expected, even natural.  It may be lamentable 
that our entrails are so susceptible to invasion, but our inability to 
know enough about the contents and operations of our viscera define 
us as human, and furthermore, connect us to our biblical ancestors 
and more contemporary political icons.   
Although Walter‘s observations sketch out some abstract notions 
about human sovereignty, which he seems to suggest in practice does 
not often extend much beyond the idea itself, the literal nature of his 
analysis – the interest is fundamentally frogs in bellies for Walter – 
further informs his project.  When Aelred agrees to end the young 
man‘s anguish, in contrast with his earlier miracles, the abbot does 
not simply offer a prayer, issue a command, or lay his hands on the 
victim, instead he thrusts his fingers into the man‘s throat and out 
pops the offending frog.  The roughness of this gesture seems to have 
less to do with a saintly invocation than the gag reflex.  Likewise, the 
ailment does not miraculously disappear, as if it were a kind of 
spiritual manifestation or demonic possession; the parasitic frog and 
all its unsightly by-products are belched up, insisting that the detritus 
of physical symptoms be taken as seriously as the marvel of a holy 
intervention.  This is a messy miracle.  Yet it is the mess and the 
touch, Aelred‘s getting his hands dirty to rescue a creature that only 
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he properly recognizes as still human, that provide the engine for the 
miracle and, it would seem, that restore life and health to the suffering 
man.  While Walter does not delineate, nor even attempt to, a thorough 
philosophy of the living being in this episode, the frog in the belly affair 
does mark out and endeavor to connect a small selection of types of 
beings: the animal, the saint, and the unrecognizable or perhaps the 
non-being.  For this assembly, Aelred becomes a curative force, but he 
does not achieve this healing, according to Walter‘s report, by means 
of a distanced or radiating sanctity, but rather through intimate 
contact with another man.  As in other encounters discussed above, 
the living being is shown to be unstable and even uncategorizable, a 
complex of forces whose boundaries are difficult to distinguish, yet 
this miracle story adds very tangibly the dimension of community and 
affiliation, even at the level of the couple, to an understanding of the 
emergence and survival of the living being.  
 
*    
 
Again, in the closing chapters of the Vita Walter emphasizes the 
communal dimension of the living being, or at least how it can be 
comprehended and represented.  Immediately following the reports of 
Aelred‘s wondrous healings, Walter narrates his friend and mentor‘s 
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―second circumcision‖63, alternating between the abbot‘s bodily 
sufferings, both naturally occurring and ascetically inflamed, and his 
later sermons and teachings to reveal the effects of Aelred‘s 
increasingly intense self-deprivation.  As Walter points out, this 
―second circumcision‖ is not an effort to expunge excesses, or as he 
writes, ―not…the removal of superfluities which did not even exist‖64, 
but rather a further paring down of his physical appearance and his 
habits, throwing into relief the living organism at its barest and most 
vulnerable.   
The network of associations appears at Aelred‘s deathbed, where he 
is surrounded by fellow abbots and monks, his intimate friends and 
also engulfed in a textual complex of internalized citations.  In a 
discussion of Walter‘s depiction of the abbot‘s death scene, especially 
the last words that the biographer attributes to Aelred, ―In manus tuas 
commendo spiritum meum‖65, Thomas Heffernan argues that this 
utterance edges the biography into the zone of sacred biography 
because it causes the Vita‘s audience to acknowledge the typological 
significance both of the statement, which is a rearticulation of Luke 
23:46, repeating Jesus‘s dying plea, and of Aelred himself who earns 
sanctity by his imitation and quotation of Jesus thereby becoming a 
                                                 
63 Powicke, 1994, p. 127.   
64 Powicke, 1994, p. 127. 
65 Powicke, 1994, p. 138; Powicke, 1950, p. 61. 
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little less Aelred and a little more saint66.  This typological shift 
dispels, then, ―verisimilitude‖ of Walter‘s text in favor of a more 
universal figure of piety: ―The quotation leads the reader to an 
apprehension of the general, to what is shared, to what is common, 
and not to what is private, unique, sui generis‖67.  For Heffernan, this 
textual movement exploits the reading tendencies of the Vita‘s 
monastic audience, conditioned to look beyond and behind the simple 
details of the biography in order to access its historical precedents or 
cosmic significances.  These inclinations introduce a whole host of 
characters into Walter‘s Vita, adding traces of Luke, Jesus, Bede, 
Jerome, and countless other relevant commentators to Aelred‘s end68.   
While these departures quite possibly do crowd the scene for 
medieval, and some subsequent, readers, it is difficult to miss Walter‘s 
need to return the focus to Aelred‘s living body, even in its moment of 
extinction.  Restraining to an extent his keen interest in bodies in 
crisis, Walter recounts Aelred‘s death with affection: ―I sat with him on 
that day and held his head in my hands, the rest sitting apart with us.  
I said to him in a low voice, ―Lord, gaze on the cross; let your eye be 
                                                 
66 ―The quotation places Aelred in a tradition, and the crucial point of such 
placement is to direct the audience‘s attention to Aelred‘s relationship to that 
tradition and not, for example to underscore his unique historical attributes in his 
role as abbot of Rievaulx.‖ (Thomas Heffernan, Sacred Biography: saints and their 
biographers in the Middle Ages [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988], p. 78.)  
See p74-83 for Heffernan‘s larger argument, which also takes up the role of the 
reader in the formulation of sacred biography. 
67 Heffernan, p. 79. 
68 See Heffernan, p. 80-2 for more on the textual reverberations of the Lucan 
quotation. 
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where your heart is‖69.  The point of connection, the touch, between 
Walter and Aelred grounds the duo in the corporeal.  Their 
communication, which in turn elicits Aelred‘s last words, depends 
upon this intimate contact.  Moreover, it recalls the death of the 
unstable monk discussed above, who could only find release from life 
and illness when Aelred gathered the man‘s head into his hands70.  As 
Aelred in that moment bodies forth a convergence of spirit, life, and 
death, not as passing tangents but as overlapping and intermixing 
forces, so Walter repeats this meeting in his report of his role in the 
abbot‘s last hours.  If Heffernan is correct and Aelred‘s invocation of 
Luke removes the reader from the distraction of verisimilitude to the 
leapfrogging of typology and allusion, then surely we are returned to 
Aelred‘s chamber when Walter follows his teacher‘s triumphant 
quotation with the abbot‘s labored breathing: 
Indeed, in the very next night his breathing was slower than before.  
So he lay until close on the fourth watch.  Then, when we were 
aware that death was near, he was placed, as the monastic custom 
is, on a hair-cloth strewn with ashes, and, as the brethren with the 
four abbots who were gathered there with him, he surrendered his 
spotless spirit into the hands of his Father…71 
 
                                                 
69 Powicke, 1994, 138.  ―In illo die sedi ego et sustentaui capud eius maniubs meis, 
aliis longius consedentibus nobis.  Dixi autem demissa uoce, nemine nobis 
intendent, ‗Domine, respice ad crucem et ibi sit oculus tuus ubi est etiam cor.‘‖ 
Powicke, 1950, p. 61. 
70 Powicke, 1994, p. 117.  
71 Powicke, 1994, p. 117.  ―Statim enim nocte sequenti spiritum solito lencius 
trahens usque ad quartam pene uigiliam sic iacebat.  At tunc nobis eum iam iamque 
obiturum sencientibus, positus est super cilicium et cinerem more monachorum, 
filiorumque turba circa illum adunata cum abbatiubs quatuor qui affuerant, in 
manus Patris inpollutum spiritum emittens…‖ Powicke, 1950, pp. 61-2. 
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In the communal assembly as in the biographer‘s hands, the abbot‘s 
life is suspended in these connections.  Walter insists that we stay 
with Aelred and seems intent to keep Aelred in the narrative 
foreground even in this time of anguish in an effort to remind his 
readers that the meaning of those ultimate words and these final 
moments is multiple.   
 Explaining the various ancient and medieval glosses on spiritum 
from the Lucan verse, Heffernan theorizes that Walter attributes 
Jesus‘s last words to Aelred as a way to demonstrate ―human 
individuality in its complete fullness, to augment it, by placing the 
concept of the individual within the larger frame of a collective 
personality‖72.  Just as the citation of Luke evokes Psalm 30 and parts 
of Genesis, so spiritum serves to affix the essence of the individual with 
the notion of a divine creative force.  Typically glossed as the 
―animating life principle,‖ an entity that represents both something 
which distinguishes one person from another – a soul, personality, 
mind, consciousness etc. – and something which operates in the 
individual but is separate from him, spiritum also was believed by 
certain medieval commentators to refer to ―the very creative breath of 
life that gave birth to the universe,‖ otherwise known as the 
spiraculum vitae73.  What this leads Heffernan to conclude is that, in 
                                                 
72 Heffernan, p. 87. 
73 Heffernan, pp. 83-4. 
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light of Aelred‘s invocation of Jesus‘s dying cry, Walter seeks to show 
that the spiraculum vitae, a divine spark, resides in Aelred, indeed 
even enables him to perform the holy deeds and miracles, 
manufactures his sanctity74. While Walter does seem invested in 
addressing the range of levels of meaning associated with Aelred‘s 
death and his inscription of it, his narration of this particular event 
seems mostly preoccupied with the local manifestation of the abbot‘s 
spirit, despite the referential distraction of the last words.  Of a piece 
with Aelred‘s ―second circumcision,‖ Walter‘s report of Aelred‘s last 
living moments situate the spiritum close at hand, close enough to be 
perceived by the biographer and his fellow monks.  An experience of 
the animating principle, however fleetingly, surpasses sanctity and 
citation as the question of the Vita in this pivotal episode in Aelred‘s 
personal history.  So much so that even Aelred is given a voice in the 
matter. 
Walter‘s intent, it seems, is not to defer the question of the spirit 
or the individual, nor its life principle, but to attempt to gather it into 
his narrative, whether to examine or to detain and to care for it (after 
all, it is the disappearance of this living quotient that sets Walter off in 
                                                 
74 ―For if spiritum meum is related to spiraculum vitae/‗breath of life,‘ then the force 
which guided Aelred on his saintly pilgrimage is the Lord actually resident in his 
body.  Such a concept is not in the least foreign to the medieval mind, nor does its 
acknowledgment suggest a theology which was possessed of a pantheism of 
immanence…To put it baldly, the saints whose lives were chronicled exhibited 
behavior which [hagiographers] believed was contingent on the shifting interstices 
between the human and the divine presence.‖  (Heffernan, p. 86.) 
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the Lamentacio).  Isolating this energy is out of the question, instead 
Walter traces a zone where the spirit is shared and not divisible into 
individual portions, nor entirely retractable into a remote or 
universalized form.  For Walter, as well as Aelred, the life principle is 
bound up in a communal awareness, which implies that the living 
organism is not delimited by the body, but rather a force that reaches 
through and beyond it; although this organic vitality may not be 
produced by communal attachments, it is certainly in Walter‘s 
estimation most perceptible in affections and interconnections of the 
monastery.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“More Life”: Animal Encounters in the South English Legendary 
 
In Act Five of Perestroika, the second part of Tony Kushner‘s 
play, Angels in America, Prior Walter, the play‘s hero of sorts, visits a 
ruinous and very bureaucratic Heaven which looks ―mostly like San 
Francisco after the Great 1906 Quake.‖1  The angels of the Continental 
Principalities tempt Prior, whose struggle with AIDS has left him 
physically weak, with the gift of prophecy if he will encourage his 
fellow humans to stop moving forward, but Prior refuses and instead 
asks for their blessing.  ―Bless me anyway,‖ Prior demands, and 
continues, ―I want more life.  I can‘t help myself.  I do….Death usually 
has to take life away.  I don‘t know if that‘s just the animal.  I don‘t 
know if it‘s not braver to die.  But I recognize the habit….Bless me 
anyway. I want more life.‖   The life that Prior demands is not 
experience or adventure.  He doesn‘t ask for time, wisdom, knowledge, 
or love.  The life that Prior wants is the extension of his bodily 
existence, vital energy.  He also wants, of course, the acknowledgment 
that life matters, that lives like his count as lives worth living.  ―More 
life‖ suggests not only the desire for vitality, but the recognition of 
                                                 
1 Tony Kushner. Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes. New York: 
Theatre Communications Group, 2003: 79. 
 
 75 
different lives as lives and the ethical exigencies of this recognition.  
The phrase ―more life,‖ which Kushner claims to have discovered in 
Harold Bloom‘s The Book of J as a translation of the Hebrew word for 
―blessing,‖ returns to close the play when Prior uses it to speak his 
own blessing, a blessing of the audience, saying: ―You are fabulous 
creatures, each and every one. And I bless you: MoreLife.‖  In 
Kushner‘s play, ―more life‖ is both an appeal and a bequest. 
A saint whose afterlife is characterized by excesses, Francis of 
Assisi has trickled down into popular culture as a proto-ecologist.  
Simpler than that even, he has become a medieval tree-hugger, an 
ancient bird-whisperer.  In the modern imaginary, Francis is 
sentimentalized and monumentalized as a garden statuette, a resting 
spot for suburban creatures.  Maybe birds, mostly squirrels.  Of 
course, this is no small afterlife for Francis.  How many other saints‘ 
lives have been retained with any accuracy, for, after all, even 
Bonaventure records Francis‘s interactions with Perugian beasts?  
How many other saints can boast such protracted holds over the 
average, the botanic, and the poetic imagination?     
Even the extraordinary poet, Galway Kinnell channels this 
agrestic Francis in Saint Francis and the Sow2: 
The bud  
stands for all things,  
even for those things that don‘t flower,  
                                                 
2 Kinnell, Galway. A New Selected Poems. Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 2000: 94. 
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for everything flowers, from within, of self-blessing;    
though sometimes it is necessary  
to reteach a thing its loveliness,  
to put a hand on its brow  
of the flower  
and retell it in words and in touch  
it is lovely  
until it flowers again from within, of self-blessing;    
as Saint Francis  
put his hand on the creased forehead  
of the sow, and told her in words and in touch    
blessings of earth on the sow, and the sow    
began remembering all down her thick length,    
from the earthen snout all the way  
through the fodder and slops to the spiritual curl of the tail,    
from the hard spininess spiked out from the spine    
down through the great broken heart  
to the sheer blue milken dreaminess spurting and shuddering    
from the fourteen teats into the fourteen mouths sucking and 
blowing beneath them:  
the long, perfect loveliness of sow.  
 
This poem, which brings together the potencies of blessings and 
contact, of words and pressure, to manifest the vitality of things, uses 
Saint Francis as its centerpiece.  The pivot of the poem‘s structure, ―as 
Saint Francis‖ is the twelfth of the piece‘s 23 lines, Francis looms over 
the poem.  He is the sole non-animal figure; he performs the poem‘s 
self-realizing miracle – when he touches the head of the sow, she 
remembers her own ―loveliness.‖  Yet, Francis is also on a verse island, 
cordoned off, separated by time and mythology from the earthy 
interests of the poem that begin with ―[t]he bud‖ and promise that 
―even those things that don‘t flower,‖ like a sow, contain an animate 
beauty.  This is how we like to think of Francis, reminding us and 
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barnyard animals of the fullness of our given beings.  And this is how 
we like to think of animals, especially the ones with which we share a 
living space – docile, broken-hearted, just like we are, and awaiting a 
moment of recognition, just like we are. 
Indeed, medieval accounts of Saint Francis‘s famed sermon to 
the birds started this craze and offer a nice example of this type of 
instruction.3 Praising the birds‘ inherited attributes – you can fly!  you 
don‘t need clothes!  you can eat wherever you find food! – Francis 
underscores their natural condition and encourages them both to 
recognize their blessings and to thank God for them.  There isn‘t 
anything to correct in the animals; they are already fit to give thanks 
for their perfect state.  But if the birds have nothing to change about 
themselves, they may have nothing to learn from Francis.  So, we 
discover that the animal is not the true object of these lessons; instead 
it is the fable‘s human audience which begins to realize that a tree full 
of birds understands obedience or communal life or proper prayer 
better than a bunch of itinerant monks.  The birds set up an 
intermediary, a screen for the homily‘s intended non-animal audience.  
The human reader following along at home must understand Francis‘s 
address ironically, since the ―natural‖ state of the human is decidedly 
less free.  Probably not cloistered for the likes of Francis, but not quite 
                                                 
3 Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, The Major Legend of Saint Francis, in Francis of Assisi: 
Early Documents, vol. 2, ed. Regis Armstrong, Wayne Hellmann, and Williams Short 
(New York: New City Press, 2000), 525-683.    
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so whimsically permitted to flit about the countryside.  Perhaps the 
intimation is that through thanks, through an attitude of gratefulness, 
the believer may return to a more natural, unblemished – and free? – 
version of himself.  These birds, and to a certain extent Kinnell‘s sow, 
are humans in disguise.  What Francis aims to teach in both cases is 
less about what it means to be animal than what it means to define 
humanity, what is proper to humans and our desires.     
Often when animals meet saints – or holy anchors, monks, 
believers of all stripes – the exchange includes scenes of dominance, of 
taming, of overcoming the animal‘s evident or assumed intentions.  
Geese are banished from wheat fields; crocodiles are made to ferry 
passengers on their spiny backs; lions are quieted with snacks or 
orders; flies are dispersed.  These displays typically serve as testament 
to the saint‘s thaumaturgical powers – by a brief prayer pesky ravens 
are convinced to abandon a field of tasty barley.  The interaction goes 
in one of two ways: either the animal is made tame, taught to be more 
like a human by ignoring an appetite or following a routine that will 
sate the appetite without the possibility of injury or aggression, or the 
animal shows an immediate propensity for discipline, without even 
being asked, and the saint can begin to instruct the animal (so often a 
lion, bird, or wolf) in complex moral matters.  In these scenes, animals 
rarely challenge the saint for more than a moment or two, and the 
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interactions emphasize that furry mammals which act like we do are 
humans-in-training, just as we suspected.  Animals with demeanors 
or habits that bear an uncanny resemblance to humans or that are 
quickly dominated by saintly intervention tend to be read, particularly 
by scholarly audiences, as symbols.  Wolves are signs of bestial 
masculinity; birds are images of the holy ghost.  After surveying the 
past forty years of scholarship on medieval animals, Sarah Stanbury 
concludes that the ―textual history of animal respresentation is bound 
by the tyranny of metaphor, the anthropocentric figuration in which 
animals appear in texts chiefly to mark and even create human 
subjects‖4.   These animals are understood to present a sentimental 
foil for the human, insisting on the continuities between species – 
embodying the notion that given enough time and proper instruction, 
nonhuman animals would become more like human animals – and 
reinforcing a teleological understanding of animal-human relations5.      
   The high-profile animals in the South English Legendary6, 
however, subvert these traditions, and, it seems to me, attempt to 
                                                 
4 Stanbury, ―Posthumanist theory and the premodern animal sign,‖ postmedieval: a 
journal of medieval cultural studies 2 (2011): 102. 
5 In a recent and convincing article, Karl Steel explores both how medieval texts tend 
to enforce this subjection and how contemporary critical theories of the animal 
respond to this problem: Steel, "How to Make a Human," Exemplaria 20.1 (2008): 3-
27. 
6 I will devote the large part of this chapter to animals found in this assemblage of 
saints‘ lives.  Though I will concentrate my textual inquiries on lives found in the 
―standard‖ edition of the South English Legendary, ed. C. D‘Evelyn and A. J. Mill, 
vols. 1 and 2, EETS OS 235-6 (London, 1956), vol. 3, EETS OS 244 (London, 1959), I 
have also made use of C. Horstmann‘s, The Early South-English Legendary, EETS OS 
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carve into the human vita a non-human vita.  Animals proliferate in 
the collection and are used deliberately to tell a fuller story of the lives 
that exemplify and the lives that touch the holy.   While the SEL often 
does use animals to display the full force of human will when 
exercised in concert with great piety, certain noteworthy lives – those 
of Francis, Brendan the Navigator, and native royal saints – organize 
an unconventional presentation of the animal, a presentation that 
creates space for non-sanctified, non-human living beings in the 
confines of the Life.  When saints encounter animals in the South 
English Legendary, the narrative introduces alternative ways of 
understanding the living being by allowing the animal to be alien and 
by demonstrating the power of the animal to disrupt narratives of 
mastery as well as to complicate ontological and epistemological 
boundaries. 
 
Becoming Legendary 
Legendaries are collections in which more life is the expectation, 
and the South English Legendary is no exception.  It includes lives not 
just of the average, canonized saints or the kinds of folks who appear 
on stained glass windows, but also histories of objects – the legend of 
the Sancta Cruz, a more than 600-line narration that traces the 
                                                                                                                                            
87 (London, 1887), especially in my examination of the life of Saint Francis.  Unless 
otherwise noted, citations will refer to the former edition and will be cited 
parenthetically by line number.  Page references for the individual legends can be 
found in the table of contents in the first two volumes. 
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origins of the Holy Cross back to seeds Seth placed beneath the tongue 
of Adam just before the latter‘s burial – and apostles, spurious kings 
and unhistorical princesses on pilgrimage, voyaging abbots and actual 
kings.  There are many theories about the intended function and 
audience of this collection, but few definitive conclusions about the 
SEL‘s original uses.7  The lives are didactic in tone, which has led 
some readers to reject the compilation as rough-hewn and shallow8, 
written in the vernacular, and shaped into verse with rhyming 
couplets and a generally iambic meter.  Although the earliest gathering 
of these lives is estimated to have been produced in the last third of 
the 13th century, the oldest extant manuscript, edited by Carl 
Horstmann and known as the Early South English Legendary, MS 
                                                 
7 Klaus Jankofsky asserts that the objective of the South English Legendary is to 
inform a lay readership of topics related to theology and dogma by way of a collection 
of direct narratives For Jankofsky‘s summary of the origins and purposes of the SEL, 
see his chapter, ―National Characteristics in the Portrayal of English Saints in the 
South English Legendary,‖ anthologized in Images of Sainthood in Medieval Europe 
(ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Timea Szell.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), esp 82-85.  Oliver S. Pickering‘s excellent article, ―The South English 
Legendary: Teaching or Preaching?‖  (Poetica: An International Journal of Linguistic-
Literary Studies 45 [1996]: 1-14) delves more deeply into questions of audience and 
authorial intent, though generally agrees with Jankofsky‘s claims.  And Jill 
Frederick‘s ―The South English Legendary: Anglo-Saxon saints and national identity,‖ 
argues for the politically and historically conservative nature of the compilation.  
Perhaps most relevant to this project is Anne B. Thompson‘s monograph, Everyday 
Saints and the Art of Narrative in the South English Legendary (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2003), which examines the narrative and fictional acumen of the SEL-poet, 
looking in particular at the choices he makes about what is interesting, what is 
worthy of inclusion and at the dramatic, colloquial, and political tensions the poet 
weaves into the legends.  
8 Cynthia Ho points out that the SEL‘s life of St. Francis has been derided as a 
―meaningless pastiche‖ compared to its sources.  (―The Middle English St. Francis: 
Text and Context‖ in Mindful Spirit in Late Medieval Literature, [ed. Bonnie Wheeler.  
New York: Palgrave, 2006], 81.) 
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Laud 108 dates to about 13009.  Likely tied to the Worcester area, but 
certainly to the western part of England, the South English Legendary 
enjoyed notable popularity; by the end of the fifteenth century, it 
circulated in around sixty manuscripts.   
This plurality, of purpose, of subject, and of audience, renders 
the Legendary an ideal space for non-human animals to wander.  
Anne Thompson remarks that the SEL ―seems to have been regarded 
as a kind of open text which redactors felt free to emend stylistically 
and thematically, or to expand through the addition of items which 
they might compose themselves or find elsewhere.‖10 This openness 
does not simply result in a grouping of non-identical legendaries with 
charming incongruities, but rather coincides with the political and 
poetic inclinations of the lives‘ multiple authors, who, according to 
Thompson, participate in the thirteenth-century interest in the 
phenomenal world, describing what can be perceived rather than 
relying entirely on convention11.  Such an interest in the ―everyday‖ 
seems to invite the animal into the lives of saints much in the way that 
it would encourage reflections on local geography or climate patterns.  
From lions in the Egyptian desert to wolves in the East Anglian forest, 
animal footprints crisscross the compilation.  Yet, the SEL-poet 
                                                 
9 For a concise but compelling summary of the SEL‘s textual history, see the 
Appendix in Anne Thompson‘s Everyday Saints and the Art of Narrative in the South 
English Legendary (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 189-197. 
10 Thompson, 197. 
11 Thompson, 181-185. 
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deploys with what I take to be a clear degree of intentionality his 
inclusion of animal exploits in the lives, underselling some notorious 
beasts and leading others into narratives whose sources lack them.  
These choices suggest that the SEL-poet‘s investment in the everyday 
does not stop at mimesis or even scientific inquiry.  Instead, writing in 
the vernacular without apology or explanation, the poet seems 
committed at the levels of language and narration to finding subtle 
ways to invert power dynamics, and the careful positioning of animals, 
especially in lives with social and political consequence, extends 
however obliquely a sense of mistrust in existing constructs of 
authority.12  In this way, the non-human animals attended to by the 
SEL-poet slip their usual yokes and do some of this insubordinate 
work, work meant in fact to point up the injustice of these yokes.  
They are not simply convenient screens for projecting human 
problems, but are given by the SEL-poet roles that matter in the lives 
of saints. 
 
Sows & Legendary Bodies 
For all Francis‘s modern legacy as an animal enthusiast, the 
medieval versions of his activities underscore his capacity to discipline 
and manipulate whatever birds or wolves cross his path, and the SEL 
                                                 
12 Thompson connects this subversive intent to the poet‘s implied support for the 
Montfortian rebellion against Henry III (46-57) and later to a more general interest in 
the undoing of ―the unjust rule of the ‗heymen‘‖ and in ―religion‘s role in bringing 
about a just society‖ (180-181). 
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generally follows this tendency toward mastery and appropriation.13 
Unlike most of the lives in the Legendary which seem to rely on 
Jacobus de Voragine‘s Legenda Aurea as their primary source14, the 
life marked only by the Englished version of the saint‘s name - 
―Franceys‖ – translates and reorganizes Bonaventure‘s foundational 
vita.  Listed among native saints, bookended by Oswald and Edward 
on one side and Alban and Wulfstan on the other, Francis‘s Middle 
English life takes on an even more anomalous tinge as if the saint 
himself were being made English through his first appearance in the 
language15.  According to Cynthia Ho, this repatriation might suggest 
                                                 
13 As the E. Gordon Whatley‘s introduction to an excerpted version of the SEL  
Francis explains, Bonaventure interprets Francis‘s ability to communicate directly 
with animals as representative of the prelapsarian spiritual perfection achieved by 
the saint. (The Life of Saint Francis in the South English Legendary (c. 1270-80): 
Introduction.  Ed.  E. Gordon Whatley with Anne B. Thompson and Robert K. 
Upchurch.  TEAMS Middle English Texts.  University of Rochester and Medieval 
Institute Publications, n.d.  Web.  23 December 2010. < 
http://www.lib.rochester.edu/camelot/teams/whfraintro.htm>) 
14 Although there is little question that Voragine‘s Legenda Aurea heavily influences 
the SEL, the tales and the shape of the collection do not seem to aim at reproducing 
or translating in a strict sense the source materials.  The departures and novelties in 
the SEL have led some scholars to posit the use of additional sources, like breviaries, 
sermon cycles, or other vernacular texts intended to further lay instruction.  While 
there is no reason to think that these types of popular instruction did not contribute 
to the SEL-poet‘s project, Anne Thompson makes a convincing point about the way 
that Voragine‘s narrative scope affects the quality of the SEL tales and their focus on 
the life, the living of the saint rather than his cultic or liturgical afterlives: ―The 
weakening of the link between individual saint and local cult…is still more evident in 
the Legenda Aurea, whose saints hail from such widely separated horizons as Ireland 
and Egypt and which has no ties with a specific place.  The consequences of this 
detachment were, I think, of considerable significance for the SEL, insofar as it 
offered a precedent for the foregrounding of hagiographical discourse without regard 
to its referent.  SEL legends take their shape from the saints whose lives they 
narrate: a saint is born, has a life, and dies, and this underlying biographical curves 
subtends a formal aesthetic that shapes narrative according to a similar orderly 
curve.‖  (Thompson, 122) 
15 As Cynthia Ho points out, this life is included in the earliest extant manuscript, 
MS Laud 108, and is contained in twelve other manuscripts.  (Ho 83)  For this 
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Franciscan authorship, or at least a poet attentive to the growing 
public relations crisis of Franciscans in fourteenth-century Britain.  
Francis in this version of his life becomes a mascot, a sign of the unity 
and orthodoxy of the order, and even a monolith, for the SEL has 
Francis integrate into every element of the life‘s narrative the order he 
would eventually found as a way to insist, however proleptically, on 
the inevitability of the Franciscan movement.16  This reading of the life 
has the SEL-poet amplifying Bonaventure‘s attempts in the Legenda 
Maior Sancti Francisci at justifying the order, but further, it dilates and 
foregrounds ideas of discipline and mastery.  Not only are animals 
made to bend to the will of the saint, made a theater for the expression 
of the species hierarchy, but Francis himself is rendered an 
ecclesiastic tool, erasing any trace of original radicality or reform. 
Indeed, the SEL-poet changes little of the source materials he 
selects for his translation.  The tales that precede the notorious 
sermon to the little birds are illuminating in their contradictory 
representations of the saint‘s power and character.  The account that 
comes immediately before the sermon describes Francis‘s struggle to 
quiet a flock of unruly birds – the SEL-poet seems especially interested 
in Francis‘s relationship with birds -- that have interrupted the 
                                                                                                                                            
reason, I will refer to the Francis legend printed in Horstmann edition of the Early 
South English Legendary for this discussion.  References to this edition will be 
marked ESEL. 
16 Ho sees this colonization of the figure of Francis even in the SEL‘s narration of his 
birth which places Francis already numbered among the Friars Minor (84).   
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prayers of the saint and his brother.  Though most birds that Francis 
met in his wanderings, ―wilde foules, smale and grete,‖ recognized his 
saintly merits and ―honoureden him i-novȝ‖ (ESEL, l. 329), this lot just 
squawks away: ―Þo maden þis foules so gret noise : þat huy ne 
miȝhten noþing i-here.‖ (ESEL, l. 338).  The racket so disturbs Francis 
that he chastises the congregation, demanding that they ―chaungiez 
eouwer manere‖ (ESEL, l. 339) so that he may fit in his prayers.  
Predictably enough, the birds fall silent, setting up these episodes as 
markers of Francis‘s command of nature.  Not only does he encourage 
birds to sing in praise of their creator, but he also can manage the 
excitability of animals, keeping the myriad outdoor sounds from 
intruding too much into his devotions.  This exchange with the birds 
enlarges Francis‘s authority, and maybe even implies something about 
his managerial skills.  It is one thing to control a cloister, another 
entirely to quell the obstreperousness of wild animals or mendicant 
friars.  
To a certain extent, this example is just what we expect: animals 
in saints‘ lives may challenge or annoy the saint, but they are easily 
understood and instructed by the holy figure.  Bird voices are 
compressed into human voices.  These animals indicate the direction 
of spiritual progress – this is the type of being into which humans 
might devolve without proper behavior.  The love for animals 
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associated with Francis has more to do in these episodes with a 
distancing from the animal than a recognizing of it – a recognition 
acknowledged apologetically only through denial.  There is no agency 
permitted the chattering birds, only chaos, emptiness (þat huy ne 
miȝhten noþing i-here), static.  And the SEL‘s version of the sermon to 
the birds, slightly shorter than Bonaventure‘s account, seems to 
repeat this pattern and to return to the same concerns.  Yet, the SEL 
has Francis inform the passing birds of their good fortune, noting that 
God provided them with ―much pruyte and ayse‖ (ESEL, l. 358) since 
they ―Delue ne diki ne þorue ȝe naþur : ase manie Men moten do‖ 
[Neither delve nor dig as a result of the serpent as many men must do]  
(ESEL, l. 360).  This reference to digging and delving seems especially 
English, but it also reveals something about the SEL-poet‘s interest in 
the place of animals in hagiographic narrative.  Here the poet goes out 
of his way to avoid the anthropomorphizing implications of the original 
lecture.  These birds are distinguished from their toiling human 
counterparts, and the birds enjoy a ―pruyte,‖ a privacy that seems 
poised to acknowledge the bird as other.  Not as reformable other, but 
rather possessed of a private space that ought to be protected from 
and perhaps even imitated by human animals.  If Francis‘s followers 
are meant to see themselves in this homily, the intimation is that the 
monk ought to become more like the animal, not the reverse.   
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Once the creatures find an entry into Francis‘s life, the SEL-poet 
cannot help but let them take it over.  It is as if Francis‘s earlier life, at 
least the poetic representation of it, finds its truest expression in the 
animal encounters.  Although the animal narratives in Francis‘s life do 
tend on the surface to repeat a dominion motif, their clustering, their 
strange violences, and their contiguity with the stigmata experience 
belie a simple replication of Bonaventure‘s Legenda or an 
intensification of it. One such violence sets up both Francis‘s love of 
animals, lambs in particular, and further overturns the mastery theme 
of the saint‘s encounters with birds: 
In þe Abbeye of seint verecunde : a ȝoung lomb he founde, 
A souwe a-strangli it a-non : and fret it in a stounde. 
Seint Fraunceis stod and bi-heold : "A-mong alle bestes," he  
seide, 
"A-corsed þou beo, luþere souwe : þat dudest þis luþere dede… 
(ESEL, ll. 302-305) 
 
[In the Abbey of Saint Verecundus he found a young lamb/A sow was 
strangling it anon and devouring it at this time./Saint Francis stood 
and beheld, saying, ―Among all beasts/may you be cursed, hateful 
sow, that would do this horrible deed…] 
 
This tale as a whole sets up Francis‘s love of lambs in particular, 
which proves less about his power than about the extension of his 
faith, since Christian iconography informs even his everyday likes and 
dislikes.  Although Francis is indeed able to save the lamb and curse 
the sow, preserving the model of mastery advanced in the bird tales, 
this encounter is different from the others.  These encounters with 
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animals participate in a world that does not belong to or right away 
obey Francis and his wishes.  Bewildering violence takes place in this 
animal world, and this exceptional violence intrudes even on the 
Abbey of Verecundus.  There is something unnatural and willful in 
both this intrusion and the sow‘s action.  The sow might bite or 
trample the poor, little lamb, but how could a pig strangle (a-strangli) 
anything?  The curse that Francis puts on the pig also sets this 
example apart from the others.  Instead of instructing the sow in 
proper farmyard behavior or the righteous restraint, Francis wishes 
disease and destruction on the creature: 
―Þat þi lijf beo schort and strong : and þi dethþ beo strong al-so, 
And þat no þing ne ete of þi flesch : ȝwane þou ert of liue i-do!" 
Þo bi-gan þe souwe a-non : ase he þis word seide, 
To beo ful of schabbe and of buyles : and of oþur wrechhede 
(ESEL, ll.306-309) 
 
[May your life be short and grievous, and your death also terrible/And 
may no thing eat of your flesh when you are undone of life!/As he said 
these words then the sow right away began/To be full of scabs and 
boils and of other wretchedness] 
 
The emphasis here shifts to the beste’s life and death, which will 
essentially be the same thing.  (And indeed, the sow dies three days 
later.)  Francis‘s oath reaffirms his power, but in this episode there is 
nothing instructive or productive that comes of the saint‘s ability to 
speak his desires into being.  More than anything Francis becomes 
enmeshed in the aggression and decay of the original scene; he even 
repeats its logic by sacrificing the sow in place of the saved lamb, 
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which suggests that there are some practices in the natural world that 
even Francis cannot overrule. 
But a painful, scabby death is not the only blight Francis calls 
down on the sow, he also mandates that the sow should die for 
nothing as ―þat no þing ne ete of þi flesch.‖  Not even scavenger birds 
will touch the sow‘s carcass after death: ―And fur-rotede and stonk 
foule i-novȝ. : no best þat it i-seiȝ,/ Rauon ne pie no oþur foul : nolde 
enes come þare-neiȝ‖ [And (it) thoroughly rotted and stunk foully 
enough that no beast that saw it/Neither raven nor magpie nor other 
bird would come close at all] (ESEL, ll. 312-3).  Removing the sow from 
the agricultural economy clearly insists upon the irredeemable, luþere 
nature of this particular beast.  It also attaches this episode with 
questions other than the influence of human will, bringing up 
problems of food, consumption, and husbandry.  Suggesting that it is 
a shameful thing for the sow to be denied the opportunity to serve as 
food implies that sow, and other farm-raised animals, are complicit in 
their slaughter, that they may even find honor and purpose in such a 
demise, which in some way posits that animal lives participate in 
human lives in a kind of communal agreement.  Francis‘s injunction 
also insinuates that some animals are too immoral to be eaten, that 
whoever might consume a sow like this one could be contaminated 
with its criminality.  This is certainly not a new idea but one that 
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grows out of and perhaps also encourages a more constant awareness 
of the animal world.   
  The food issue foregrounds the human propensity to view 
animals as food uncritically or at least paradoxically.  Derrida suggests 
in his lectures, ―The Animal that Therefore I Am‖ (L’animal que donc je 
suis [à suivre]) that the eating, the ritual slaughter and consumption, 
of animals serves as a cultural bedrock and turning point, 
distinguishing the human from the animal, setting the human outside 
of natural practices and also above these habits.   Despite the Edenic 
directive to eat only things that grow in the earth, Derrida reminds us 
that after the Fall: 
Abel will have himself preferred by God by offering up to him the 
sacrifices of a husbandman, whereas poor Cain remains a 
sedentary cultivator.  Finally, Cain had been more faithful to 
God‘s arch-primary commandment, and the whole history, that 
is to say, the fault and criminality that install historicity, is 
linked to God‘s preferences for Abel‘s animal offering…17 
 
But this choice of flesh over grain is indisputably problematic in its 
arbitrariness, its silences, and its contradictions. As David Wood 
points out in his brief discussion of this ―culture...of fault and 
sacrifice‖ identified by Derrida, ―We may surmise that the (external) 
animal we eat stands in for the (internal) animal we must overcome.  
                                                 
17 Derrida, Jacques. The Animal That Therefore I Am.  New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008. 111.  
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And by eating, of course, we internalize it!‖18  This bind, the uncanny 
animal that we attempt to master but instead become more and more 
attached to, is staged in the SEL‘s life of Francis, in a moment when 
Francis‘s identity as a nature-lover is in jeopardy.   More importantly, 
Francis‘s curse reminds that in one way or another, in the 
neighborhood or at the table, animals are an undeniable part of the 
human body.  How can we say we are not animal when their bodies 
become ours?  When we prey on animals the way they prey on each 
other?  As in the account of Francis and the sow, the place of food, 
and correspondingly the power of hunger, of appetite, repeatedly 
emerges in tales of holy animals.  Animals that eat other animals, 
animals that eat too much (but then learn quickly to give up this trait), 
domestic animals that mistakenly become food for another human, 
typically an uninitiated passer-by, crowd these narratives.19   Each of 
                                                 
18 Wood, David. ―Thinking with Cats.‖  Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in 
Continental Thought.  Ed. Matthew Calarco and peter Atterton.  London: Continuum, 
2004. 139. 
19 The stories, like those of Bartholomew of Farne whose pet bird is gulped down by a 
hawk, Godric of Finchale who corrects a tree-destroying deer, or Saint Moling, a 
seventh-century Irish prince and bishop, question uncritical swallowing and 
highlight the animal within metaphorically and literally.  In the latter episode, a 
priest is visited by a bird with a fly in its beak.  While the bird was enjoying its meal, 
a cat attacks and kills the bird.  Moved to pity, Moling orders the cat to spit out the 
bird, but discovers the wren did not survive the assault.  It is expelled from the cat 
―half-eaten‖ (semicommestam).  Moling revives the bird in a particularly graphic and 
spectacular way:  ―The holy priest made the sign of the cross over the bird‘s corpse 
and it rose up alive and well, still stained with its own blood.  The saint then 
commanded it to disgorge before him the fly which it had swallowed, and the little 
bird immediately disgorged the fly from its stomach like a tiny piece of dung.  The 
holy man blessed this monstrous little lump, and thereupon the fly got up, healthy 
as ever, and flew around buzzing.  The bird flew back to her own kind, chirping 
happily.‖  (David Bell, Wholly Animals: A Book of Beastly Tales. Kalamazoo: 
Cistercian Publications, 1992: 96).   Although the fly, wren, and cat do not do 
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these narrative excesses identifies the process of consumption as 
violent and polluted.  This focus on hunger is also interesting because 
it implies a shared desire, a point of connection between non-human 
animals and human animals.  We all get hungry after all.  And 
sometimes we act in unexpected ways under the influence of such a 
powerful desire.   
It is likewise significant that Francis‘s reception of the stigmata 
is tucked into these accounts.  Wedged between the sermon to the 
birds and the story of a ―swyþe strong qualm of orue,‖ a livestock 
plague, (ESEL, ll. 418ff) which was cured by springwater used by 
Francis to wash his stigmatized hands, this sequencing seems to 
intend to preserve the chronology of the life, but it also aligns this 
―schewingue and Ansaumple‖ (ESEL, l. 401) of Francis‘s body with the 
strangeness of animals that suddenly understand and obey the saint‘s 
preaching.  Receiving the stigmata obviously places Francis in a 
special category of saints, an ―exceptional being‖ as Cynthia Ho 
claims20, who has more in common with the seraph who heralds the 
arrival of the stigmatic marks than with other human beings.   As 
                                                                                                                                            
anything out of the ordinary in this account, the narration is punctuated with 
excesses: the still-stained bird, the fly as bit of reeking dung (quasi fimi particulam), 
the recurring, almost rhythmic, vomiting.  Moling does not participate in the chain of 
ingestion which perhaps sets human food choices apart from the instinctual eating 
of animals.  Or, Moling‘s compassion mixed with horror may gesture at the 
possibility of attentiveness to both the animal world and the ways in which humans 
partake of it.  (For the full Latin life of Moling, see Charles Plummer‘s Vitae 
Sanctorum Hiberniae: Partim Hactenus Ineditae. Oxonii: E typographeo 
Clarendoniano, 1910. )   
20 Ho 87. 
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Francis is opened up to an alternative kind of relationship with 
animals so his body is opened by the stigmata to new concerns, which 
the SEL life draws attention to lingeringly describing the swelling of his 
hands and the persistent bleeding of his wounds: ―And þe woundene 
ornen ofte a-blode : and nameliche of is side,/ And bi-bledde is cuyrtel 
ofte : and is briech al-so;/ he carede muche hou he miȝhte : stilleliche 
it a-wei do‖ [And the wounds ran often with blood and particularly the 
wound on his side/And it often bled through his habit and his britches 
also/He worried quite a bit how he might silently do away with (the 
bleeding)] (ESEL, ll. 415-417).   In fact, the SEL relates Francis‘s 
reception of the stigmata warily, intimating that the saint‘s wounds 
emerge from within as a product of intense prayer and meditation.  
Although this altered view of the miracle subtracts divine contact, it 
does not, in my estimation, ―de-radicalize‖ the scenario.  Attaching the 
stigmata to the physical world, to bodily somatics and to the real life 
effects – bloodstains and embarrassment – seems radical enough.  
Moreover, the context of this episode coupled with the interest in its 
mundane causes and consequences adjoins the animal world, 
conceptually and poetically, to the world of revelation and miracle.     
The SEL-poet‘s willingness to look into the opened up body of 
Francis, to expose the saint‘s life to the influence of animal lives, to the 
fullness of animal beings that are not deployed as props or projections 
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might emerge from and certainly informs the idea of a legendary 
collective.  Thompson explains that, although hagiographic materials 
are often judged harshly for their debts to convention which amounts 
to repetition of similar plots and of miraculous acts in the lives of 
individual saints, these overlaps have long been defended by 
hagiographers as representative of a larger point about sanctity:  ―So 
let no one be disturbed even if these miracles were performed by any 
other of the holy saints, since the holy Apostle, through the mystery of 
the limbs of a single body, which he compares to the living experience 
of the saints, concludes that we are all ‗members one of another.‘‖ 21 
This justification, made by an anonymous English author of the life of 
Gregory the Great, does more than excuse poetic borrowings or 
lethargy; it imagines a saintly pastiche and a living being that does not 
recognize the limits of the body.  To insist that the ―mystery of the 
limbs of a single body,‖ that is the coincidence of the Church and 
Christ, compares to the lived, vital experience of saints posits an 
animate body that exceeds dogma and metaphor.  With this in mind, 
the legendary itself becomes an avatar of this saintly patchwork, 
suggesting that jumble of saints and objects in the South English 
Legendary enjoy a corporate status.  This texty body points out to the 
collective and communal impulses ever present in the SEL and out to 
the assemblages that constitute the saints‘ powers and presences.  No 
                                                 
21 Qtd. in Thompson 13. 
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life is an island in the SEL.  This interdependence and the SEL‘s 
inclusion of animals into many of its lives suggest that non-saint 
animals are a part of this body, and perhaps a part of the saint‘s own 
body.  As we see in the Francis life, animals not only have a space in 
the narrative, but Francis, as an exceptional being, may even be 
counted among them.  However invested in the foundations of 
Franciscan practices the Middle English life of Francis may be, the 
SEL-poet cannot give the saint fully to the ranks of masters, the 
oppressors.  By affiliating Francis in body with something not quite 
human and by focusing on the saint‘s thwarted attempts at full 
dominion over the animals he encounters, the SEL-poet extends these 
animal stories beyond exemplifying discipline to tell us something less 
about mastery and more about discovery, to posit a new way to look at 
the relationship between human and non-human, and even at the 
non-human in the human. 
 
Doves, Cows, & Bodies of Authority 
  In the Vita sancti Kenelmi. Regis, the SEL-poet goes further by 
casting the animal not simply as strange or wondrous but an active 
participant in community living and even in the foundations of these 
communities.  The narrative and figure of Kenelm in his Middle 
English life (with a Latin title) reverse the logic of the record of 
Francis‘s deeds.  Instead of the saint‘s displaying foundational and 
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masterful authority, Kenelm‘s presence becomes energetic in its 
submission, and instead of the saint‘s serving to redirect or amend 
animal behavior, the animals and animal references of the Kenelm 
legend provide the corrective at local, national, and spiritual levels.  
Like the other narratives in which animals figure prominently, 
Kenelm‘s legend strays almost immediately from strict hagiographic 
convention.  The SEL-poet seems positively unconstrained by form in 
this vita, even shifting occasionally into the first person.  The saint 
himself, a seven-year-old Mercian king, continually drifts off stage, 
rendering the story almost always about someone or something else.  
In the Latin Vita22 upon which the life found in the SEL is presumed to 
be based, Kenelm enjoys the spotlight throughout the narrative, while 
in the vernacular version, the saint is announced in the opening lines 
as the legend‘s subject only to be replaced immediately by a protracted 
catalogue, spanning roughly 75 lines, of geographical, topographical, 
political, and ecclesiastical information23.  Near the mid-point of the 
                                                 
22 Vita et Miracula sancti Kenelmi, ed. R. Love, Three Eleventh-Century Anglo-Latin 
Saints’ Lives (Oxford, 1996): 74-5.19.  All subsequent citations of the Latin Life of 
Kenelm will refer to this edition and will be cited by page and paragraph number. 
23As Paul Hayward points out in an article that primarily examines the Latin lives of 
English children saints,―The Idea of Innocent Martyrdom in the late Tenth- and 
Eleventh-Century English Hagiology‖ [Studies in Church History 30, (1993): 83], 
narratives that center on young, holy victims of the villainy of others typically 
circulated orally before being formally committed to writing.  In the case of Kenelm, 
this kind of genesis appears most likely since there is little historical evidence to 
support a son by his name of King Coenwulf.  Rosalind Love concludes that based on 
the absence of any mention of a young Kenelm in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle ―the 
events described by the Life of St Kenelm must be regarded as very largely fictitious.‖  
[―St Kenelm of Winchcombe and Vita et Miracula sancti Kenelmi,‖ Three Eleventh-
Century Anglo-Latin Saints’ Lives [Oxford, 1996]: xci-xcii.] The numerous folkloric 
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legend, Kenelm has been entirely forgotten after his own sister has 
ordered his murder.  The queen/murderess enforces a strict silence 
with regard to Kenelm, not allowing any Mercian residents to mention 
the disappeared king or even to remember him, to give him a second 
thought.  After a certain amount of time, a white cow belonging to a 
local widow begins to frequent Kenelm‘s secret burial location.  
Forsaking meals with the rest of the livestock, this cow would hurry to 
spend its day sitting upon Kenelm‘s unmarked grave.  Notwithstanding 
lack of sustenance, this cow returned home each evening ―fair and 
rond‖ and ―swyþe Mielch al-so‖ [heavy with milk] (227-228).  This 
wonder, however, remains only partially realized in the narrative, since 
the local residents acknowledge the cow‘s excessive milk production as 
an inexplicable event – ―heo ne miȝten i-wite noþing;/bote in heore 
heorte huy onder-stoden : þat it was sum tokning‖ (235-6) – but 
cannot determine what the token signifies.  Dramatic irony abounds 
here, for the narrative‘s reader who has been privy to saint‘s 
martyrdom appreciates Kenelm‘s fertile presence and, perhaps more 
importantly, begins to associate the saint with the animal.  Further, 
this scene stages the limitations of both human law and conditions of 
knowledge.  The wily cow initiates the textual, and social, movement 
by which the queen‘s censorship of the public discourse will be 
                                                                                                                                            
motifs that appear in the Kenelm legend lead Cubitt to the same conclusion (―Sites 
and sanctity: revisiting the cult of murdered and martyred Anglo-Saxon royal saints,‖ 
74). 
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subverted.  In this legend, the cow does more than point out the 
intrusion of the miraculous or the divine in phenomenal life and more 
than suggest that animal bodies suffer in ways similar to human 
animal bodies; it draws attention to, even corrects, the blindness of the 
people of Mercia.  As the legendarist illustrates, the Mercian citizens 
tacitly endorse Quendrid‘s tyranny by permitting their memories to be 
controlled by her decrees: 
Þane no man nolde, þat witti was : of him þenchen ene, 
Ore louerd nolde nouȝt þat he were : allingues for-ȝite so clene; 
Ȝwane no man, þat witti was : of him ne hadde muynde, 
A doumb best, þat is with-oute witte : hadde, a-ȝein kuynde. 
(213-216) 
 
[When no man who was smart think of him at all/Our Lord did not 
will that he would be so wholly and cleanly forgotten;/When no man 
who was prudent had him in mind,/A dumb beast that is without 
reason had him in mind against his beastly nature.] 
 
Repeating the failures of the ―witty‖ or sagacious men underlines the 
complicity of the populace in Kenelm‘s obscurity, yet this repetition 
also manifests the universal terrain of this royal saint since ―witti‖ 
typically connotes not a learned intelligence, but rather a practical or 
natural wisdom24.  It is not the erudite or the nobility who inherit the 
cult of the saint, but any human endowed with natural intelligence.  
Indeed, the unrestrained force of human law handed down from 
Kenelm‘s own ranks deserves the blame for the perversion of the 
natural human faculties, a corruption that seems to necessitate a 
                                                 
24 The first four entries in the MED for ―witti‖ define the word in this way. 
 100 
complex reassertion of the vitality of creation by way of the ―doumb 
best.‖   
 This beast is embedded in economies less epistemological, too.  
Unlike the birds, wolves, and giant fishes of other tales, the white cow 
that discovers Kenelm‘s burial place is directly connected as a 
domestic animal to human practices and needs.  The cow‘s role in the 
establishment of Kenelm‘s cult and veneration underscores the 
working relationship that human animals have forged with nonhuman 
animals, but also marks it as revisable, suggesting in this case a 
connection that goes well beyond need.  Although the cow might be 
seen as willfully breaching its contract by leaving the herd and 
refusing to eat, it does not manage to remove itself entirely from its 
alimentary obligations given its constant milk supply.  The animal‘s 
surprising method of survival (and production), as well as its way of 
being, reiterates concerns about agency, both beastly and saintly.  Not 
only is the cow moved to behave in ways not entirely inspired by its 
own desires, which is not so terribly different, one imagines, from the 
typical experience of livestock, but the doumb best‘s silence, its 
inability to voice the reasons for its habits, produce the episode‘s 
mystery and frustration, limiting in turn the knowledge and actions of 
the residents of Clent.  In the legend, both the cow and the boy saint 
mark out a boundary, a limit to human understanding while also 
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representing in a mutual gesture the vitality of this border zone.  
Moreover, even though the cow has become more useful, more 
productive than ever, it cannot be persuaded to give up its antics or to 
give up the secret it intuits.   
 Similarly, the miracle that restores Kenelm‘s name to human 
memory first confounds (super-)human intellect and then finds 
resolution through subversion, this time of a pope.  The second 
spectacle dramatizes a more conspicuous fissure than do the habits of 
the cow for it interrupts the pope in the middle of a mass with a dove‘s 
delivery of a ―lite writ‖ (254) upon the high alter in Saint Peter‘s 
Church.  When the pope tries to read this sacred missive, however, he 
is rendered speechless: 
he nuste ȝwat it was to segge : ne non in-siȝt he ne couþe i-
wite— 
For he ne couþe englisch non : and on englis it was i-write. 
he liet cleopie eche-manere men : of eche diuerse londe, 
ȝif any covþe of þis holie writ : Ani-þing onder-stonde. 
Þo weren þare men of Engelonde : þat wusten ȝwat it sede, 
And onder-stoden wel þat writ : þo heo i-heorden it rede. (253-
258) 
 
[He did not know what it meant to say, nor no other insight could he 
bring to it/For he did not know English and in English it was 
written./He allowed to be called men of every manner from each 
diverse land,/to see if any of them could understand anything in this 
holy writing./Then there were men of England there who knew what it 
said,/And understood well that writing when they heard it read.] 
 
This artifact presents a robust challenge to the scope of cognition 
insofar as the infallible human center of the Church proves incapable 
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of deciphering a divine sign; yet, unlike the Mercian natives, the pope 
and his congregation are not content to chalk up the sign as a 
mystery.   Luckily, there are ―men of Engelonde‖ attending mass that 
day who alleviate the baffled pope‘s distress.  In a moment of 
destabilized mastery, the pope‘s confusion shakes the supposedly 
unwavering papal authority and parallels another incidence of 
pontifical undoing that occurs in the SEL‘s version of the life of Saint 
Hilary of Poitiers.  In the latter, the pope who is about to reprimand, 
perhaps even publicly embarrass and disempower, the dissenting 
Hillary dies during a sudden bout of dysentery.25  Both episodes 
represent institutional fault lines, chinks in the armor of the papacy, 
with a bold irreverence, and taken together, these events underscore 
the SEL‘s commitment to questioning the inevitability of power.  If the 
pope‘s guts might spill out with no warning, then what kind of body is 
the papal body?  If he is ignorant of a vernacular so close at hand, how 
universal is his reach?  These disturbances in Rome also dramatize 
the living being in especially vulnerable moments – in the ―warderobe,‖ 
the privy, for Hilary‘s pope and in a related moment of incapacity for 
Kenelm‘s.  These popes have bodies and minds that betray them, and 
                                                 
25 In a detailed interrogation of this life, Anne Thompson claims that the Hillary 
legend exemplifies the narrative and political acumen of the SEL-poet, foregrounding 
the studied choices about the interest he embeds in the lives and the suggestiveness 
of the social reversals he stages.  (Thompson 7-12)  For the pope‘s shocking death, 
see ll. 59-72 in the Hilary legend. 
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for a time, escape their historicity, their ranks in the rosters of Saint 
Peter‘s to become in their weaknesses living beings.     
Moreover, animal beings help to expose these vitalities and knit 
together the miraculous puzzles in Kenelm‘s life as well as to point up 
the subversiveness of the vernacular intrusion.  The heavenly, 
disordering missive appears to operate on a nationalistic level, 
suggesting something to the effect of ―God speaks English.‖  And 
delivering the message by way of a dove – a ―coluere, ȝwiȝt so ani snov‖ 
[a dove as white as any snow] (l. 247) – rather than an angel or some 
other human figure insists on the naturalness of the vernacular and 
by extension the unnaturalness of the papal court.  Yet, while the 
message gestures at the primacy of the English language or 
vernaculars in general, it also associates this speech with animality.  A 
heavenly animal, to be sure, but a being without a comprehensible 
voice whose effects, like the antics of the cow back in Clent, do more to 
bewilder than to communicate26.   Still, the reciprocal quality of the 
                                                 
26 My attention to the possibility of animal voice and its association with a textual 
entity was inspired by a short article by Karl Steel in which he studies the animal 
voices – the cries, in particular – recorded in a work that imagines the apocalyptic 
end of the world: ―15 Signs of the Last Days.‖  Steel encourages, as he claims the 
text itself does, an attempt at hearing the voices of animals: ―But the animals will not 
have cried out in vain, if we attend to the incomprehensibility of animal speech, not 
as a lacuna in the tradition's explanatory capability, but rather as a gap deliberately 
left open, a space that has not been stuffed with human meaning. These noisy 
animals appear in texts written by humans, for humans, in a genre about the end of 
the world that is primarily a genre about the preliminaries to a specifically human 
future. Nonetheless, the genre represents animals, and does so while simultaneously 
representing the inability of any human representation or understanding to 
represent animals completely. This deliberate representation of the ultimate 
unfathomability of animals to human understanding breaks sharply with the 
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two animal miracles posits a mode of sanctity, or of understanding 
holiness, that is both animal and literary, illegible and decipherable.   
Digging up Kenelm‘s body adds human vitality back into the 
mix, and the result of this combination is a kind of violent, even 
explosive, potency.27  The enduring images from Kenelm‘s life, 
however, lean toward the illegible.  The stumping of the Pope and the 
scramble of his men to translate the heavenly letter as much to make 
sense of this evidently significant event as to salvage the Pope‘s 
superiority proves a more lasting image than even the unearthing of 
Kenelm.  And the several animals that surround Kenelm – for, in 
addition to the fateful cow, there is the dove into which Kenelm‘s soul 
transforms at the moment of his beheading, the dove that later 
delivers the mystifying letter to Rome, and even Kenelm‘s nurse named 
Wolvene seems to have some link to the animal world – assume more 
                                                                                                                                            
anthropocentrism of nearly all medieval engagements with animals, where they 
appear for humans almost always as interpretable signs: paradigmatically, in the 
bestiaries, or in Hexameral commentaries, encyclopedias, or heraldry. In this case, 
however, animals appear while simultaneously thwarting the signifying utility 
humans might seek to derive from them‖ (―Woofing and Weeping with animals in the 
last days,‖ postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies (2010) 1, 190).  
Similarly, the heavenly letter in the story of Kenelm‘s re-discovery confounds, at least 
for a time, human and even papal comprehension, and this challenging text is 
associated with a mysteriously animal/divine messenger.  Although the author of the 
letter is not an animal, it is non-human and mystifying. 
27 In the final lines of the legend, at the same moment that Kenelm‘s body is being 
translated to the abbey at Winchcombe, the saint‘s thuggish sister, Quendrid 
schemes herself to death.  Catching sight of the procession which bears her brother, 
Quendrid again turns ―witles‖ by her proximity to Kenelm and endeavors to curse 
him by reading from the book of Psalms27.  Quendrid‘s body is undone when her 
malice rebounds on her, causing her eyes to fall from her head onto the Psalter: ―For 
riȝt ase heo þat vers radde : out-borsten boþe hire eiȝe/ And fullen a-doun op-on hire 
sauter : ase manie men i-seiȝe.‖ (ll. 348-349)   After this graphic injury, the queen 
quickly dies, and the vernacular life concludes by recording the nasty treatment her 
body receives, tossed into the ―fouleste‖ ditch the people could find. 
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importance in the narrative than does any examination of the seven-
year-old‘s claim to piety.   These animal imprints not only imply that in 
the saint‘s life there is a space enough to represent a range of living 
beings, or to explore the energy of life itself, but also that these animal 
entities participate in the disarticulation and constitution of holy 
selves and holy writs as well as national and linguistic identities.     
 
 
Where the Wild Things Are 
 In the legends of Francis and Kenelm, animals are not just for 
food, for pedagogy or allegory, for work or burden.  As I have argued, 
the stories of animals in the South English Legendary do occasionally 
propose uncommon relationships between animals and humans, and 
these connections tend to hinge on the surprising ways that animals 
show both the limits of saintly dominance and the seemingly limitless 
human appetite for dominion.  In other legends, the focus is less on 
phenomenal mastery and more on imaginative possibilities.  Animals 
in the lives of Saint Brendan and Saint Cuthbert, for example, not only 
eschew the shepherding and utilitarian impulses of the humans that 
stumble upon them, but even manage to act on humans.  In certain 
legends, animal metaphors and animal encounters go where humans 
fear to tread and draw the human animal – usually the saintly variety 
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– beyond the boundaries of human communities into spaces where 
rules and beings take unexpected forms.   
 Animals have traditionally patrolled and crossed boundaries 
both literal and conceptual.  As David Wood notes, ―Many animals are 
symbolically deployed as boundary negotiating operators, servants 
themselves, that is, of an abyss…Coyote, fox, spider, cat, jackal, 
jaguar – have all been given this work to do – educating men, bringing 
fire, mediating the transition between life and death, etc.‖28 Animals in 
Kenelm, it seems to me, also move in this direction, cruising along 
even national boundaries, working as translators – or presenting the 
opportunity for an act of translation – , guiding the foreign into remote 
locations, and operating as a visible link to history and to the sacred.  
But these animals do not impart without a remainder; the animals in 
Kenelm‘s life are not simply tools or fetches that are entirely used up 
in the act of pointing out.  Different from the ephemeral panther who 
visits in dream or vision, the animals in the SEL combine the mystical 
crossings of the ―boundary negotiator‖ with the presence of the 
―proximate strangers‖ that Jeffrey Jerome Cohen finds in Middle 
English poetry29, animals that share our domestic spaces but remain 
separate from human family structures and occasionally reveal their 
                                                 
28 Animal Philosophy,138. 
29 Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome. ―Inventing with Animals in the Middle Ages.‖  Engaging 
with Nature: Essays on the Natural World in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.  Ed. 
Barbara A. Hanawalt and Lisa J. Kiser.  Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2008. 41. 
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alien nature as alien.  This strangeness is inviting and at times 
penetrating in the SEL; in the far-flung life of Saint Brendan, it opens 
up new ways to understand history and vitality, the stuff of life. 
Straddling the genres of hagiography and travel narrative, the 
SEL‘s Vita sancti Brendani, Abbatis de Hybernia, the Life of Saint 
Brendan, Abbot of Hibernia, is unsurprisingly concerned with borders 
and boundaries geographical, narrative, spiritual, and, as we shall see, 
species.  Critically neglected, perhaps because of its relative 
faithfulness to its sources, the SEL‘s life of Brendan extends the 
legendary‘s interest in disrupting narratives of mastery.  It also 
introduces into the space of the life a world where animals participate, 
organize, and even dominate, an ecosystem just beyond the horizon of 
strange-looking and strangely behaving creatures.  Or perhaps it is 
more accurate to imagine the narrative life being brought out to these 
animals which then find places in this form.  The Brendan story 
immediately departs from a pure hagiographic form to produce this 
travelogue.  Hearing tales of other monks‘ journeys, Brendan resolves 
to travel to the ―lond of biheste‖ (76), the promised land, an earthly 
paradise, bejeweled and mysterious, which may be the original site of 
Eden30.  The voyage is lengthy (as is the narrative – 740 lines) and 
difficult to track.  Not only are the abbot and his companions charting 
                                                 
30 ȝif Adam a-ȝein godes heste : ne hadde no-þing mis-do/here-Inne he hadde ȝuyt i-
beo : and is of-sprung al-so. (65-66) 
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unknown – and unreal – territories, but the travelers also seem 
compelled to keep moving.  Pauses in the activity do not often 
translate to breaks in the narrative‘s action, and adventures pile up.  
And although Brendan claims to be searching for that Edenic island, 
the voyage becomes more cyclical, with the band of monks returning to 
particular locations and creatures each year following the liturgical 
calendar, than teleological.  The narrative spirals before it reaches its 
object and gestures at a marvelous, chaotic world out there but does 
not seem ready to visit or even imagine it.   
Despite the controlled progress of Brendan‘s expedition, the tale 
offers spectacles enough, especially of the animal variety.  A canine 
messenger welcomes the crew at their first stop; an island of giant, 
visibly healthy sheep impress the party with their brilliance and joy; a 
choir of birds constitutes a ―foweles parays‖ (150); Brendan‘s boat is 
chased by a giant fish, foaming at the mouth, but is saved when 
another fish rises up from the west and smashes into three pieces the 
aggressor.  Many of the animals stumbled upon by Brendan fit into the 
hagiographic auspices of the life as exemplars of their species, 
polished and good, living out an earthly reward that entails either 
consensual service to kind, human masters or performing to the best 
of their beastly abilities in praise of their creator.  In the section of the 
legend that precedes Brendan‘s arrival at the paradise island, however, 
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the animals and other discoveries turn darker and more belligerent, 
presenting the travelers with trials and frights as a way it seems to 
prepare them for a vision of perfection.  One episode stands out 
because it does not fit either model – the encounter with Iastoni, or 
Iasconius.    In the tale, Brendan‘s companions mistake a giant fish for 
an island: 
Þis monekes wende vp to þis yle : ac seint brendan noȝt. 
Þis monekes gonne makie here mete : of þat hi hadde 
ibroȝt 
hi makede fur & soden hem fisch : in a caudroun faste. 
Er þis fisch were isode : somdel hi were agaste : 
For þo þis fur was þurf-hot : þe yle quakede anon 
& wiþ gret eir hupte al vp— : þis monekes dradde echon,  
& þe wei toward hor schip : ech after oþer nom, 
God leuest hem þoȝte he was : þat sonest þuder com. 
hi bihulde hou þe yle : in þe see wende faste 
& as a quic þing hupte vp & doun : & þat fur fram him 
caste; 
he suam more þan tuei myle : while þis fur ilaste. (159-
169) 
 
[These monks approached the island, but not Saint Brendan/The 
monks planned to prepare their meat which they had brought/They 
made a fire and quickly boiled their fish in a cauldron./Before the fish 
was boiled suddenly the monks were aghast/For when the fire was 
very hot, the isle started to quake/ And a shot went up with a great 
burst of air – each of the monks was terrified/ And they ran toward 
their ship, each taking off after the other/Loved by God he thought he 
was who first arrived there./They beheld how the island sunk quickly 
into the sea/ And with a shake the thing hopped up and down and 
cast the fire from his back/ he swam more than two miles while this 
fire lasted.] 
 
The monks‘ naïve project, driven by hunger, and their subsequent, 
frightened scurrying back to the boat combined with the fish‘s showy 
and jerky gestures – thrashing (hupte) around in an effort to put out 
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the fire on its back --  distinguishes this incident from other 
encounters with exceptional animals, marking it with a comic, even 
slapstick, tone.  It is a kind of ancient whale watch gone very wrong.  
Yet, the misjudgment made by Brendan‘s cohort, but notably not by 
the saint himself, seems more than a silly mistake.  That the monks 
treat this fish as part of the landscape insists on the limits of human 
perception and, more specifically, the potential inadequacies in our 
judgments of nonhuman animals.  The scene, both as comedy and 
exemplum, hinges on these limits, on the unexpected.  Earth and 
beast intermingle here: an island could with a rumble turn into an 
animal31.  The monks‘ ―dradde‖ comes not only from their fear of being 
plunged into the ocean, but also from the shock of this 
metamorphosis, shock at the vitality of this nonhuman entity.  Even 
after the island begins to quake, the monks do not comprehend the 
quality of their dinner spot.  ―[H]i bihulde hou þe yle : in þe see wende 
faste‖: it is an island that seems to be sinking into the sea, not a 
burning fish.  Only after Brendan explains the fish‘s history do the 
monks begin to grasp this sighting: 
 
                                                 
31 In a variety of bestiaries, whales are said to masquerade as islands and to drag 
unsuspecting sailors to their deaths, a practice that is read as a parallel of the devil‘s 
capacity for temptation and destruction.  The Middle English life of Brendan departs 
from this interpretation, however, and suggests not that the fish has erred, in fact 
the monks ought to respect Iasconius for his lifespan, but rather that the travellers 
have.  See the online encyclopedia, ―The Medieval Bestiary‖ for a collection of 
bestiary entries (David Badke.  ―Whale.‖ The Medieval Bestiary: Animals in the Middle 
Ages. N.p., 2011. Web. 24 June 2011.) 
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Þe monekes iseȝe þe fur wel longe : & were sore agaste : 
hi cride ȝurne on seint brendan : what þe wonder were. 
"Beoþ stille," quaþ þis gode man : "for noȝt ȝe nabbe fere. 
Ȝe weneþ þat hit beo an yle : ac ȝe þencheþ amis : 
hit is a fisch of þis grete see : þe gretteste þat þer is. 
Iastoni he is icleped : & fondeþ niȝt & dai  
To pulte his tail in his mouþ : ac for gretnisse he nemai." 
(170-76) 
 
[The monks saw the fire for a long time and were sorely aghast/they 
cried desperately to Saint Brendan to explain what the wonder 
was./―Be still,‖ said this good man, ―for you have nothing to fear./ You 
guessed that it was an island but you thought wrong/It is a fish of this 
great sea, the greatest that there is./Iastoni he is called and he 
attempts night and day/To put his tail in his mouth but for his 
greatness he may not.‖] 
 
It is the fire -- Þe monekes iseȝe þe fur wel longe – that they watch 
disappearing over the horizon before Brendan reveals, rather 
enigmatically, the true identity of their harbor.  Brendan intends to 
assuage his comrades‘ panic by clarifying that it is not an island that 
has heaved out of sight, but instead a fish, the biggest in the ocean.  
Perhaps he means to imply that land is still constant and secure, but 
the idea that giant animals can masquerade as terra firma seems 
equally disquieting and may account for the monks‘ silence following 
Brendan‘s disclosure.32  
                                                 
32 In the Latin original of this tale, the fish is not simply the ―gretteste,‖ but ―the first 
of all who swim in the ocean‖.  This primacy suggests both that Iastoni/Iasconius is 
a leader among fishes (whatever that could mean) and that it may be the original fish 
created by God.  It also intensifies the travelers‘ misapprehension.  Misreading any 
old island-looking fish is one thing, but not recognizing the original fish might have 
epistemological and devotional consequences.  If the monks cannot spot a being so 
intimate with creation, so connected to the inauguration of life, how can their 
judgments and assumptions about other beings be trusted?  For the Latin life of 
Brendan, see Navigatio sancti brendani abbatis, ed. C. Selmer (Notre Dame, 1959) 
20-21. 
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Giving these rattled monks the benefit of the doubt, the account 
does seem at least to question how the presence of organic beings can 
be reliably detected, and it awakens a doubt about the human 
capacity to discriminate between living being and inert matter.  It 
disrupts the usual boundary between animal and geographical bodies.  
After all, the giant fish does for a short while serve as an island; the 
misprision is not an entirely visual one for the sailors, like seeing 
mermaids where there are manatees.  Instead, the episode seems to 
posit a ―possible body‖33, an animal-geological hybrid.  Yet, this 
monstrous body becomes somewhat tamed, treated as a familiar figure 
or even a pet by being named, rendering the fish at once terribly alien 
and intimately known. 
   This encounter with Iastoni does operate at a symbolic level, 
too, since this peculiar fish is attached to forms of knowledge, history, 
and vitality that remain foreign to the human observer (or dinner 
party).  As the oldest fish in the sea and one of earth‘s original 
creatures, Iastoni embodies a long history.  His great size and his 
lumbering motion confirm this attachment: it is as if earthly, 
creaturely history coheres to his body like barnacles.  This history is 
unfamiliar to the monks, perhaps finally unfathomable for them and 
                                                 
33 As Cohen claims, ―[a]nimals…offered ‗possible bodies‘ to the Dreamers of the 
Middle Ages, forms both dynamic and disruptive through which might be dreamt 
alternate and even inhuman worlds‖ (Cohen, ―Inventing with Animals in the Middle 
Ages,‖ 40).  For more on Cohen‘s possible bodies, see his Medieval Identity Machines 
(Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xi-xxiii. 
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resistant to them, implying a form of historical narrative outside the 
chronicle and the records kept by humans.  Furthermore, the fish‘s 
habit, attempting to reach his tail with his mouth, seems to insist on 
the continuity of this alternate history.  Brendan does not explain this 
inclination – nor does he, in the SEL version of the encounter describe 
how he knows so much about Iastoni – but the gesture recalls 
Ouroboros symbols of snakes or dragons biting their own tails, 
symbols of the cycle and repetition.  That Iastoni cannot achieve this 
desire seems to indicate that his history, which charts the starting 
point and continues to live through his creaturely vitality, advances.     
The shock, the moment of surprise and disbelief that these 
―wonders‖ provoke may return the reader and the voyaging monks to 
the idea that every sort of possibility may find a place in world‘s 
diversity and perhaps also in the capaciousness of the legendary.  This 
shock further destabilizes the symbolic register of Iastoni, focusing on 
the giant fish as animal.  Cohen contends, ―As living, moving beings 
not well inclined to the stasis required by epistemological systems, 
animals are at best imperfect allegories…This inherent instability 
affects (indeed, infects) the human as much as the beast.‖34  Not only 
does Iastoni move, but he also suffers visibly as a result of the 
voyagers‘ recklessness.  As he swims off into the horizon, it is the 
animal we see, not the symbol. 
                                                 
34 Cohen, ―Inventing Animals in the Middle Ages,‖ 52. 
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The strange career of Iastoni seems to map a space in the saint‘s 
life for other living beings, fixing our attention on a vitality that may be 
shocking in its sharedness. Writing animal lives into the saint‘s life 
moves the genre away from a conventional understanding of the saint 
and moves the narrative – and often the saint or his fellows – out of 
spaces where life is imagined as purely anthropocentric.  Like the 
encounters in the life of Brendan, the SEL‘s Vita sancti Eadmundi regis 
includes animals that seem to delineate psychic and metaphorical 
spaces where the non-human animal and human animal touch.  Also 
like Brendan‘s life, Edmund‘s strays nearly immediately from a strictly 
hagiographic tone.  Aside from mentioning that Edmund was a ―holie 
kyng‖ (1), the life eschews direct examination of what renders the king 
worthy of his saintly title, favoring instead an introductory foray into 
romance: ―Swyþe fair knyȝt and strong he was : and hardi and 
quoynte‖ (5) followed by a rapid transition into historical narration.  In 
fact, the ensuing 25 lines read more like a chronicle dedicated to the 
―twey princes of an oþur lond,‖ to Hubba and Hynguar‘s conquests, 
than an index of Edmund‘s exemplarity.  The legend sufficiently 
outlines what not to be, unless becoming a Danish invader is one‘s 
path, but discussion of Edmund‘s goodness is limited to an 
explanation of the war that will kill him: ―Of þe godnesse of seint 
Edmund : he [Hingwar/Ivar] hurde moche telle/In to his lond he 
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wende anon : to fondi him to quelle‖ (17-18).  This is a rather 
backhanded statement of Edmund‘s merits since the king‘s moral 
rectitude seems magnetic and powerful, yet it is perhaps not always 
best to have a leader who attracts such attention.    As a ninth-century 
king of East Anglia, a decidedly English figure, Edmund represents an 
ancient, but still invaded, England.  Like Kenelm and even Brendan, 
he is a native saint who stands for an Anglo-Saxon past, yet this 
history is already targeted, marked by violence, and defended only 
barely.  For when the SEL narrative does turn its full attention to 
Edmund, it is to recount the meeting of the three leaders in a very 
brief battle during which the English king hardly resists; and the 
legend quickly shifts from war to the body of Edmund naked and tied 
to a tree (35-39).   
The location of this ―wode,‖ the site of Edmund‘s torment and 
martyrdom, is unspecified, but the space is written as one of judgment 
and suffering: the king is in a ―luyte stounde,‖ a little stretch of time or 
occasion of physical pain as the Middle English dictionary defines it, 
when he is brought before the enemy army ―[f]or-to a-fongue þare is 
dom‖ (35-37).  In this place associated more with pain than geography, 
Edmund is tortured and transfigured: 
So þat þis liþere turmentours : þat beote him so sore, 
þoȝte þat þeȝ hi him schame dude : þat hi him wolde do more. 
Hi stode afur & bende here bowes : and here arewes riȝte : 
And as to a merke schote to him : as euene as hi miȝte. 
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þe arewes stode on him þicke : & al is bodi todrowe; 
& euere stod þis holi man : stille ase þeȝ he lowe. 
As ful as an illespyl is : of pikes al aboute 
As ful he stikede of arewen : wiþinne & wiþoute, 
So ful, þat in none stude : ne miȝte an arewe in wende.. (41-49) 
 
[So then his wicked tormentors who beat him so sorely/thought that 
they who did him shame might do him more./They stood afar and 
bent their bows and their arrows right/And as at a target, they shot 
him as evenly as they could./The arrows stood on him thickly and torn 
open all his body;/And ever stood this holy man still as though he was 
fine /As full as a porcupine is of spines all about/So full was he stuck 
with arrows within and without,/So full that in no place might another 
arrow enter in…] 
 
Edmund is likened to a short list of things in this extract – a target, a 
porcupine (illespyl), a mass of arrows.  Just as the holy man becomes 
the focus of the poem he is captured, attacked, and erased.  Even the 
arrows of Edmund‘s attackers possess more agency than Edmund, 
who stands ―stille‖ despite his anguish.  It is clear that the legend 
locates Edmund‘s sanctity in this indifference, but it is also in this 
assault that Edmund‘s human body is changed, is opened up, ―al is 
bodi todrowe.‖  Elaine Scarry notably described torture as a language.  
Although physical pain fragments language, reducing it to something 
original like the cry, acts of torture make visible what is usually 
inscrutable or at least intensely individual, that is the representation 
or communication of pain35.  A version of this sharing occurs in this 
scene, yet no pain is communicated.  Instead, Edmund‘s body is 
transformed around him.  It is at once torn open by the arrows and 
                                                 
35Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985): 4, 27.   
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closed off as the saint becomes a bolus of arrows, so covered with 
spines that no additional shots penetrate.   
Scarry contends that the language prompted by torture is taken 
from the victim and redirected to signify the power of the torturer and 
his affiliates so that the victim cannot communicate and the world 
around him is disintegrated, stripped of any meaning36.  The SEL poet 
works with simile in this passage to convey this silencing and to bring 
the animal into the moment when Edmund becomes a saint.  While 
the possibility of disintegration arises in this account – and perhaps 
even occurs – Edmund protects himself, and by extension his 
kingdom, through this comparison with a porcupine.  Porcupines, of 
course, are not poked by their own quills, so the saint‘s association 
with one reverses the damage of the arrows.  Yet, the simile does not 
stop at a simple trick of language or at the suggestion that the saint 
reverts to an animal state at the moment of his death.  When we 
expect to see inside the saint, we encounter the porcupine.  Or more 
accurately, we encounter a relation with the animal, because what is 
inside Edmund is not a porcupine waiting to get out, but something 
that bears resemblance to what makes the porcupine special, to what 
makes it distinct and animate, what guards its survival.  The object of 
violence in this scenario becomes a potential agent of violence.  And 
since the porcupine image is immediately linked to Saint Sebastian: 
                                                 
36 Scarry 41. 
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―As þe holi man imartred was : þe holi seint Bastian‖ (53), the 
metaphor compounds and provides an historical, hagiographical, anad 
citational nexus through the animal relationship37.    
Edmund‘s connection to the animal world extends beyond his 
bodily death.  As the king prays for mercy, he is beheaded, and the 
dissolution threatened during his torture is accomplished: ―And is bodi 
was er al torend : þat noþing nas bileued‖ (58).  Although the invaders 
take care to bury the head in a ―durne stede…Among þicke þornes‖ (l. 
63-4), a wolf is drawn to the hiding place. 
     
A wyld wolf þer com sone : & to þe heued drouȝ, 
& þer vppe sat & wiste hit fast : aȝe cunde ynouȝ 
For his cunde were betere to swolewe hit: & lickede hit ofte & custe,  
& as he wolde his owe whelp : wiþ wylde best hit wiste. (67-70) 
 
[A wild wolf soon came there and drew near to the head/And there sat 
up and protected it securely against nature enough/For his nature 
would tend to swallow it, but he licked and kissed it often,/As he 
would his own whelp; with a wild beast it was protected.] 
 
For all the pathos of this episode, the wolf‘s function in the legend 
remains uncertain.  It does not lead the ―Cristine Men‖ who search for 
Edmund‘s head to the thornbush; nor does the wolf return the head to 
the English community.  And once the missing body part is discovered 
                                                 
37 This imagery and the comparison in particular are not original to the South 
English Legendary.  The Legendary‘s primary source, Jacobus deVoragine‘s Legenda 
Aurea, also links the victim of multiple arrowshots to a porcupine in the account of 
Saint Sebastian‘s martyrdom.  (Jacobus de Voragine.  Trans. William Granger Ryan. 
The Golden Legend: Readings on the Saints, Volume 1. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 1995: 100.)   
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by the search party – the head itself calls out ―Al an Englisch. her. her. 
her.: as þeȝ he were alyue‖ (79) – the wolf disappears from the 
narrative.  The wolf does not nurse the saint back to life exactly with 
its kisses and licks, but rather keeps it company and connected to the 
natural world until it can be restored to the body.  It seems to stand as 
a marker and protector of Edmund‘s continued life in a way not easily 
assimilated into even a miraculous narrative.   
The animal relationship, the affiliation with the porcupine, and 
the wolf‘s effect on Edmund‘s head are left out in the ―durne stede,‖ 
yet the presence of these animals, as simile or protector, in such 
important moments returns us to the idea of animals as boundary 
indicators and crossers.  But these animals also foreground the 
boundaries between the witness, the reader of the life and the martyr.  
Writing about reception of medieval martyr images and legends, Robert 
Mills argues that ―[w]hat stands out in medieval devotional writings is 
the notion that pain is transferable from one body to another: from the 
body in an image to the body of a devotee.‖38  What is so interesting 
about this life of Edmund is that the transfer happens between the 
saint‘s body and an animal body rather than the saint and the 
devotee, which leaves the reader of the legend in a position to identify, 
to suffer along with the porcupine or the wolf in addition to Edmund.  
                                                 
38 Mills, Robert.  Suspended Animation: Pain, Pleasure, and Punishment in Medieval 
Culture.  (London: Reaktion Books, 2006): 148.   
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The reader feels an animal‘s pain and pleasure, the fear of the 
cornered porcupine and the maternal affection of the wolf, along with 
(or perhaps rather than) the transcendent suffering of Edmund.39   
Following Mills, this unexpected affiliation of both saint and 
devotee with an animal body presents an ambiguous amalgam of 
vitality, of living beings, and perhaps even a queer image.  Mills 
explains that episodes depicting torture often produce ambiguously 
gendered figures: ―Male saints are visually de-phallicized by being 
decapitated, disemboweled and flayed…Martyrs such as Sebastian are 
subjected to a proliferation of phallic instruments (in Sebastian‘s case, 
arrows), in order to symbolize their figurative transformations from 
wielders of earthly power to tortured purveyors of divine presence‖40.  
Edmund‘s decapitation and penetration by countless arrows certainly 
follow this pattern.  And in addition to breaking down sexual binaries, 
Edmund‘s sacrifice questions the finality of the animal-human divide.  
Even so, this bridge is not complete or enduring, and the distance 
between animal and human that shrinks is at the same time 
reaffirmed in this extreme suffering.  Edmund has already become 
something unreachable, a possible hybrid body but a mystical one.  
Even so, the possibility that this transfer to the animal represents 
                                                 
39 Mills claims that ―[s]aints‘ lives, as such, set up a tension between two alternative 
conceptions of pain: on the one hand, the martyrs‘ body-affirming discourse, which 
emphasizes corporeality as a route to mystical pleasure and spiritual empowerment, 
and on the other, the mind-body dichotomies of dualist pain concepts‖ (158). 
40 Mills, 173. 
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might prove more enduring.  Mills concludes that the torturing and the 
opening up of sacred bodies ―welcomes the loss of the self‖ as the 
beginning of new identities41.   In the case of Saint Edmund, the 
subject gets out of his human skin and into an animal one before 
making the leap to a spiritual body, a transition that seems to make 
possible a human animal identity in which the non-human animal is 
not denied, not the thing to be transcended, not the aggressor or the 
bumbling ignoramus, but the analogue and the caretaker and even the 
instructor. 
 
More Life: Imagining the Breakdown 
The animals in the South English Legendary draw our attention 
again and again to the vitality of multiple living beings and thereby 
back to the question of organic life.  What we find in the SEL is not 
just a curious collection of saints‘ lives, although that would certainly 
be interesting enough, but a legendary that is open to an assortment 
of living beings. By including animal lives the SEL-poet imagines a 
vitality that is not ensouled, a vitality that is ours and not ours, 
human and non-human.   
The more enigmatic of these animals serve as examples of a 
vitality that dissolves and reifies the separation between human and 
                                                 
41 Mills, 175.  He also argues that the ―painful ordeal…shows how acts of torture 
might temporarily disrupt the identities of sacred subjects, producing a confusion of 
categories such as gender.‖ 
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non-human animals.  The SEL‘s short life of Cuthbert closes with a 
particularly enigmatic animal encounter.  Just ten lines before the 
narrative announces Cuthbert‘s death, we learn of the saint‘s nightly 
meeting with otters: 
 
Eche niȝt wanne þis monekes : to bedde were igone 
Sein Cuberd wel stilleliche : wendeþ forþ al one, 
Into þe colde se he ȝeode : anon to þe chinne; 
Forte it was nei mid niȝt : so he stod þer inne. 
Þanne wende he up þerof : & wanne he cam to londe, 
For feblesse he uel adoun : for he ne miȝte noȝt stonde. 
Þanne come þer up of þe se : tweie oteres grete 
And lickede him in eche stude : ar hi him wolde lete. 
And wanne hi him hadde þus ilikked : hi neme him into þe se, 
And sein Cuberd hol & sound : wende into is celle aȝe… (85-94) 
 
[Each night when the monks were gone to bed/Saint Cuthbert very 
quietly went forth all alone/Into the cold sea he went up to his 
chin/Although it was near midnight he stood there like this./Then he 
went up from there and when he came to land,/For feebleness he fell 
down for he could not stand./Then came up out of the sea two great 
otters/And they licked him in each place before they would release 
him./And when they had licked him thus they returned to the 
sea,/And Saint Cuthbert went again to his cell whole and sound.] 
 
Although it is not explicitly stated, it seems that Cuthbert‘s nocturnal 
bathing is a form of penance or ascetic discipline.  When saints 
undertake such dramatic practices much is usually made of their 
suffering and their endurance, yet Cuthbert‘s efforts are not even 
named as penitential, let alone proclaimed for their extremity.  
Instead, the narrative turns its focus to the otters whose actions also 
go unexplained, though perhaps for more obvious reasons.  In Bede‘s 
Life of St. Cuthbert, the otters only use their hair to dry the shivering 
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man42, and in Aelfric‘s version, it is not otters but seals ,―seolas,‖ 
which seems quite a bit more likely on the coast of Lindisfarne, that 
tend to the saint, drying his feet and warming him with their ―blaede,‖ 
their breath43.  Aelfric also claims that the seals lay at the feet of 
Cuthbert: ―licgende aet his foton.‖  It is possible that, in the SEL, 
licgende becomes licked.  Or it is also possible that the otter/seal 
confusion is compounded even further by the licking, associating 
Cuthbert‘s otters with the bear of medieval and ancient bestiaries44.  
The story goes that this oral fixation attaches to the origins, both 
organic and linguistic, of the bear, which gets its name from the word 
for mouth (orsus) because bears must lick their cubs into a proper 
bear shape right after birth.  Isidore of Seville in his Etymologies 
writes: ―Bear cubs are born as a shapeless lump of flesh; the mother, 
by licking it, gives it shape.‖  Not only does the otters‘ licking, then, 
imply a nonhuman element in the formation of the saint, perhaps even 
figuring Cuthbert, notorious for his incorruption, as an amorphous 
lump before the otter intervention, but the scenarios also in its 
overlapping of seal, otter, and bear seems interested in the 
uncategorizable, the unfamiliar, the unfathomable nonhuman body.   
                                                 
42Bede, Life and Miracles of St. Cuthbert, in Ecclesiastical History of the English 
Nation, trans. J.A. Giles, Everyman's Library 479,(London: J.M. Dent; New York: E.P. 
Dutton, 1910), 286-349.  
43 Wyatt, A J. An Anglo-Saxon Reader. Cambridge: The University Press, 1919: 82. 
44 I am grateful to Professor Peggy McCracken for suggesting this analogue. 
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The scene also overturns the dominion model taken up in 
Francis‘s legend, since Cuthbert‘s otters act entirely of their own 
volition.  In fact, it is interesting that there is no mention of the 
animals‘ working contrary to their natures.  Instead, it seems entirely 
to be expected the ―tweie oteres grete‖ arrive to tend to Cuthbert in his 
exhaustion.  Cuthbert‘s otters seem to know Cuthbert‘s needs better 
than he does and even show the legendary‘s audience something 
about the limits of mortification.  Their care of the saint, which returns 
him to a ―hol and sound‖ condition after his attempts at mortification, 
is the appropriate response, or at least it is a response that goes 
without critique from the hagiographer or the holy man, and the 
encounter positions vitality entirely on the side of the nonhuman 
animal.  The otters have agency and restorative energy, while the saint 
can‘t even stand on his own.  Despite the intimacy of the scene, there 
is something uncanny and a little creepy about the otters‘ behavior.  
The incident is suggestive on multiple levels: the licking reverses the 
human-animal food relationship, but also hints at the saint‘s body as 
a potential object for consumption, dietary and erotic.  While Cuthbert 
may be figured as a food source, it is the otters‘ eating action that 
transfers energy back to the eaten, that reanimates the frozen saint.  
In this nurturing, there is something nourishing, too. This animal 
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vitality is dependent not on human command, nor is it imitative of 
human practices.   
 In fact, this scene highlights animal behaviors that do not 
imitate human patterns or expectations.  Tasting the saint‘s body, out 
of care or desire, becomes, particularly given the silences surrounding 
the interlude, a transgression, a strangeness that resists explanation 
and allegorizing.  The otters are not the huggable, furry mammals that 
frolic on their backs and hold their food like humans, but rather 
oversized sea creatures that emerge from and retreat to an abyss 
under cover of darkness, more monster than playmate.  The benign 
licking threatens something more sinister, which suggests that the 
SEL‘s use of animals in a genre that addresses life could be more 
radical than it seems at first.  David Wood concludes that in theorizing 
about the importance of the non-human animal ―[p]erhaps the point is 
that we must try not to allow our moral imagination to end with those 
creatures who seem to function like us.  And that it is where obvious 
continuities break down that the ethical begins.‖45  What Cuthbert 
learns from the otters and what the SEL exploits in many of its legends 
are the insurmountable ruptures between humans and animals that 
paradoxically force us to acknowledge that the animal in its difference 
and defiance participates in and helps to produce the life.  This 
defiance from the animal that contravenes expectations and acts very 
                                                 
45 Animal Philosophy, 140. 
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little like the human animal stretches the possible sources and 
possible bodies included in a request for and a bequest of ―more life‖ 
as it stretches our obligations to them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Thing Power in Literary Lives: Vital Materials in Pearl and The Second Nun’s Tale 
 
Making space for the lives of non-human animals, however 
unensouled and however indomitable, likely fails to scandalize or even 
surprise us in a time when more than one cable television channel is 
entirely dedicated to animal programs, whole weeks are given to 
sharks, and a dog that can respond to more than a thousand words 
and that can put away its own toys is featured in The New York Times 
and on the Today Show1.  While interest in and regard for nonhuman 
animals certainly was not invented in the age of mass culture or even 
in the relative luxury of industrialized societies, inserting animal lives 
into the expressly sanctified context of hagiography, introducing lives 
without souls, lives without obvious spiritual concerns into the saint‘s 
life illustrates an investment in vitality itself.  Or perhaps these 
introductions yield to the life force that cannot be controlled, that pops 
up even where it has not been invited.  This chapter turns to the 
literary work of the life to explore how shifting the context of the vita 
into an intentionally literary or performative space, like the storytelling 
performances in Chaucer‘s Canterbury Tales, changes the focus and 
the attachments of the life.  How does relieving the life of its exemplary 
                                                 
1Nicholas Wade, ―Sit. Stay. Parse. Good Girl!‖ The New York Times17 January 2011: 
D1.  Web. 13 February 2011. 
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responsibilities usher in different concerns and involvements?  What 
other lives are allowed to emerge in these decontextualized, 
regenerated lives?  To address these questions, this chapter examines 
two literary texts: one in which the hagiographic form falls away but 
sacred questions are dramatized and figured in a self-consciously 
literary mode and one in which a martyr‘s passion is appropriated but 
reformulated to investigate the mechanisms of the genre.  That is, in 
Pearl, the dream vision frame finds a kind of saint‘s life kernel once 
the Dreamer encounters his lost Pearl-maiden on the shores of a 
heavenly river.  The poem stages to a certain extent the making of a 
saint‘s life, a quasi-autobiographical saint‘s life, insofar as the maiden 
recounts for the Dreamer the motives for her induction into the Lamb‘s 
bridal corps.  By contrast, Chaucer‘s Second Nun’s Tale offers the 
frame of a saint‘s life to work through social and generic perplexities.  
In both poems, the digesting of hagiographic material invites a test of 
the limits of the form and allows speculation about the sources and 
threshold of vital energies. 
In putting these two narratives in contact with each other, I 
examine the work of poets important to the Middle English canon, but 
these particular narratives – Pearl and The Second Nun’s Tale – do not 
represent these poets‘ most canonical or critically popular pieces.  
While more central to medieval literary history and studies than the 
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South English Legendary  or Aelred of Rievaulx‘s life and writings, 
discussed in previous chapters, these texts still remain outside of the 
body of poetry typically studied and commented upon.  Labeled – let‘s 
face it – boring, straightforwardly symbolic, doctrinaire, immature, or 
unliterary, these poems are connected in their critical neglect.  They 
are made neighbors by their peripheral status, forced out into the 
suburbs of the canon, but also of course in their content, their 
investment in the literary status of hagiographic materials.  Much in 
the way that the issue of life – as a big question mark or as a force 
acknowledged as important but not worthy of inquiry – is neglected in 
favor of the soul or in the way that things are dismissed as 
possessions or dead objects not having any real impact on organic 
agents, these two works are often avoided for their apparent lack of 
literary depth.  But it seems to me that these assumptions, like 
assuming that life, an animating force, is a category that cannot be 
interrogated, are not well founded and even miss the point.  Although I 
make my own assumption in this chapter about the debts that Pearl 
and The Second Nun’s Tale owe to hagiography, I think that the 
adoption of devotional themes and the structure of the saint‘s life in 
these poems is not a result of cataleptic habits.  Both of these poems 
question the appropriation of this form directly and through distortion, 
debate, and reinvention press the limits of the life; both works 
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question not only what it means to be alive, but how vitality can be 
recognized and ethically represented.   And like many of the other 
narratives I explore in this project, both Pearl and The Second Nun’s 
Tale begin with what appears to be a singular, human (all too) living 
being and conclude with a vitality that is multiple, discovering that it 
already was so.    
Turning to more recognized narratives also opens up a new 
scope for the question of representations of vitality.  Hagiographic 
materials used in these poetic settings are distilled, stripped to a 
certain extent of their devotional roles in favor of other ends, which 
suggests the plasticity of the form, the problem, and the idea of life 
itself.  That the question of the living being – its definition, its limits, 
its representational possibilities, its animating energies – emerges in 
the work of Chaucer and the Pearl-poet attests that interest in vital 
principles is not merely a by-product of legendaries, of the 
reproduction of many lives, or of the recreational biographer in the 
case of Walter Daniel, but rather these poems demonstrate that 
thinking through the notion of life happens outside of the works that 
identify as hagiographic in genre and intent.  Although both narratives 
I explore in this chapter address to a certain extent the problem of life 
as an ontological problem, a philosophical inquiry, these texts also are 
inclined to consider the experiential and ethical affiliations of vitality.  
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Appropriating a form that itself seems to have crystallized into a thing, 
Pearl and The Second Nun’s Tale examine not only the commonality of 
a life force that unites organic bodies, but also imagine this animating 
energy‘s connection to substance and postulate a relationship with the 
inorganic. 
 
Turn on Your Heartlight 
 
Near the close of the vision in Pearl, the Dreamer experiences a 
radical reorganization of his dream‘s universe, and perhaps of the 
phenomenal universe, too.  As a part of his glimpse of the Heavenly 
Jerusalem, the Dreamer discovers that the source of light in that 
substantial yet wandering city is neither sun, nor moon, but Jesus 
Christ figured as a shining lamb: ―Of sunne ne mone þay had no 
need;/Þe Self God watz her lombe-lyȝt‖2.  The Pearl-poet‘s clever 
metaplasmus reveals the reach that this dream vision ought to have – 
even giants of the solar system can be replaced by spiritual bodies, a 
substitution that might console the Dreamer who has been mourning 
the lost body of his ―pearl.‖  Alan Fletcher sees this pun as a term that 
                                                 
2 All quotations from Pearl refer to The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript: Pearl, 
Cleanness, Patience, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, ed. Malcolm Andrew and 
Ronald Waldron (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), here lines 1044-1045.  All 
subsequent citations from the poems are from this edition and will be cited 
parenthetically in the text by line number. 
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―condenses alternative meanings effortlessly into itself‖3.  It conjures 
the light given by a lamp and the lamb as a light, spiritual illumination 
through the figure of the lamb.  ―Lamb‖ and ―lamp‖ would have been 
homophones according to Fletcher, so the hybrid term is both only 
lamplight, a concrete and plausible image, and a radiant lamb, an 
image more eccentric.  The misspelling hypostatizes the effectiveness 
of rhetoric and figuration in the poem – if substitutions of letters can 
animate a lamp into a lamb, then the Pearl-maiden‘s explications of 
heavenly practices must surely have resonated with her jeweler.  
Moreover, this particular combination, the Lamb and the light, at the 
vision‘s apex illustrates the kinds of vital presences that circulate in 
Pearl, for the lombe-lyȝt  is the combination of inorganic (light) and 
organic (lamb) materials.  It is both inanimate and manufactured – a 
lantern – and animate in the most perfect way.  In this moment, and 
many others, the poem seems to ask what qualifies as living, to ask 
how it is possible to tell the difference between lights and lambs.  As 
Jane Bennett puts it in her captivating inquiry into the life of metal, 
―[c]an nonorganic bodies also have a life?  Can materiality itself be 
vital?‖4 
                                                 
3 Fletcher, Alan J.  ―Reading Radical Metonymy in Pearl.‖  Sacred and Secular in 
Medieval and Early Modern Cultures: New Essays.  Ed.  Lawrence Besserman.  
Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 58. 
4 Bennett, Jane.  Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010: 53. 
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This lombe-lyȝt vibrancy has something to do with what Bennett 
calls ―vital materialism.‖  Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett 
identifies ―life,‖ a power that animates but cannot be reduced to 
biology or assigned to soul (since it moves un-ensouled creatures, too) 
as ―a restless activeness, a destructive-creative force-presence that 
does not coincide fully with any specific body…a vibratory effluescence 
that persists before and after any arrangement in space: the peculiar 
‘motility‘ of an intensity‖5.  This is the force that is not eradicated 
simply because a body ends or degrades.  Nor is it equivalent with 
mind or spirit, since even those beings not believed to possess these 
attributes, like a snail or a bristlecone pine tree, are believed to have 
life. Bennett wonders if this vitality can be seen in materials typically 
understood as nonorganic -- metals, foods, weather events.  Pearl 
takes up this question in intriguing ways.  It matters to the Dreamer 
that life, in some form, continues for his Pearl, and his dream vision 
gives him, as we will see, more than he expected.   
   As I noted earlier, Pearl does not assume the form of a vita, 
nor does the poem tell the story of a recognized saint, but Pearl does 
take up the question of life: what counts as life in heaven, what kind of 
living qualifies a soul for salvation, how the living mind can 
comprehend life without body, to name only a few of the problems 
raised.  The human living being in a rather pared down state is 
                                                 
5 Bennett, 54, 57. 
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especially important to the poet, as a hefty portion of the poem‘s 
theological debate centers on how so young a child, likely under two, 
could merit a mystical marriage with Christ.  As Nicholas Watson 
points out, the conclusion presented in the poem deviates from the 
conventional notion that only those who make a practice of virginity 
earn conjugal privileges with the Lamb.  Watson sees this departure as 
indicative of the poem‘s interest in redefining ―every aspect of human 
salvation‖ as having more to do ―with a person‘s external and 
‗objective‘ state than with her or his internal or moral one‖6.  Taking 
this reading a step farther, I believe that Pearl in its concern with 
externals, both theological and ritualistic, also illuminates a material 
vitality.  Building the poem around a dispute seems to have 
emboldened the poet to proffer moderately controversial allegations 
about heavenly rewards, claims which channel the reader‘s attention 
toward embodied living; the structure of conflict and testing as well as 
the topics of lived life and living body within the context of Heaven lead 
the Dreamer to wonder about a life force that can be reduced neither 
to body or form nor to matter. 
 
DEAD ZONES 
It is hard to deny that Pearl is as much about things, about 
objects that inspire, confound, and seduce as about disputing 
                                                 
6 Watson, Nicholas. ―The Gawain-Poet as Vernacular Theologian,‖ A Companion to the 
Gawain-Poet.  Ed. Derek Brewer and Jonathan Gibson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997): 302. 
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theologies or paying tribute to a life lost too soon.  At the most obvious 
level, a primary concern and figure in the poem is a precious object – a 
pearl.  Descriptions of heavenly landscapes and edifices also abound.  
Gemstones and glitzy outcroppings populate nearly every section of 
the poem, but there are also coffers and gardens, outfits and 
headdresses, vines and phoenixes.  Everything in the Dreamer‘s vision 
of heaven is blazing, shining, reflecting, as if it cannot be touched or 
even seen properly, as if Vaseline were smeared on a camera lens.  
Perhaps because objects seem to drift in and out of focus, critics have 
paid more attention to the ideological topics the poem addresses - 
consolation, salvation, separation of body and soul – than the 
adamant presence of things in the text7.     
The opening lines of the poem introduce the pearl, which is 
described in loving and conventional detail.   
Perle pleasaunte, to prynces paye 
To clanly clos in golde so clere: 
Oute of oryent, I hardyly saye, 
Ne proued I neuer her precios pere. 
So rounde, so reken in vche araye, 
So smal, so smoþe her sydez were; 
Queresoeuer I jugged gemmez gaye 
I sette hyr sengeley in synglere.  (1-8) 
 
                                                 
7David Aers divided the readings in Pearl scholarship into two veins: (1) theological 
interest in the poem and (2) rhetorical interest, especially in the love language (Aers, 
―The Self Mourning: Reflections on Pearl.‖  Speculum 68 [1993]: 56).  Since the 
publication of Aers‘ article, not much has changed, though some discussion of the 
materials, both cultural and phenomenal, in the poem has emerged and is addressed 
below. 
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―Pleasaunte‖ surely does not do the Pearl any justice since its 
perfection is extolled and bemoaned repeatedly throughout the poem, 
yet this first modifier aptly evokes the speaker‘s attitude: the pearl is 
an object meant to satisfy him.   The mourner‘s senses are moved by 
the object and its memory, but the pearl‘s power depends upon the 
mourner and can be perceived only through his experience of it.  His 
judgment, his depiction, and perhaps even his craft as a jeweler 
matter in these lines.  Although the pearl clearly affects the poem‘s 
narrator, the object itself does not have a terribly stable presence.   It 
is a pearl that is buried at the narrator‘s feet and linked to exotic 
lands, both here and there, a pearl that is both an ornament and 
child, lost but visible.   
And the problem of Pearl‘s first section hinges on the death of 
the Maiden and the speaker‘s unchecked mourning of this loss, so 
vitality seems displaced, if not altogether absent.  Repeating the link-
word ―spot‖ throughout this first part of the poem engenders a feeling 
of geographical and textual fixity, binding the narrator to the Pearl‘s 
gravesite.  The play on the word – spot as both location and blemish – 
ramifies this attachment, since, as a stain, the spot represents 
something that cannot be removed, which also seems to allude to the 
immobility of the Pearl‘s corpse8.  Yet, the narrator contends that the 
                                                 
8 Katherine Terrell claims that an understanding of the decaying body as a 
companion to the saved soul and the spotless Pearl is a crucial component in the 
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spot is precisely what the Pearl does not or did not have: ―þat pryuy 
perle wythouten spot‖ (12).  Of course, the fear is that now the Pearl 
has been marred, if not spiritually at least physically following her 
death, that her body suffers the indignities of all bodies no matter her 
spiritual purity or the love of the narrator: ―Forsoþe þer fleten to me 
fele,/To þenke hir color so clad in clot./O moul, þou marrez a myry 
iuele…‖ (21-23).  Despite the narrator‘s protests, the spot, like his 
attachment to the burial place, cannot be denied.9 
This entanglement extends to other images as well as the tone 
and pace of the section, too.  All the talk of enclosure – the pearl‘s 
setting, ―clanly close in golde,‖ the narrator‘s oppressed heart, ―þrych 
my hert,‖ even the ―erbere,‖ likely an enclosed garden10 where the 
pearl was lost and ostensibly buried -- doubles the stillness.  It is also 
August (―I entred in þat erber grene,/In Augoste in a hyȝ 
seysoun…‖[38-39]) when the narrator has his vision, which suggests 
                                                                                                                                            
Dreamer‘s development. "Rethinking the "Corse in clot": Cleanness, Filth, and Bodily 
Decay in Pearl." Studies in Philology 105.4 (2008): 429-447. 
9 Ad Putter has argued that ―wythouten spot‖ might indicate the displacement of the 
Maiden, that she in fact is not in the erbere but is in heaven, which the Dreamer 
must come to accept (An Introduction to the Gawain-Poet [London: Longman, 1996], 
148). While the dream vision certainly bears out this reading, the woeful visit to the 
garden that precedes the vision, it seems to me, rests on the logic of stasis and 
enclosure.  As David Aers claims, the Dreamer‘s insistence on memory before the 
vision and when he finally encounters the Maiden is an attempt to render the world 
fixed.  But as Aers continues, ―Using memory in such ways may encourage a 
consoling denial of our transience, which is at the same time a denial of our 
creatureliness…‖ (Aers 63).  This creatureliness is an important part of what the 
poem teaches about vitality and insisting on the purely spiritual residue of the 
Maiden seems to miss this point. 
10 See Andrew and Waldron, eds., The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript, 53, note to line 
9. 
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not only the start of the harvest, but also the stifling dog days of 
summer.  And the ―sleep slaughter,‖ slepyng-slaȝte that concludes the 
first part of the poem and inaugurates the dream vision fits with this 
stagnation and with the Dreamer‘s mourning, which seems to have 
trapped him in a physical and spiritual morass.   
Yet, the narrator insists, perhaps in an effort at self-consolation 
or appropriately restrained mourning11, on the fertility of his 
surroundings.    
Þat spot of spysez mot nedez sprede, 
Þer such rychez to rot is runne, 
Blomez blayke and blwe and rede 
Þer schyne ful schyr agayn þe sunne. 
Flor and fryte may not be fede 
Þer hit doun drof in moldez dunne, 
For vch gresse mot grow of graynez dede; 
No whete were ellez to wonez wonne. (25-31)    
 
This passage seems to balance out the narrator‘s compulsive returning 
to spots: new life, he explains, has grown from the ―rot‖ of the Pearl.  
In fact the Pearl proves so productive that flowers and fruits are riper 
than ever – do not fade – at the place where the body lies.  The 
Maiden‘s death is assigned a purpose, a rather vital, colorful (white, 
blue, and red), restorative purpose in these lines; even in this grieving, 
repetitive space, a certain lively energy breaks through.  Likewise, the 
liturgical setting for the poem, the Feast of the Assumption, according 
to Elizabeth Petroff, brings to mind another eruption of vitality since 
                                                 
11 See Terrell (437-8) for a discussion of the tradition of this brand of consolation. 
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on this feast day, ―lay and religious people brought medicinal plants 
from their kitchen of infirmary gardens so that the healing power of 
the herbs might be sanctified,‖ and recalling the ascension of Mary, 
―their having their own herbs blessed reminded them of the immediacy 
of the spiritual world in the most material and earthly things‖12.  
Seeing this imagery drawn from the gospel as ―an allegory in little‖ of 
the exegetical and thematic investments of the poem, Alan Fletcher 
claims that the ―graynez dede‖ represent the necessary evacuation of 
singular, monadic identity in favor of a multiplicity of identities, the 
field of wheat from a single grain13.  The vegetal metaphors and 
celebrations as well as the promise of multiplicity imbue even the 
space of mourning with a material vitality that resists the pathetic 
fallacy.  The narrator, however, cannot resist the impulse to re-enclose 
these sprouts, noting that the wheat that might grow from ―graynez 
dede‖ is bound to a household, to ―wonez.‖  If these homes are 
nourished and satisfied, the reader might be obliged to recall that the 
narrator‘s is likely sterile and empty without Pearl. 
 
Debating Lives 
Waking to dream, the narrator discovers a dramatically different 
place.  The dream vision landscape is brilliant and hard.  Everything 
                                                 
12 Petroff, Elizabeth, ―Landscape in Pearl: The Transformation of Nature,‖ The 
Chaucer Review, 16.2 (Fall, 1981): 181. 
13 Fletcher, 53. 
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shines, blinds, and distracts with ―crystal klyffez‖ and trees with glossy 
silver leaves.   And soon, though not too soon since the Dreamer 
devotes over a hundred lines to description of the bejeweled 
surroundings, the solitary mourner meets an interlocutor, the 
―mayden in menske‖ (161) who turns out to be the girl with whom the 
Dreamer yearns to reunite, the soul of the dead child ―[h]o watz me 
nerre aunte or nece‖ (233).  The Maiden, however, shows herself to be 
less pliable than the Dreamer has remembered (although anyone who 
has engaged in debate with a child about two years old knows that 
toddlers are mostly everything but submissive), for the first speech the 
Maiden gives amounts to a correction:  
'Sir, ȝe haf your tale mysetente, 
To say your perle is al awaye, 
Þat is in cofer so comly clente 
As in þis gardyn gracios gaye… (257-260) 
 
Apparently unmoved by the Dreamer‘s list of sufferings which he 
attributes to his separation from his child, the Maiden chastises the 
Dreamer‘s account.  She does not simply offer an alternative to his 
loss, consoling him with claims that her coffin has been transformed 
into the vast and glittering garden in which they meet, but rather the 
Maiden attacks the Dreamer‘s very ―tale,‖ his own account of his 
melancholy.  The Dreamer‘s ―mis-setting‖ is a dig at both his claims to 
be a ―joylez juelere,‖ implying he may not be the artisan he believes 
himself to be, and his comprehension of his emotions and their 
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situation more broadly.14  The ―mysetente‖ of the pearl maiden‘s 
critique looks and sounds something like ―mysententia,‖ which might 
suggest that the Dreamer has problems with rhetoric as well as with 
craft.  And the chastening continues throughout the poem, proving the 
impetus for the Dreamer‘s education.  For each of the Dreamer‘s 
theories or readings, as in the discussion of the Parable of the 
Vineyard, the Maiden proposes a counterpoint.  Their debate covers 
topics from the redemptive rewards of innocence as opposed to a 
doctrine of works to questions of value or competition.   
One particular problem to which the couple returns, and which 
is arguably central to the Dreamer‘s development, has to do with the 
quality and conditions of earthly and heavenly lives.  After all, the 
poem owes much of its tension to the disparities between father and 
daughter, especially insofar as the father/Dreamer is alive and the 
daughter/pearl maiden is not. When the Dreamer announces that he 
plans to remain in his heavenly vision with his found daughter, the 
                                                 
14 Whether the poem‘s narrator can be considered more jeweler than mourner and 
whether the poet himself might have worked with precious stones has recently 
interested critics.  There is little agreement on either the narrator‘s or the poet‘s 
métier, but these discussions turn our attention to the material elements of the 
poem.  Imagining the narrator as jeweler has led Felicia Riddy to examine the 
material and economic implications of the poem, concluding that the poem benefits 
from a tradition of European luxury (―Jewels in Pearl‖ in A Companion to the Gawain-
Poet.  Ed. Derek Brewer and Jonathan Gibson [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997]: 149).  Tony Davenport, however, concludes that jewels in Pearl remain 
more symbolic than material (Tony Davenport, ―Jewels and Jewellers in Pearl,‖ The 
Review of English Studies, 59.241, [Fall 2008]: 508-521).   While I follow these 
investigations insofar as much of my reading focuses on the things in Pearl, I choose 
to refer to the narrator as a Dreamer primarily to emphasize his visionary and 
theoretical intentions. 
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Pearl-maiden reminds him that this relocation is not so easily 
achieved.  As she explains, if the Dreamer wants to stay with her in 
paradise – won in þis bayly (315), he first must die: Þy corse in clot mot 
calder keue (320).  It is odd that the Maiden must instruct the 
Dreamer on so obvious a requisite.  The comment, however, makes it 
clear that at issue is the Dreamer‘s decision to live or die, but also that 
living, and not living, are not entirely in the power of the human agent.  
And perhaps the Dreamer has forgotten that the vivid vision of his 
daughter is not a living one but instead a manifestation of her soul.  
The Pearl-maiden‘s insistence on the dead, cold body underscores this.  
Yet, the Dreamer cannot relinquish the earthly idea of life so easily 
and does not learn the lesson.  He protests that he would be a fool to 
recover his pearl only to lose it again:  Why schal I hit boþe mysse and 
mete? (329).  Although the Dreamer concedes that knowing something 
about the whereabouts of Pearl will assuage his suffering and his 
ignorance, he continues to employ earth-bound rhetoric, asking the 
maiden to describe ―wythouten debate…[w]hat lyf ȝe lede erly and late‖ 
(392).  These returns to the problem of the life, which the maiden does 
this time indulge, illustrate the difficulty in excising the rhetoric of 
earthly vitality and the structures for understanding what it means to 
dwell somewhere.  How can you be somewhere (won in þis bayly) and 
not live there?     
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Into this repositioning of the spaces and the relevance of life in 
heaven, things intrude.  As part of the Dreamer‘s re-education, the 
Maiden revises his application of metaphor, making it clear that the 
poem‘s, and the mourner‘s, principal image is inapt, for even as a 
living being she was never a pearl:   
For þat þou lestez watz bot a rose 
Þat flowred and fayled as kynde hyt gef. 
Now þurz kynde of þe kyste þat hyt con close 
To a perle of prys hit is put in pref. 
 
This suggests something about the poem‘s interest in the protean 
nature of things, and the redefinition also points to space outside of 
the categories of organic and inorganic.  The human being straddles 
this divide, or perhaps demonstrates the intersection of the two 
categories, since the Maiden was once a rose, whose properties, in 
particular the capacity to die, were determined by nature (kynde), but 
transformed into a pearl through a natural process, through the 
―kynde of þe kyste‖ – the nature of the chest or coffin in which she was 
buried.  On one level, this account imagines a humanly parallel to a 
mollusk‘s production of a pearl, which modifies the Dreamer‘s earlier 
horror at his daughter‘s decomposing body by suggesting that that 
process might be less grotesque, or at least more productive, than he 
believes.  On another, this description implies a kind of minerality as 
part of the human living being.  Even the soul, the ―perle of prys,‖ 
seems to be associated with a type of thingness, a mineral vitality, 
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despite the Maiden‘s claims about its absolute distinction from the 
cold, dead body15.  Outlining the progression from rose to pearl also 
serves to highlight the hazy categorization of pearls as gemstones or 
entirely inert objects.  The organic origins, the bodily origins, even if an 
animal body, of the pearl render it at once mineral and alive.16  In this 
heavenly terrain, a life force cannot be entirely banished. 
 
Cities & Stones 
And when the debate goes silent, the powers of stone and 
decoration dominate the poem.  The Dreamer is seduced by the 
landscape, filled with joy at its beauty and richness to the extent that 
his mourning starts to diminish: ―The dubbement dere of doun and 
dalez,/ Of wod and water and wlonk playnez,/ Bylde in me blys, 
abated my balez,/ Fordidden my stresse, dystryed my paynez‖ (121-
124).  He even fails to recognize the object of his melancholy when he 
                                                 
15In his reading of the Pearl-maiden‘s revision of the jeweler‘s pearl metaphor, 
Fletcher argues that the rose is a better choice because it is used up in its 
metonymic move much in the way the human body is exhausted in living. (55)  In 
the essay, Fletcher claims that Pearl stages metonymic shifts as a way to weave 
exegesis into a literary context.  What metonymy typically does, he instructs, is 
remind us of the literal.  It is a kind of backwards reading that pretends to privilege 
the association, but is always moving back to something more concrete.  To speak of 
the ―crown‖ is in fact to refer to something more solid than the concept of royalty, 
that is, the body of the king.  This movement and this tension produce a figurative 
network, but as we discover, this network built on substitutions trends toward 
literal.  Fletcher claims that the literal was ―increasingly considered in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries to be of fundamental importance‖ (49), and this mounting 
attention, it seems to me, emphasizes the material elements of a poem that appears 
so intent on spirituality and interiority.   
16 As Tony Davenport reports, ―So, against the established divine power of God‘s 
twelve stones, the pearl appears a more malleable and flexible image, with a strange 
origin combining natural process with a sense of mystery and evanescence…‖ (521). 
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first encounters her, perhaps because the jewels and general luster 
dim his own pain17.  Although there is something aloof and inorganic, 
perhaps a little cold even, about the glittering backdrop, it is 
undeniably vibrant.  And as the Dreamer approaches the river that 
serves to divide the narrator from the Pearl and the heavenly terrain 
but also to connect him to his earthly life, the setting becomes more 
and more organic: 
Þe fyrre in þe fryth, þe feier con ryse 
Þe playn, þe plonttez, þe spyse, þe perez; 
And rawez and randez and rych reuerez, 
As fyldor fyn her bonkes brent. 
I wan to a water by schore þat schereȝ — (103-7) 
While the heavenly ecosystem continues to stun by its multiplicity, the 
plantings grow less metallic as the Dreamer advances.  The 
organization, in hedgerows (rawez) and riverbanks (randez and 
reuerez), becomes familiar, navigable.  The Dreamer has names for 
these sights and orders them into a list, a kind of garden inventory.  
                                                 
17 Aers addresses the first encounter with the landscape, noting its distracting 
qualities and that it inaugurates a forgetting, but he also argues that this reaction 
strays from the conventions of praise for the creator of such wondrous views: ―It does 
not involve attention to the creator of either the landscape or himself‖ (59).  This is at 
once a delight that might overwhelm, a danger in Christian art, and the phenomenal 
attachments of the Dreamer who can go from thing to thing, but not from thing to 
idea.  On the other hand, Petroff asserts that ―it is the function of landscape imagery 
to embody mental states, emotions, emotions which are being experienced by the 
persons within the landscapes and which need to be objectified in order to be 
understood.  Nature can be used in this way to depict the inner life of man, precisely 
because each object in nature has a fathomable, intrinsic spiritual meaning, its 
meaning in the mind of God‖ (183).  While it seems to me that the wonder that the 
Dreamer experiences as he traverses the heavenly/dream terrain goes beyond 
pathetic fallacy and that in the poem the material presence of the bejeweled cliffs 
exceeds the psychological needs of the Dreamer, I do think that the Dreamer‘s 
evolving relationship with his vibrant surroundings tells us something about the 
function of and quality of both materiality and vitality in the poem. 
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Even the river, which has many textual resonances from the stygian to 
the apocalyptic, is manageable and recognizable as simply ―a water.‖  
Its description combines the section‘s early wonder with a sense of 
intimacy: 
In þe founce þer stonden stonez stepe, 
As glente þurȝ glas þat glowed and glyȝt, 
As stremande sternez, quen stroþe-men slepe, 
Staren in welkyn in wynter nyȝt… (113-116) 
 
This multifarious river unites element and mineral, shine and blur, 
movement and fixity, here and there, living and dead, yes and no.  It is 
paved with stones, likely jewels given how they ―glente‖ and resemble 
glowing glass, which suggests an ancient and intentional permanence.  
The riverbed may be the work of an ambitious artisan or a natural 
revelation, and it combines, too, the coolness of the jewel-studded 
heavenly topography with the vitality of water, which is so necessary 
for and original to life, so seemingly alive, but still elemental and not 
exactly animate18.  Yet, the river does have something to do with life as 
the Dreamer, and probably the reader, knows it.  The gemstone 
surface evokes a starry winter‘s night -- a sight that all ―stroþe-men,‖ 
earth dwellers recognize.  It is a protective (sensed while the earth-men 
sleep) and common image that tethers the heavenly river to earthly 
spaces.   
                                                 
18 For Petroff‘s evaluation of the absence of water in erbere and the significance of 
the river in the dream landscapes, see pages 185-188 in ―Landscape in Pearl.‖ 
 147 
Across this river, on the opposite bank, the Dreamer spies his 
daughter, the Pearl-maiden.  The river provides the point of their 
connection, both a source and a limit of knowledge, recalling the 
notorious exchanges between Zozimas and the desert saint, Mary the 
Egyptian, but also marks a divide: on one side reside all things 
paradisiacal, on the other, the Dreamer.  The Maiden warns the 
Dreamer repeatedly to remain on his side of the river, and the idea of 
this transgression, the undertaking of which finally terminates the 
dream, generates an important source of tension in the poem, implying 
perhaps most notably the hazards of unchecked grief and the absence 
of self-control.  The beauty, the mystery, and the power of the river 
depend on the intensity of these contrasts; and since this river tends 
to be considered analogous to the river of life in Revelations19, it draws 
attention to both the place of vital, life-giving energy in heaven and the 
participation of both organic and inorganic matter in this energy. 
If the question of living in heaven is left undecided by the Pearl-
maiden, the vibrant liveliness of heavenly matter is less equivocal.  If 
the souls in the Dreamer‘s vision have given up their relationship with 
animate, atomistic, particulate existence in favor of something more 
eternal and more whole, and it is not entirely clear that this has 
happened, then a remainder of this life force seems to have been cast 
                                                 
19 See Andrew and Waldron, eds., The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript, 59, note to line 
107. 
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out into the scenery that witnesses the dream debate and encases 
Dreamer and Pearl-maiden.  Rather than the pathetic fallacy, which 
stages an exteriorization of psychology, the landscape in Pearl mirrors 
a coincidence of vitalities, the exteriorization of the life force of things 
and once embodied humans.  As the locus of the source of life, it 
makes sense that Heaven would be imbued with this vibrational 
vitality.  And the early sheen of the scenery finds its partner in the 
final vision of the heavenly Jerusalem.  On the glittering city Petroff 
opines, ―natural landscape has become city, artifact, so that all that 
remains of natural landscape is the river‖20 (190).  The progression 
from wilderness to city seems to privilege the material and assigns the 
inorganic a kind of vitality as a counterpoint to the vitality of the 
heavenly figures – or the lack of vitality, since after all they are only 
spirit now.   
It is interesting that in both moments the Dreamer loses track of 
the Pearl-maiden, so overcome by the splendor that he forgets his 
project.  The excess of these visions seems intended to disorient: 
I syȝe þat cyty of gret renoun, 
Jerusalem so nwe and ryally dyȝt, 
As hit was lyȝt fro þe heuen adoun. 
Þe borȝ watz al of brende golde bryȝt 
As glemande glas burnist broun, 
Wyth gentyl gemmez an-vnder pyȝt 
Wyth bantelez twelue on basyng boun… (986-992) 
 
                                                 
20 Petroff, 190. 
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Jerusalem seems almost afire it gleams so powerfully – brende and 
burnist.  The section goes on to describe each of the twelve levels of 
stone that form the city‘s foundation: jasper, sapphire, chalcedony, 
pearl, emerald, sard, ruby, beryl, topaz, crysopase, jacinth, and 
amethyst (1009-1018).  These gemstone strata seem to be less 
manifestations of the soul or mind, less manifestations of virtue than 
actual minerals.  Perhaps the ideal formation of each rock, but 
certainly real, weighty, glimmering things.  There is no ignoring the 
city‘s density or its power to impress.  The Dreamer even makes a 
point of the reality of his vision of heaven:  ―As John þe apostel hit syȝ 
wyth syȝt,/I syȝe þat cyty…‖ (985-6), ―As John deuysed ȝet saȝ I 
þare…‖ (1021), and ―As John hym wryteȝ ȝet more I syȝe…‖ (1033).  
The seeing is real and the sight is, too.  So, it is unlikely that the 
stones, described in minute but still evocative detail, are meant to be 
read as ghostly or spiritual in nature.   Yet, the city might be said to 
yield some of its visual stability as a result of its mobility.  Because the 
Dreamer cannot cross the river to visit the city and because the city is 
only open to unstained souls (―withouten mote‖ [972]), the Dreamer 
has been granted permission only to view the heavenly Jerusalem from 
afar, which means that the city must travel to him.  Even after the city 
is rolled down from its usual, more blissful location, it still seems to 
move.  The Dreamer reports that he can see three gates on each side of 
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the palace: ―Vch pane of þat place had þre ȝatez‖ (1034).  A few lines 
later the Dreamer claims to have X-ray vision: ―Þurȝ woȝe and won my 
lokyng ȝede‖ (1049).  It is as if the city itself is spinning or opening 
itself up to the Dreamer.  At the very least, this impossible perspective 
reflects the intensity of the Dreamer‘s vision and the motile minerality 
of the new Jerusalem. 
 
A Life of Things 
But the heavenly citadel does more than sparkle and twirl – it, 
and other lively inorganic materials in the poem, changes the 
Dreamer.  Toward the close of the description of the heavenly 
architecture, the Dreamer explains his transformation: 
I stod as stylle as dased quayle 
For ferly of þat frelich fygure, 
Þat felde I nawþer reste ne trauayle, 
So watz I rauyste wyth glymme pure. (1085-1088) 
 
The vivid sight proves powerful enough to render its viewer a ―dazed 
quail.‖   If the Dreamer has become the hunted animal, then the city 
with all its enigmatic stones and its sometime transparency is the 
hunter, capturing, acting upon (rauyste wuth gylmme pure) the 
Dreamer.  That the Dreamer feels his own grasp on humanity 
imperiled by this experience underscores not only the force of the 
aesthetics of the scene, but also the things of heaven as living agents 
or actants, which is a term taken from the work of Bruno Latour that 
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Bennett uses for objects that seem to possess the powers of thingness, 
the powers of activity21.  This term fits here because the poem 
repeatedly questions the soundness of the Dreamer‘s agency, implying 
that letting go of the desire for mastery, for total understanding and 
acknowledging the influence of other actants might bring him peace, 
even redemption.  Further, in a text so dedicated to debate, to the 
continual shifting of positions and expectations, it seems necessary to 
represent non-anthropomorphic point of views.  One of these points of 
view adheres to the divine, but the poet goes perhaps a step farther to 
include the things that make up Jerusalem itself.  What is salvation to 
a stone?  Critics have discussed the ways in which the poem works to 
give a voice to the Pearl-maiden, to offer a view from a saved place, but 
what is the story like from the pearl‘s perspective?   
Although I am not sure the poem manages to answer the last 
question, it does seem to ask it indirectly.  Life in Pearl is more than a 
genre or a catalogue of virtues and miracles; even so, catalogues and 
lists attain a heightened structural presence in the poem and 
introduce another non-anthropomorphic life into the mix.  Pearl‘s use 
of concatenation –  repeated words and phrases that begin and end 
stanzas in each section of the piece – configures a machine.  From this 
listing, this iteration emerges both the intricacy and the fluidity of the 
poem.  In the first section, as we have seen, ―spot‖ bounces from 
                                                 
21 Bennett 9. 
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meaning location to blemish; in the ninth part, the link-word ―date‖ 
suggests rank, calendar day, natural or cyclical time of year, and a 
stopping point.  Although the Pearl-poet seems expertly to manipulate 
these repetitions, hitching the poem to the concatenation form invites 
flexibility.  It acknowledges the associative forces that construct the 
poem and that read into and out of it.    The concatenation even 
suggests that the poem participates in its own production, that the 
poem as an object and an associative machine hums along at its own 
pace.  Like a dream that is always a little bit out of the control of the 
Dreamer, Pearl takes seriously the life of things and perhaps even 
imagines the poem itself traversed by mechanical vitality. 
 
* 
 
In Chaucer‘s Canterbury Tales, lives that evoke saints‘ lives 
abound.  The portraits of the pilgrims in the General Prologue present 
as mini-biographies, earning once upon a time charges of realism and 
prompting investigations into the figures‘ possible connections to 
historical people, the poet‘s contemporaries.  Tales of example, of how 
to be a proper knight, of how to embody virtues, of how not to be a bad 
wife, too, render the Canterbury set invested in questions of the living 
being.  Chaucer‘s concern with private and domestic spaces also 
brings into relief an interest in intersubjective experience, in what 
happens when people, families or pilgrims, are packed into close 
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quarters.  With all this interest in narrating lives, in telling stories that 
speak to a diverse audience and represent their speakers, it is not 
surprising that Chaucer includes several tales that explicitly or 
obliquely appropriate the rhetoric of hagiography. 
The lives that Chaucer tends to favor, particularly in the 
Canterbury book, are not your average saints‘ lives.  Far from the lives 
of monastic or historical saints, the legends Chaucer selects are 
intense, bordering on operatic.  Griselda undergoes incredible torment 
at the hands of her husband; Cecilia succumbs to a very public and 
very prolonged martyrdom; Custance is victimized at every port of call.  
Even the Prioress‘s account of the luckless clergeon, a Miracle of the 
Virgin rather than a conventional vita, pushes the limits of a 
hagiographic subset already known for its intensity.  On the one hand, 
these extreme holy athletes seem chosen expressly for the acute 
affliction they endure and the curiosity they engender -- these figures 
live (and suffer and die) more than others.  There is more to the stuff, 
the matere22, of their lives than, say, a St. Dunstan.  On the other, the 
                                                 
22 As Kellie Robertson points out, associating materiality with poetry and in 
particular the act of making poetry was commonplace in the Middle Ages.  Not only 
was poetry a vehicle for discussing matter for the likes of Alain de Lille and 
Bernardus Silvestris, but later poets like Chaucer and Gower often termed their stuff 
of their poetic endeavors matere.  ―The Middle English term matere, like its Modern 
English counterpart, can refer either to a physical substance (either prime matter or 
elemental matter) or to an ―immaterial‖ activity – for instance, a business affair or a 
subject of discussion.  However, in Middle English (unlike in modern English), it also 
had more common and more specialized textual meanings: it regularly referred to a 
scholastic question or to the literary subject matter of a work…It is this homologous 
relation between textual matter and physical matter – the origin of a metaphor now 
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inordinate adversity that these poor souls bear waives the question of 
sanctity.  To a certain extent, it is obvious what makes the clergeon, 
Griselda, and Cecilia worthy of veneration.  Since the matter in these 
lives is not how to achieve salvation, or even legendary status, the 
tales seem free to turn to other, less theological concerns, focusing on 
how forces other than spiritual purity affect the life and, in particular, 
drawing attention to the enigma of the living being itself. 
 
Still, Fertile Spaces 
 The Second Nun‘s Prologue begins with stillness, or to be more 
specific ―Ydelnesse,‖ which seems to threaten the tale‘s narrator, 
tempting her (or him23) to yield to inertia, to indulge in bodily 
pleasures like sleeping, eating, and drinking, and presumably to 
                                                                                                                                            
dead – that animates much of the post-twelfth-century didactic poetry‖ (Kellie 
Robertson, ―Medieval Materialism: A Manifesto,‖ Exemplaria, 22.2, [Summer 2010]: 
112).    
23 As Lynn Staley points out, the Second Nun never takes full ownership of the 
narration and the speaker here seems to be the poet, or at least some 
writer/translator who identifies as male.  The narrator‘s reference to himself as the 
―sone of Eve‖ (62) seems to be the first clue that the speaker is not your average 
Second Nun.  Lynn Staley also explains that certain phrases attach the Second Nun’s 
Tale  to ―Troilus and Crisseyde‖ and other texts believed to have been composed 
around the same time.  (Aers, David, and Lynn Staley. The Powers of the Holy: 
Religion, Politics, and Gender in Late Medieval English Culture. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996: 199.) According to Catherine Sanok,  
however, the ―slip has, of course, long been read as the evidence of the hasty 
inclusion of the tale in the Canterbury collection, a mark of its original (and therefore 
implicitly authoritative) identification with Chaucer‘s own voice rather than with the 
Second Nun, who may be, after all, only a scribal fiction‖ (Sanok, Catherine. 
"Performing Feminine Sanctity in Late Medieval England: Parish Guilds, Saints' 
Plays, and the Second Nun's Tale." Journal of Medieval & Early Modern Studies 32.2 
(2002): 293).  Most likely an editorial oversight or an example of the Second Nun‘s 
appropriation of the authority necessary to offer her sermon, as Sanok goes on to 
argue, the line might also indicate the impossibility of a biblical lineage, a biblical 
precedent for spiritual women.  After all, the only named children attributed to Eve 
are sons.   
 155 
abandon her artistic pursuits, a temptation that most writers 
periodically endure.  While the antidote to this enticing torpor is 
simply enough ―feithful bisynesse‖ (24), the menace of idleness seems 
larger than its personification.  In fact, the Second Nun’s Prologue and 
Tale is often charged with an sluggishness that infects its structure 
and even its readers (particularly modern ones) who see Cecilia as a 
kind of dead letter, an overly textual exemplar of a piety 
uncharacteristic of and unimaginable for the poet, a character without 
humanity in a tale without drama or anything original to commend 
it24.  Earlier audiences, however, proved more sympathetic to both 
Cecilia and Chaucer‘s retelling of her passion, which seemed to have 
operated as much as portable hagiography as performance since the 
tale stands alone in two late medieval manuscripts.25   
Even so, the prologue‘s first lines produce an atmosphere of 
immobility and inflexibility by relying on images of being boxed in: the 
―thousand cordes slye‖ and the ―trappe‖ of the ―feend.‖  Idleness is said 
to be the porter at the gate of ―delices,‖ which implies that these 
                                                 
24 Joseph Grossi notes that critics regret that Chaucer steeps the tale with ―a 
piety..hopelessly remote‖ and that the characters in the narrative are ―deprived of all 
will except the will to self-destruction‖ (Grossi, ―The Unhidden Piety of Chaucer‘s 
‗Seint Cecilie‘‖, The Chaucer Review, 36.3 [2002]: 298).  Sanok points out the poverty 
of characterization in the tale: ―Given no portrait in the General Prologue, the Second 
Nun has no ‗body‘ or personal history to ground her performance, and in the absence 
of a clearly distinguished voice in her tale…no distinct personality emerges‖ (Sanok, 
289).  For similar critiques of the relevance and merit of the tale, see Derek Pearsall, 
The Canterbury Tales, London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985 and Jennifer Summit, 
"Topography as historiography: Petrarch, Chaucer, and the making of medieval 
Rome," Journal of Medieval & Early Modern Studies, 30.2 (2000): 211-46. 
25 Grossi, 299.   
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pleasures might be found in an all too enclosed garden.  The Sloth and 
Idleness duo seem to have at their disposal not just the allure of 
unscheduled time but a series of well-defined spaces, enclosures.    
This space gets a little narrower when the narrator invokes the 
intervention of the Virgin and imagines her pregnancy: ―Withinne the 
cloistre blissful of thy sydis/Took mannes shap…‖ (43-44)26.  Praising 
the purity of the Virgin and noting her good fortune in being chosen as 
the dwelling place for God (―In whom that God for bountee chees to 
wone‖ [38]) is one thing, but using such graphic terms to represent the 
fetal Jesus, a kind of ultrasonic vision, seems to insist on the physical 
presence of Mary.  Yet, this presence is not as whole and intact as 
Marian images tend to be.  Catherine Sanok postulates that the appeal 
to the Virgin is another move to authorize the Second Nun‘s public 
preaching within the context of the Canterbury pilgrimage as the 
speaker implicitly compares the cloister of the womb to the cloister of 
the nun‘s monastic home.  According to Sanok, this metaphor 
becomes the Second Nun‘s ―strongest argument for women‘s 
performance of sacred speech‖27 because it reveals the spaces typically 
open to the conversation of spiritual women as severely restricted.    
But if the voice in the womb is likened to the Second Nun‘s voice, it 
seems to me that we encounter another gender substitution – the 
                                                 
26 This and all further references to the Canterbury Tales are to the Riverside 
Chaucer, ed. Larry Benson, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). 
27 Sanok 291. 
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nun‘s voice joins with Jesus‘s voice -- as well as a potentially 
generative association.  Since this metonym involves a womb and not a 
tomb, the boxes and enclosures of the Prologue in their most 
miniaturized versions toggle between the stiflingly narrow and the 
possibly expansive. 
The etymological dissection of Cecilia‘s name produces a related 
image.  According to the narrator (or perhaps Jacobus de Voragine 
upon whose version of the vita the poet claims to rely), Cecilia‘s name 
aligns her with heavenly lilies, sight for the blind, the biblical figure 
Leah, and ―‘the hevene of peple‘‖ (104).  
…Or elles, loo, this maydens name bright 
Of ―hevene‖ and ―leos‖ comth, for which by right 
Men myghte hir wel ―the hevene of peple‖ calle, 
Ensample of goode and wise werkes alle. 
For ―leos‖ ―people‖ in Englissh is to seye, 
And right as men may in the hevene see 
The sonne and moone and sterres every weye, 
Right so men goostly in this mayden free 
Seyen of faith the magnanymytee… (102-110) 
 
In the final (entirely spurious) meaning, Cecilia becomes both a place 
of redemption and an object to inspire faith and good deeds.  While the 
narrator seems to retreat from the spatial association, from opening 
Cecilia up to the leos by explaining that it is by ―goostly‖ seeing that 
men will recognize the saint as a kind of paradise, the comparison 
imbues both her name and her form with an extension that seems 
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more connected to visible heavenly objects – the sun, moon, and stars 
– than a spiritual vision.    
Outlining these spaces also opens up a relationship between 
people and things, between the animate and the inanimate that 
characterizes the life of Cecilia itself.  Moreover, these continually link 
back to something vital.  ―Ydelnesse‖ is both the minister and the 
―norice‖ of vices; the biblical Leah is especially fertile and associated 
with the origin of the Twelve Tribes of Israel.  The natal and 
etymological projects seem to endow the Second Nun and Cecilia with 
both a spatial dimensionality outside of her human body and a 
nominal generativeness and instability.   
The text of the prologue and tale further hypostatize this 
relationship.  The tale and much of the prologue consist of a 
translation, which the narrator openly acknowledges and which render 
the Second Nun‘s contribution more writerly than other stories.  
Taking the tale from the road to the library, from a public to a private 
place reproduces the dangerous but oddly fruitful enclosures.  Yet, the 
translation is not entirely separated from the public arena, since 
foregrounding this activity as an act of salvation, if only from the perils 
of laziness, has political resonance in late medieval London.  Lynn 
Staley has read this undertaking, along with much of Cecilia‘s life, as 
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influenced by the Wycliffite agenda28 which advocated for vernacular 
translations of the Bible:  ―Wyclif linked the ability to understand and 
to communicate the meaning of Scripture to grace…translation is at 
once a labor and a sign of the transformative actions of grace upon a 
sinful man, re-dressed in knowledge and truth.‖29  As Staley later 
concedes, there was little objection to the translation of saints‘ lives, so 
this particular rendition falls short of radical.  Nevertheless, Cecilia‘s 
life might be considered a kind of safe protest space, a revisionary 
fortress that somehow manages to expose the narrator‘s interiority, the 
grace with which he has been endowed.  The translation as an object 
seems to work as both a sign and a vehicle for this grace (does the 
translation emerge from a saved soul or penetrate to confer salvation?) 
and a bridge between the narrator‘s inner condition and worldly 
production.  Understanding the translated legend in this way 
foregrounds the materiality of the text.  It is something to be worked 
on, but also something that works on the translator herself30.   
                                                 
28While Staley does not ultimately assert Chaucer as a supporter of Lollardy, she 
does find that Chaucer ―used his poetry to ask questions about urgent social issues 
that were inevitably related to the politics of devotion or sanctity.  His legend of saint 
Cecilia is at once an early probe into the subject of spiritual authority as it was 
articulated in the early 1380s and a work he thought interesting enough to insert 
into the Canterbury book at a later date‖ (Staley, 216 and for the links between the 
Second Nun and Lollardy, 201-217). 
29 Staley 201-202. 
30 Grossi offers a different view of the translation undertaken in the tale, 
underscoring the differences between Chaucer‘s vernacular version and those of 
Jacobus de Voragine and the Franciscan abridgement.  In Grossi‘s estimation, ―the 
English poet wished to enhance Cecilie‘s strength and the prefect Almachius‘ 
weakness even more obviously than Jacobus had done‖ (Grossi 298 and for 
additional divergences from the original, see 300-302).  Other treatments of 
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These contracting spaces reappear in Cecilia‘s legend wherein 
the saint and her growing train of converts shuttle between Cecilia‘s 
bedroom and Pope Urban‘s hiding spot among the tombs of other 
martyrs: ―Among the seintis buryeles‖ (186).  Even once the hunt for 
Cecilia is underway, the saint does not suffer public exposure until her 
debate with the Roman prefect, Almachius.  In the home of one of the 
first of the ―sergeantz‖ who detain her, Cecilia convinces Maximus and 
his ―folk echone‖ of the falseness of their faith.  Hearing of Cecilia‘s 
successes, Almachius has the saint brought before him: ―Almachius, 
that herde of this doynge,/Bad fecchen Cecile, that he myghte hire 
see…‖ (421-422).  While the prefect‘s court is likely somewhat open, a 
domain for governance and other public affairs, Cecilia‘s questioning 
does not happen before a panel of wise men or ministers, and no 
interlocutor besides Almachius interrogates her, which again suggests 
a private encounter.  The saint‘s execution, too, occurs within specific 
confines; Almachius bids his officers to boil her alive at her home: 
―And he weex wroth, and bad men shold hir lede/Hom til hir hous, 
and ‗In hire hous,‘ quod he,/‘Brenne hire right in a bath of flambes 
rede‘‖ (513-515).  Although the boiling fails, a final beheading attempt 
also takes place in the saint‘s house.   
                                                                                                                                            
Chaucer‘s source materials include Sherry L. Reames‘ articles "The Cecilia Legend as 
Chaucer Inherited It and Retold It: The Disappearance of an Augustinian Ideal," 
Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies 55.1 (1980): 38-57 and "A Recent Discovery 
concerning the Sources of Chaucer's 'Second Nun's Tale'," Modern Philology: A 
Journal Devoted to Research in Medieval and Modern Literature, 87.4 (1990): 337-
361. 
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Like the act of translation, Cecilia works her grace, her ability to 
persuade and convert in interior spaces.  She seems intimately 
connected to these spaces from the beginning of the legend when she 
and her new husband, Valerian meet on the prescribed night to 
consummate their marriage: 
  The nyght cam, and to bedde moste she gon 
   With hire housbonde, as ofte is the manere, 
And pryvely to hym she seyde anon, 
―O sweet and wel beloved spouse deere, 
Ther is a conseil, and ye wolde it heere…‖ (141-145)  
 
The bedroom is both a space of coercion, or at least expectation, and 
liberation for Cecilia, where she awaits her fate, but also hides a 
secret, ―a conseil.‖  As she explains to Valerian, the secret turns out to 
be an angel who seems to have arranged a spiritual marriage with 
Cecilia.  The ―conseil‖ is not just the creeds and rituals of Cecilia‘s 
unlawful faith, but an other-worldly relationship with some kind of 
physical commitment.  In this first private space as in those that 
follow, Cecilia is able to bend the bonds of the marital contract and to 
redefine her connection with Valerian.  So too in Urban‘s illicit 
graveyard and in Maximus‘ ―safe house‖ Cecilia is able to get around 
the laws of Rome and to rewrite beliefs.    
Aligning Cecilia with these nooks both encases the conversion 
group and opens up the saint.  As in Cecilia‘s etymology, the saint 
merges with the space of redemption, which might open up the holy 
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body, as often happens in martyr legends, to inspection, to find out 
what makes it tick.  Yet, much of the liberation that Cecilia discovers, 
enjoys, and deploys in these spaces is rhetorical since these 
enclosures enable her preaching and debates.  The saint‘s affiliation 
with these locations, the dimensionalizing of her, seems to threaten to 
turn her into an object, something to be marveled at, spoken through, 
or lived in.  While complicated agency and physical status are common 
for the martyr who is always on the verge of dying or expected to be 
dead, it does not posit Cecilia as an especially lively character31.  The 
spaces and the rhetorics of Cecilia‘s legend at first seem to distract 
from an exploration of the material vitality of the saint.  And still, 
Cecilia, ever ―lyk a bisy bee,‖ ever active, remains lively and vibrant; 
there is a kind of blazing, rolling activity that moves her in Chaucer‘s 
translation despite the threat of rhetorical dispersal: 
And right so as thise philosophers write 
That hevene is swift and round and eek brennynge, 
Right so was faire Cecilie the white 
Ful swift and bisy evere in good werkynge, 
And round and hool in good perseverynge, 
And brennynge evere in charite ful brighte. (113-118) 
  
                                                 
31 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen refers to Cecilia as ―still and confident‖ in the first chapter of 
Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003: 22).  
Although Cohen is writing more about the time that Cecilia seems to inhabit and 
embody than the structure of her legend, I think a very different reading of the saint 
develops once we move beyond the prologue.  Cecilia does remain confident, but the 
stillness of the tale‘s introduction is shattered on a number of levels. 
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Converting Things  
 
What maintains this vitality in Second Nun’s Tale?  Where is its 
source?  Its sustenance?  What makes Cecilia so very persuasive?  As 
Staley points out, Chaucer‘s version of Cecilia‘s legend foregrounds the 
saint: ―Chaucer subtly reshaped the legend in order to highlight 
Cecilia herself.  She dominates Chaucer‘s account in ways she does 
not other medieval English lives of Cecilia.‖32  Cecilia becomes a kind 
of hero, a protagonist in almost a novelistic sense in the Second Nun’s 
Tale as she rolls through challenges, tortures, grilling, boiling, and 
beheading with indefatigable aplomb.  Not only does Cecilia have real 
pluck, but nearly every act hinges on her presence or direction.  
Valerian and Tiburce‘s conversions and subsequent martyrdoms shift 
into the background33, transformed into one step in Cecilia‘s 
conversion of Maximus, the Roman officer sent to silence her: 
But whan they were to the place broght 
to tellen shortly the conclusioun, 
They nold encese ne sacrifise right noght, 
But on hir knees they setten hem adoun 
With humble herte and sad devocioun, 
And losten bothe hir hevedes in the place. 
Hir soules wenten to the Kyng of grace. 
 
This Maximus, that saugh this thing bityde, 
                                                 
32 Staley, 205. 
33Sherry Reames finds that in the Franciscan version of Cecilia‘s life which Chaucer 
used for the second part of his translation, Valerian and Tiburce had significantly 
reduced roles, so at least some of Cecilia‘s vibrancy might be attributed to the poet‘s 
sources (Reames 1990). 
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With pious teeris tolde it anonright… (393-401) 
 
The beheadings of Cecilia‘s husband and his brother immediately 
become the property of Maximus, who uses the miraculous sight of the 
brothers‘ souls‘ ascension as part of his preaching.  Even before this 
rapid appropriation, Valerian and Tiburce seem elided into a single 
entity, a tandem ―they‖ in their final objections and executions.  A 
short ―conclusioun‖ indeed.   
 But Cecilia cannot accomplish this eclipsing entirely alone.  At 
nearly every important turning point – conversion, confrontation, 
expiration – in the narrative, Cecilia‘s efforts are accompanied by the 
emergence of potent objects34.  Valerian‘s acceptance of the saint‘s 
request for a chaste marriage and his conversion to Christianity 
depends on the revelation of the angel that Cecilia has claimed will 
protect her purity with any means necessary.  So, to Pope Urban‘s 
hiding spot the new husband goes to profess and expose (though the 
couple has differing opinions on the order of these activities); following 
Urban‘s warm welcome, Valerian begins to see things: 
And with that word anon ther gan appeere 
                                                 
34 Sanok posits that these material investments associate Cecilia‘s preaching with 
―lay access to theology‖ which results in a tale that ―demonstrates a relation between 
women‘s sanctioned preaching and the theological substance and seriousness of lay 
devotion‖ (293).  Emphasizing the relevance of materials, books, idols, vegetation, 
etc., also seems to validate women‘s participation in religious practice, for materiality 
is so often gendered as feminine, as with the Aristotelian ―hyle‖ and the Platonic 
―chora.‖  My understanding of the relationship between gender and primal matter 
grows, of course, out of Judith Butler‘s commentary on Plato‘s Timeaus, and Luce 
Irigary‘s reading of it, in Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits 
of "sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993: especially 36-49). 
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An oold man clad in white clothes cleere, 
That hadde a book with lettre of gold in hond, 
And gan before Valerian to stonde.  (200-203) 
 
Although this conceivably evangelical apparition35 does not qualify as 
an object, he is not exactly a living being either.  He appears as an 
―oold man,‖ but is not constrained by the laws that typically govern 
earthly bodies as he is able to disappear at will: ―Tho vanysshed this 
olde man, [Valerian] nyste where‖ (216).  And as Valerian‘s baptismal 
process ensues, the gilded book emerges as the focal point: 
And on his book right thus he gan to rede: 
―O Lord, o feith, o God, withouten mo, 
O Cristendom, and Fader of alle also, 
Aboven alle and over alle everywhere.‖ 
This wordes al with gold ywriten were.  (207-210)   
  
While the reading material is evocative – though perhaps not for the 
newly initiated – the excerpted section is hardly remarkable, yet the 
golden letters in the ghostly text fascinate, awe-inspiring enough to 
cause Valerian ―as deed‖ to ―fil doun for drede‖ (204).  The vision then 
speaks to the stunned novice, and the ―olde man‖ asks, ―‗Leevestow 
                                                 
35 This figure has been identified with St. Paul, since the text Valerian reads is from 
Paul‘s letter to the Ephesians 4.5-6.  (See Florence H. Ridley‘s Explanatory Notes to 
the Second Nun’s Tale  in The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd ed., gen. editor, Larry Benson 
[Boston, 1987], 945.)  The evanescence of this ―oold man,‖ however, seems to 
connect him more with the angel that looks after Cecilia than a representation of 
ecclesiastical authority or history.  The choice of epistles also seems curious as an 
oath.  Nevertheless, the epistle is appropriate as it is concerned with the completion 
of conversion and the separation of the Ephesians from their fellow Gentiles in 
thought and action.  It also emphasizes the physical connections, the network of 
Christ‘s followers: ―That we...may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, 
even Christ: From whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that 
which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of 
every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.‖  This 
insistence on the believers as a kind of connective tissue is taken up in the Second 
Nun’s Tale with surprising effects.   
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this thyng or no?‘‖ (212)  To which Valerian replies, ―‗I leeve all this 
thyng.../For sother thyng than this, I dar wel say,/Under the hevene 
no wight thynke may‘‖ (213-215).  ―Thyng‖ in this exchange clearly 
refers to the profession of faith made through Valerian‘s reading: that 
is, the God of Christendom is the one true god.  Yet, repeating the 
ambiguous term ―thyng,‖ instead of any number of other more specific 
terms, underlines the strange presence and ephemerality, the weight 
and the dissolution of the golden lettered book and the Pauline 
specter36.  Thyng here does not only gesture at the new belief, the 
oath-swearing, and the submission to the Law, but it also affirms the 
reality and the significance of the glittering book: as Valerian says, no 
living being could think a truer thing.   
 This ritualized dialogue also reminds that this book, the 
appearance of the old man, and the flowers and angels that materialize 
later in the narrative count as things and not objects37.  Shannon 
Gayk summarizes the differences between things and objects in her 
article on things in the Prioress’ Tale thus:  
Strictly speaking, a thing is not an object.  The things stands at 
the crux of subject and object, of the singular and the 
universal…Insofar as things lie before and outside cognition, 
they resist our attempts to objectify them, to render them the 
                                                 
36 For a look at another tale in which Chaucer highlights thing-power, see Shannon 
Gayk, "To wondre upon this thyng": Chaucer's Prioress's Tale,." Exemplaria 22.2 
(2010): 138-156.  Kellie Robertson explores even more broadly the medieval ideas of 
things in her article ―Medieval Things: Materiality, Historicism, and the Premodern 
Object‖ (Literature Compass, 5/6 [2008]: 1059-1080.) 
37 Gayk 140. 
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passive objects of our interpretation and categorization.  In this 
respect, things are other than and antecedent to objects (140).   
 
And Jane Bennett offers a similar explanation of this distinction, 
noting that objects are not like things because things are ―vivid entities 
not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects set 
them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics.‖38  Such resistant 
and excessive things that are ―as much force as entity, as much energy 
as matter, as much intensity as extension‖39 cluster around Cecilia.  
Valerian‘s book was obviously not made by any human subject (and 
cannot in fact be properly modified by any possessive noun), and it is 
not available as a tool or an item to be incorporated into a context 
constructed by a more conventionally active subject.  Even its original 
author, now a kind of heavenly hologram straddling animate and 
inanimate realms, can no longer lay claim to it.  These things, not 
directly crafted by any human but still entangled in human production 
and human theologies (this is not, after all, a burning bush or the 
unmediated voice of a divine being), flaunt their unknowability, their 
failure to be possessed and even to be observed, since Valerian must 
perform a tacit submission (he is ―meke as evere was any lomb‖ [199]) 
before he is permitted to see them.  This unmoored golden book, more 
through the force of its unexpected appearing than through the 
persuasiveness of its doctrine, enacts the conversion that Cecilia 
                                                 
38 Bennett 5. 
39 Bennet 20. 
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initiated.  Likewise, when Valerian manages to return to his new wife, 
he discovers more heavenly objects presented by Cecilia‘s custodial 
angel – two floral crowns, lilies for him and roses for her.  The angel 
explains: 
―Fro paradys to yow have I hem broght, 
Ne nevere mo ne shal they roten bee, 
Ne lese hir soot savour, trusteth me...‖ (228-230)    
 
These flowers from ―paradys,‖ a place perhaps earthly, perhaps 
heavenly (or as in Pearl, able to move between both levels), boast a 
surfeit of vitality; they will never die and never fade.  These wondrous 
things follow their own agenda: their incorruptibility cannot be and is 
not explained in the text, rendering them both natural, a recognizable 
part of nature with all the expected attributes of roses and lilies, and 
not exactly living (or maybe extra-animate) since they cannot decay; 
they can be seen only by those who are ―chaast and hate vileynye‖ 
(231) which suggests that these vegetal things discern, make choices, 
or at least react in a mode that cannot be called entirely passive.  For 
instance, Valerian‘s brother, Tiburce, perhaps because of his potential 
for good works or perhaps through Valerian‘s prayer40, may smell but 
not see the flowers at first.  Altering their sensible effects given the 
readiness of the perceiver, the flowers enter into a mutable 
relationship with Tiburce.  And even in their invisible state the crowns 
                                                 
40 ―I have a brother,‖ quod Valerian tho,/‖That in this world I love no man so./I pray 
yow that my brother may han grace/To knowe the trouthe, as I do in this place.‖ 
(235-238) 
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retain the power to penetrate by their scent the very heart of the 
would-be believer:  
―For though I hadde hem in myne handes two, 
The savour myghte in me no depper go. 
The sweete smel that in myn herte I fynde 
Hath chaunged me al in another kynde.‖ (249-242) 
 
Although the thing is entirely outside and unknowable to Tiburce, the 
flowers‘ aroma is powerful enough to modify the sniffer‘s very nature, 
rearranging him at a molecular level before leading him to comprehend 
the truth of the ―myracle of thise coronoes tweye‖ (270) and finally, 
after quite a long bit of preaching by Cecilia, to seek out Urban for his 
own baptism.   
These injected things redistribute vitality in Cecilia‘s legend.  
Undoubtedly, Cecilia shows herself to be a worthy and convincing 
teacher in her own right, but still, the intrusion and the promise of 
things in connection with Cecilia‘s influence accomplish the narrative‘s 
major conversions.  The saint‘s reliance on things to participate in her 
miracles contests the idea that she is more vital (or more chosen) than 
others, which perhaps accounts for the general perception that the 
Second Nun’s Tale and Cecilia in particular lack vigor.  The tale 
spreads out the vital energy and even privileges the role that the 
material world has to play in religious experience.  Perhaps Cecilia‘s 
power is drawn from the recognition of this vitality, her ability to 
enable and to submit to the dynamism of these arrivals.   And to a 
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certain extent, Cecilia‘s own propensity for resistance – her 
impenetrability (―round and hool‖) and her vocal redefinitions of 
kinship and citizenship, as well as her predetermined martyrdom – as 
signaled by the crown of roses – align her more with the thing vitality 
than with a human vitality.  The non-human objects are not just her 
tools but her compatriots:  that everyone is turning into a dead body 
around her seems to confirm such a reading.   
 
 
Getting in Touch with the Inanimate 
 
In Cecilia‘s universe, which is at once temporally distant from 
the world of the poet and perhaps also, if we follow Staley in believing 
that Chaucer might have deployed the legend to imagine a reformed 
church hierarchy, potentially very close to the poet‘s contemporary 
world, things have a vitality that even certain animate beings, like 
Almachius, lack.  Although the Second Nun’s Tale does not pinpoint 
the source of the life force or even locate definitively the impetus for 
conversion, Chaucer‘s translation of the life of Cecilia centers on the 
vital energies of things and in particular the powerful effects of 
nonhuman energy in conjunction with the human energy.   
Cecilia‘s final moments dramatize this force.  After failing to be 
boiled for a night and a day, Cecilia is subjected to a beheading 
attempt, which like the fiery bath does not finish her off.  Only 
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permitted three strokes, the ―tormentour‖ gives up on Cecilia:  ―But 
half deed, with hir nekke ycorven there,/He lefte hir lye, and on his 
wey he went‖ (533-534).  Like those unfading crowns of roses and 
lilies, Cecilia possesses an apparent excess of vitality as she is able to 
endure three days beyond her execution.  In a very thorough reading 
of the Second Nun set, David Raybin argues in part that, in this tale, 
Chaucer responds to Dante‘s infernal bodily figures – that is, the 
paradoxical figures that suffer effective and lively torments in hell 
without souls but apparently with bodies – by pushing ―the idea of 
death as an escape from fleshly life beyond what would seem to be its 
logical limit, suggesting the possibility of a kind of invisible death that 
comes not after life but in life‖ 41.  As often is the case with logical 
limits, reversals abound; where Raybin sees the death in life, I would 
argue that Cecilia demonstrates the reverse, a defiant vitality that is 
severed in this protracted textual moment from the notion of body, 
incorruptibility, and soul.   
Moreover, even particularized, Cecilia works as the connective 
tissue between the things that surround and surprise her and the 
members of her burgeoning community.  In her vulnerable state, 
Cecilia manages to keep up her proselytizing and to distribute her 
belongings: 
                                                 
41 Raybin, "Chaucer's Creation and Recreation of the 'Lyf of Seynt Cecile'." The 
Chaucer Review 32.2 (1997): 206.   
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And hem she yaf hir moebles and hir thyng, 
And to the Pope Urban bitook hem tho, 
And sede, ―I axed this of hevene kyng, 
To han respit thre dayes and namo 
To recomende to yow, er that I go, 
Thise soules, lo, and that I myghte do werche 
Heere of myn hous perpetuelly a cherche.‖ (540-546) 
 
Cecilia‘s legacy and her final desires are bound up in things; doling 
out her possessions seems to be akin to or even a part of last sermons.  
The repeated grouping – saint, confined space, teachable opponent(s), 
and vivid thing – produces a kind of conversional magic.  In such 
small groups, the relationship is highlighted: no one converts in 
isolation, but no one converts in a cathedral either.  There is a kind of 
cellular unity in these mini-congregations that idealizes the diffuse 
authority and mutability of the ancient church but also stages 
configurations that could happen in any period42.   
These linked groups, it seems, might qualify as examples of 
Deleuzeguattarian assemblages.  Jane Bennett defines this concept as 
―ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts.  
Assemblages are living, throbbing confederations that are able to 
function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound 
them from within.‖43  Positing Cecilia as a member of such a formation 
reaffirms the human life‘s connection to a nonhuman life, even 
                                                 
42 Grossi argues that Chaucer amplifies the community, particularly the one that 
surrounds Cecilia, that appears in the Franciscan abridgement.  While the poet 
―relegates Almachius to a sort of epistemological solitary confinement,‖ he renders 
Cecilia the standard bearer of common sense and represents Rome as naturally 
inclined to support the saint (Grossi 304). 
43 Bennett, 23-4 
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suggesting that the human life may not be at the top of the vitality 
chain.  The saint does not always take the lead in her conversions, and 
in the final assemblage, the house-church and Cecilia‘s furniture seem 
more durably dynamic than the dying human.  Opening up the ―hool 
and rond‖ Cecilia (though she seems to open herself to these 
confederacies even before the beheading) to the influence of the 
assemblage, to contact with a variety of things reminds that she (and 
we) are not always in charge.   
The Second Nun’s Tale stages the effects of vital things in the 
saint‘s life.  It is not just ensouled beings that live, and it is not just 
heavenly actants that play a role in living exemplary lives.  Yet, it 
seems to me that the assemblages of the Cecilia legend might also 
inform the larger structure of the Canterbury Tales and the evolving 
understanding of the hagiographic genre.  The Canterbury pilgrims 
seem the perfect medieval example of an assemblage with their 
contestations and roiling reformations of the company‘s topography.  
As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen has pointed out, the pilgrimage and structure 
of the tales themselves move by ―rhizomatic drift.‖44  The compilation 
is varied and nonhierarchical, prone to welcome unanticipated new 
members like the Canon Yeoman, whose tale is entwined with that of 
                                                 
44Cohen, 23.  ―The Tales combine politics, religion, art, commerce, social critique into 
an unsynthesized amalgam of romance, hagiography, history, fabliaux, fantasy, 
sermons, exemplary narratives, poetry, prose.  They produce a motley assortment of 
persons who often overstep the boundaries of their textuality and begin to act as if 
alive.‖   
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the Second Nun, and aimed at a hazy target.  Bennett explains that 
the very idea of the assemblage developed in response to the exigencies 
and awarenesses of late twentieth-century globalization, which 
recognized that the many parts of ―this giant whole‖ were connected 
but also irreconcilable45.  Perhaps we see a similar awareness in the 
shifting purposes and evolving vitalities of hagiography in the latter 
part of the fourteenth century.  From the confines of the monastery to 
the chaos of the city, the vita for the extra-monastic audience must 
contend with an influx of newly animated entities.   
Moreover, it seems as though the conscious appropriation, the 
taking as an object or artifact, or even as a thing, of the life genre 
guides the Pearl-poet and Chaucer toward a consideration of 
materiality itself.  The glittering visions, buildings, and landscapes in 
Pearl and the ―throbbing confederations‖ in Second Nun’s Tale 
illustrate the expansion of the category of the life, which more and 
more concerns itself not only with the rhetorics of salvation but the 
vital forces that animate forms saintly, not so saintly, and even 
nonhuman.  Assemblages produce new forms without consuming their 
constituent parts.  ―A form in which the materials themselves have a 
say‖46: maybe what we see in the secular appropriations of 
hagiographies is that life begins to have a say in its own genre. 
                                                 
45 Bennett 23. 
46 Cohen 20. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Entanglements: The Monk’s Tale, Piers Plowman, and the Mesh 
 
I seigh his sleves purfiled at the hond 
With grys, and that the fyneste of a lond;  
And for to festne his hood under his chyn, 
He hadde of gold ywroght a ful curious pyn; 
A love-knotte in the gretter ende ther was. 
His heed was balled, that shoon as any glas, 
And eek his face, as he hadde been enoynt.  
He was a lord ful fat and in good poynt; 
His eyen stepe, and rollynge in his heed,  
That stemed as a forneys of a leed… (GP, 195-202)1 
 
The Monk we meet in Chaucer‘s General Prologue to the Canterbury 
Tales has an air of epicureanism about him.  Enclosed in plush 
squirrel furs and ornamented with gold, he becomes the type of thing, 
glittering and luxurious, that so transfixes the Pearl-Dreamer.  The 
sheen that coats his head and face, perhaps a greasiness or perhaps a 
more appealing glow of a man ―in good poynt,‖ renders him rather 
inapproachable, and also defines the Monk by his costume.  The 
rolling eyes and steam-pipe energy, which might be the force 
responsible for his love of ―venerie‖ (166), associate the Monk with 
excess both material and humoral.  Like the Miller, whose mouth is 
described as ―as greet…as a greet forneys‖ (559), the Monk blazes and 
roils.  Read as a mark of his moral inadequacies, the Monk‘s vaporous 
                                                 
1 This and all further references to the Canterbury Tales are to the Riverside 
Chaucer, ed. Larry Benson, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). 
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inclinations are often presumed to result from unconstrained 
immersion in bodily pleasures2.  Yet, Monk‘s simile does not seem to 
stop at image – it is not the suggestion of any cauldron, but a leaden 
one, a dark, heavy, mineral presence that not only points out the 
Monk‘s fiery passions and personality, but also underscores the 
importance of his material investments3.   
Likewise, in the General Prologue as in the Prologue to the Monk’s 
Tale, the Monk‘s interests and presence have less to do with the pious 
enterprises expected of a cleric, less to do with questions of devotion 
and ethics, than with animals, fashion, and corporeal desires.  These 
predilections to a certain extent overtake the Monk‘s identity and his 
portrait.  Animal metaphors and characters populate in both accounts: 
not only as items in the Monk‘s wardrobe, but as the objects of his 
hunting trips and extravagant dinners (―A fat swan loved he best of 
any roost‖ [205]) and as the companions – dogs and horses – for his 
excursions.  Cloisters are compared to oysters and monks to fish.  The 
Monk‘s portrait even concludes with a close-up of the man‘s horse: 
―His palfrey was as broun as is a berye‖ (207).  Replaced throughout 
                                                 
2 See Benson‘s Explanatory Notes to the General Prologue, 807.   
3 For Robert Worth Frank, Jr., this investment conjures Chaucer‘s own residence in 
Aldgate, where the poet might have witnessed the ironworks of bell-founders ―busy 
melting metal for buckles or pots or bells‖ (―Chaucer and the London Bell-Founders,‖ 
Modern Language Notes 68.8 [Dec., 1953], pp. 527.)  In a less mineral vein, Paul 
Beichner reads the Monk as a functionary, an ―up-to-date, progressive, an 
‗organization man‘‖ who served as an outrider, doing business for a monastery 
outside of the cloister ("Daun Piers, Monk and Business Administrator." Speculum: A 
Journal of Medieval Studies 34.4 [1959]: 611-619).  
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by this menagerie, the Monk is depicted as disproportionate in his love 
for animal life, a love that renders him a little more and a little less 
than human,  
 Yet the Host, later in the Prologue to the Monk’s Tale, construes 
this excess differently.  He notices the Monk‘s robust and commanding 
demeanor: ―Thou art a maister, whan thou art at hoom‖ (PMT, 1938), 
remarking even on his ―ful fair skyn.‖  Apparently moved by the 
Monk‘s vigorous presence and gleaming skin, the Host bemoans Don 
Piers‘ removal from the gene pool: 
Thou woldest han been a tredefowel aright. 
Haddestow as greet a leeve as thou hast myght 
To parfourne al thy lust in engendrure, 
Thou haddest bigeten ful many a creature. (1945-1948) 
 
In part, this commentary functions as a critique of the Monk‘s 
misplaced zeal, in particular his gluttony which has translated into ―so 
wyd a cope‖ (1949) 4, than of clerical celibacy, yet these remarks again 
highlight the Monk‘s material dispositions, connecting him to yet 
another animal (a chicken) and suggesting that his breeding endeavors 
would produce ―ful many a creature‖ rather than explicitly human 
                                                 
4 Frank points out that ―cope‖ is a term for the clay shell that works to form molten 
metal into the proper shape in bell-making: ―First a clay ‗core,‘ exactly corresponding 
in shape and volume to the inside of the bell, was formed and hardened by baking. 
Then the ‗thickness,‘ originally of wax but by Chaucer's day loam or earth, was built 
up on the core. It corresponded in shape and thickness to the bell to be cast. Over 
the thickness a thick clay ‗cope‘ was built. Then the clay cope was raised, the 
thickness was destroyed, the cope replaced over the core, and the metal poured into 
the space between core and cope‖ (Frank, 527).  Although Frank further explains 
that the term ‗cope‘ was not used in this sense until the late 19th century, the 
resonance of formation, earthiness, and objects is at least relevant here. 
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children.  Even if the Host is ―playing‖ with the Monk, as he later 
claims (1963), the same points about the Monk‘s habits and 
affiliations are underscored in both the General Prologue and the 
prologue to the tale.  He might be a good breeder, but of what exactly?5  
He is corpulent, but there is something praiseworthy, even sexy, in it.  
The Monk may be conspicuous for his girth, but his talents and his 
flaws, as well as the difference between them, prove hard to discern.  
Moreover, in resisting his innate, according to the Host, abilities to 
reproduce, the Monk shows his piety and his sincerity.  Despite the 
Monk‘s departures from traditional monastic codes – hunting rather 
than farming, holding to the new rather than studying the past – he 
does not become an entirely contradictory or hypocritical figure, just a 
slightly unorthodox one. 
 Even so, the Tale that ensues, a kind of legendary of mostly 
secular tragedies in which prideful or at least fortunate historical 
figures suffer a fall, is often read as a bad match for the Monk.  For a 
figure so immersed in appearance and indulgence to recite, with a 
certain measure of satisfaction, a long list of the comeuppances seems 
rather incongruous.6  The Monk‘s originally promised tale (―or two, or 
                                                 
5 Tison Pugh claims that the Host with this remark calls the Monk and the Nun‘s 
Priest ―chicken-fuckers.‖  See Pugh, "Queering Harry Bailly: Gendered Carnvial, 
Social Ideologies, and Masculinity Under Duress in the "Canterbury Tales." Chaucer 
Review 41.1 (2006): 59. 
6 For a reading of the Monk‘s flawed deployment of his exemplary materials, see 
Douglas J. Wurtele, "Chaucer's monk: an errant exegete," Literature and Theology 1.2 
(1987): 191-209.  B. W. Lindeboom presents an alternative understanding of the 
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three‖), however, complicates this reading in that his aim is to ―seyn 
the lyf of seint Edward‖ after he has run through a few ―tragedies‖ 
(1970, 1971).  This context, the unfulfilled promise of a life and 
unsuitable narrator, posits the life genre as a kind of literary-historical 
telos while also forestalling the notion of teleology, literary or 
otherwise.  Although he never manages to squeeze Edward in among 
the tragedies he favors, his intentions conform to his station at some 
level.  The tale also imagines the possibility of intersections between 
the lives that the Monk narrates and the unspoken saint‘s life.  Most 
importantly, though, not only does the Monk claim to be progressing 
toward hagiographic topics, but the legendary structure of his tale also 
sets up this possibility.  We are primed for hagiography in the Monk’s 
Tale – it is the perfect place for it – and yet we never get it.  The tale 
thwarts our expectations, and may even be going so far as to disallow 
the saint‘s life, to banish it poetically.  Taken together with that of the 
Second Nun, two compositions supposedly drafted early in Chaucer‘s 
career7, the Monk’s Tale indicates an ambivalence toward hagiography 
                                                                                                                                            
Monk, claiming that the Monk‘s selection of tragedies permits the narrator to 
interrogate his own beliefs and to arrive at a more harmonious and appropriate 
representation of self in his article: "Chaucer's Monk Illuminated: Zenobia as Role 
Model." Neophilologus 92.2 (2008): 339-350.  While I agree that the Monk described 
in the prologues seems an unexpected candidate for offering a moral education, I am 
not sure that either as a character or as a teacher the Monk must be perfectly fitted 
to his subject matter.  Perhaps part of the point is the disjunction that seems 
entirely reasonable and even desirable to the Monk (and the Harry Bailey, too). 
7 See Benson‘s introductory remarks to the tale (The Riverside Chaucer, 929-930).  
Lindeboom comes down on the side of a later composition or at least revision in his 
article (―Chaucer‘s Monk Illuminated,‖ 341-342). 
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and about what it might contribute to a project like the Canterbury 
Tales, but it also implies the poet‘s repeatedly grappling with this 
problem.       
This chapter will consider the shape and the attachments of 
later 14th-century reformulations and even implied repudiations of the 
saint‘s life.  A brief examination of one of the tales included in the 
Monk‘s collection builds on the thing-powers in The Second Nun’s Tale 
and offers an example of and an introduction to the structure of a life 
that flirts with hagiographic hallmarks without explicitly adopting 
them.  Then, turning to William Langland‘s Piers Plowman, this 
chapter‘s chief interest, I explore the afterlife of hagiographic forms 
which continually take up the question of the vitality.  The dislodged 
and unhallowed lives in Langland‘s dream vision revise a focus on 
vertical movements, looking at the living being in the process of 
sanctification, to horizontal ones in which the life is produced as much 
by other lives, worldly materials, historical contingencies – produced in 
a kind of ―mesh‖ – as by whatever lurks above, suggesting that the 
living being is not something deposited or static, not a monad, nor 
even a body sewn around a divinely unbroken soul, but rather a fluid 
part of multiple ecologies.  In imagining the organization of Chaucer 
and Langland‘s saint-less lives as a mesh, I employ Timothy Morton‘s 
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principal emblem for achieving what he calls ―the ecological thought.‖  
Morton revisits this image often in his project and defines it thus:  
The ecological thought imagines interconnectedness, which I call 
the mesh.  Who or what is interconnected with what or with 
whom?  The mesh of interconnected things is vast, perhaps 
immeasurably so.  Each entity in the mesh looks strange.  
Nothing exists all by itself, and so nothing is fully ‗itself.‘8   
 
I will return below to Morton‘s mesh, particularly as it applies to 
encounters and perspectives in Piers Plowman, and the awareness that 
this image of interconnection arouses. 
 
Zenobian Nexus 
If the Monk‘s ultimate end is to work his way around to the life 
of Edward, there must be some correspondences between the tales he 
does manage to address and the idea of historically-inflected sanctity.  
Zenobia‘s story, in this respect, is especially illuminating.  It is an 
enigmatic tale: the only narrative in the Monk‘s set that describes the 
fall of a woman and the longest tale in the grouping.  Although the 
source of Zenobia‘s account is easy enough to trace – it is taken from 
                                                 
8 Morton, The Ecological Thought. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
(2010): 15.  As strangely as Morton phrases and insists on phrasing this idea, he 
offers a convincing reason for his expression - he claims to be attempting to critique 
and develop a structural approach to the problem: ―Of course there are ecological 
thoughts.  And this book has no monopoly on ecological thinking.  But there is a 
particular kind of thinking that I call the ecological thought.  It runs like a strand of 
DNA code through thousands of other kinds of thoughts.  Moreover, the form of the 
ecological thought is at least as important as its content.  It‘s not simply a matter of 
what you‘re thinking about.  It‘s also a matter of how you think.  Once you start to 
think the ecological thought, you can‘t unthink it: it‘s a sphincter – once it‘s open, 
there‘s no closing‖ (4). 
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Boccaccio‘s De claris mulieribus – what the tale is doing in the 
collection remains perplexing.  Does it properly belong to another Tale, 
another teller, another work entirely, like the Legend of Good Women?  
Why Zenobia?  What does her undoing add to or underscore about the 
Monk‘s project?  Even if such questions of intention were fully 
resolvable, the narrative of Zenobia‘s journey from freedom to 
imprisonment would still stand out.  Unlike Sampson or Julius 
Caesar, Zenobia is not an immediately recognizable figure, nor is her 
biography the stuff of adage.  The account of her fall from majesty 
reads as dramatically as the other tales, but its eccentric, even 
intentionally exotic, details and the tale‘s form set it apart.   
 Zenobia‘s life becomes a kind of miniature of the Monk‘s 
compilation, providing a meeting point for several forms of 
hagiography.  The tale reflects the Monk‘s needs and training in its 
form: as a type of ―lay saint‘s life‖9, Zenobia‘s story seems a generically 
appropriate exemplar for the Monk in spite of the tale‘s other 
enigmatic properties.  While Lindeboom claims that Chaucer‘s 
readership would have noticed the poet‘s efforts to mold his Italian 
source into a hagiographic history, it seems to me that readers might 
first appreciate the rhetoric of the life foregrounded in this way.  
Although it is striking that Zenobia stands as the sole female in 
Chaucer‘s adaptation of Boccacio‘s De Casibus Virorum, the Syrian 
                                                 
9 Lindeboom, 348. 
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queen does not acquiesce to traditionally feminine roles10.  She hunts, 
governs, conquers, resists and redefines marriage.  As the Monk puts 
it, ―From hire childhede I fynde that she fledde,/Office of wommen, 
and to wode she wente‖ (2256-57).  Like the narrator, Zenobia seems 
to have much in common with animal life, impelling her even to 
imitate their living habits: ―She dorste wilde beestes dennes seke,/And 
rennen in the montaignes all the nyght,/ And slepen under a 
bussh...‖(2263-65).  Yet this apparent metaphor for womanly 
waywardness and disorder reverses sharply.  As in touch with a 
version of unfettered nonhuman vitality (and we must wonder if it is 
vitality that a hunter pursues) as Zenobia at first appears, the strict 
controls she applies to her sex life contradict her wildchild portrait.   
 
They lyved in joye and in felicitee, 
For ech of hem hadde oother lief and deere, 
Save o thyng: that she wolde nevere assente, 
By no wey, that he shoulde by hire lye 
But ones, for it was hir pleyn entente 
To have a child, the world to multiplye... (2277-81) 
 
One of the stranger elements of Zenobia‘s narrative, the pattern of her 
sex life, sketches out a nuanced character unlike others in the Tale 
                                                 
10 And if we take seriously the idea that Zenobia functions as foil for the Monk, a 
projection through which he may examine his own tastes, habits, and relationship to 
the didactic batch of tales he tells, then it only makes sense that Zenobia‘s gender 
should tip toward the masculine.  As Harry Bailey has insisted, the Monk is a great 
specimen of masculinity, so if Zenobia is his textual reflection, perhaps there are no 
women in the Monk‘s Tale.  For a more precise examination of masculinity in this 
tale and others, see Tison Pugh‘s, "Queering Harry Bailly: Gendered Carnvial, Social 
Ideologies, and Masculinity Under Duress in the "Canterbury Tales." Chaucer Review 
41.1 (2006): 39-69. 
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whose most significant attribute is to suffer at Fortune‘s whim, which 
is not so unique an experience.  But before Zenobia‘s defeat, she 
already has quirks.  Irrational in her highly structured marital 
routines, Zenobia seems intent to protect a version of her freedom by 
imposing such parameters, but, at the same time, she consents, 
perhaps unwittingly, to other limits.  She decides when Odenake, her 
husband, will be allowed to ―doon his fantasye‖ (2285), but attaches 
this decision to biological rhythms and to the mysteries of conception.  
Moreover, her desire to have children suggests that Zenobia‘s ―entente‖ 
may not be entirely about extending the apparent freedom of her 
untamed youth, as both pregnancy and motherhood produce 
attachments not easily escaped or controlled.  In fact, this 
arrangement resembles in both purpose and action a chaste, or semi-
chaste, marriage.  Despite the tone of censure in the Monk‘s 
description of Zenobia‘s sexual habits, the queen stands as icon of 
perfect wifehood, perhaps even perfect Christian wifehood though both 
the narrator and likely the reader would be aware of this inaccuracy.  
Even so, Zenobia‘s moral project assumes a decidedly Christian tenor; 
not only does she devote herself to reading primarily about ―how she in 
vertu myghte hir lyf dispende‖ (2310), but Zenobia also tells Odenake 
that  ―[i]t was to wyves lecherie and shame,/...if that men with hem 
pleyde‖ (2297-98).  Lechery, virtuous living, spousal restraints, the 
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Monk‘s Zenobia hits recognizably righteous notes which testify to the 
Monk‘s integrity and complement his own knotty piety.   
The hagiographic correspondences in the Zenobia narrative do 
not stop at her desire for chastity and interest in edifying reading 
material.  The tale begins with Zenobia‘s noble lineage and her 
unchildish childhood spent outside the usual social circles and 
requirements.  Although she ultimately gives in to marriage, her initial 
resistance (―She kepte hir maydenhod from every wight,‖ 2269) aligns 
the queen with the virgin martyr tradition.  And Zenobia‘s conspicuous 
successes as a ruler affiliate her with the royal saints, perhaps even 
with Saint Edward whose appearance in the Monk‘s catalogue she 
preempts.   Like the Monk, Zenobia has a taste for the hunt and for 
luxury, but also wishes to conform to a relatively austere moral code.   
B. W. Lindeboom contends that Zenobia‘s tale acts as foil and warning 
to the Monk, that the Monk singles out this particular story to validate 
his own behaviors –  showing precedent for mixing upright living with 
outdoor enthusiasm – and, perhaps less consciously, to chastise his 
excesses with Zenobia‘s tragic end.11  The life‘s reach, however, 
                                                 
11 ―To begin with, there is their common love of hunting, which may well have been 
the exact reason why Zenobia was made to participate in the Monk‘s histories. If so, 
then her example is used to demonstrate that this is something that need not keep 
one from a celibate life or taking time off for the pursuit and contemplation of virtue. 
With respect to the Monk, the moral of her story thus becomes a warning at his 
address. If this mighty huntress, so noble, beautiful, virtuous and courageous could 
fall so low, let the Monk—as keen a hunter, goodlooking and chaste as per his vow, 
but a slave to his appetites—beware unless he be humbled likewise.‖ 
(Lindeboom,348.) 
 186 
extends beyond passive reception of repetition, as Zenobia‘s life works 
to touch – to reflect and correct – the life of the narrator himself.   
The range of the Zenobia narrative goes further.   It provides a 
bridge in the Monk‘s anthology of tragedies from biblical and 
mythological narratives to more contemporary histories.  For a 
peripheral figure, in Chaucer‘s sources and in a broader view of 
history, Zenobia takes on a rather connective formal role in the Tale.  
Acting as a substitute, perhaps, for the promised life of Edward, the 
historicity of the Zenobia story becomes important.  It at once speaks 
to the local, although somewhat distant, history of the tale‘s audience, 
both pilgrim and actual, and to an exotic and even more remote past.  
As a conqueror and then a prisoner, the queen is a point of contact, 
often described as a violent contact, between regions and peoples.  
Zenobia‘s history starts to look like a many-tentacled thing, a neuron 
of a life connecting time, place, genders, activities, example, and the 
authorial persona.       
Zooming out, the Tale‘s anthological structure also seems to 
reflect the pattern established by the life of Zenobia.  Although the 
Monk’s Tale adopts the form of the legendary, it goes beyond the genre.  
While the legendary, and even compilations like De Casibus, are 
designed for portability, for disarticulation for feasts and sermons 
rendering the life discrete and distinct from those around it, the 
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Monk‘s selections move in the opposite direction.  Because the 
narratives are remembered and spoken, we assume that Don Piers 
(and perhaps the poet, too, who also worked from memory) connects 
them, at least unconsciously.  Intentionally removing the accounts 
from a chronology, the Monk invites this kind of speculation: ―Though 
I by ordre telle nat thise thynges/...But tellen hem som bifore and 
some byhynde,/As it now comth unto my remembraunce‖ (1985-89).  
The possibility of other associations highlights the entanglements of 
the literary life, suggesting too that lives – and living beings – bestow 
upon and derive vitality from what surrounds them, a relationship 
that rethinks the hagiographic genre as well as the concept of life. 
 
Animating Allegory 
In a poem dedicated to polemic and figural representation, it 
seems almost foolhardy to look for an interest in vital energies.  
Concepts that double as habits of behavior like Dowel and characters 
that personify psychological faculties like the poem‘s Dreamer-
narrator, Will make for the kinds of things sought after in and glossed 
by readers of William Langland‘s Piers Plowman.  Most of the ―beings‖ 
in Langland‘s poem hover between character and idea.  Like 
Ymaginatif in Passus XII, the closer these apparitions come to 
something human, the more personality – or personhood – they 
accrue, the more apt they are to dissolve.  Just as Ymaginatif mimics 
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the thinking and customs of Will, he evaporates: ―and right myd that 
he vanysshed‖ (12.295)12.  In a circuitous way, however, we discover 
that it is not so far-fetched to imagine these allegories as alive13.  
Figures like Kynde Wit, Conscience, Anima, Ymaginatif, to name only a 
few, have many of the features that are believed to distinguish 
humans: they have bodies, move freely, and speak – at length in most 
cases.  Gloton, the embodiment of that deadly sin, even suffers from 
graphic, if all too recognizable, digestive disturbances (5.354-57).  They 
are also social presences, participating, for example, in rituals of court, 
marriage, and war.  Although not exactly human, the figures that 
march through Will‘s dreamscape enjoy a vitality robust enough to 
breathe life into theories.  After Will exhausts Thought‘s understanding 
                                                 
12 Quotations of the poem, cited parenthetically by passus and line number, are from 
William Langland, The Vision of Piers Plowman: A critical edition of the B-text based 
on Trinity College Cambridge MS B.15.17, 2nd edition, edited by A. V. C. Schmidt 
(Everyman: London, 1995). 
13 Anne Middleton writes that, in Passus IX of the A text, Will‘s encounter with Wit 
and Thought sets up this pattern.  Thought and Wit are likened through simile to 
Will – Thought looks like Will and Wit is long and thin like him.  Different from 
figures like Clergie or Peace, Thought and Wit seem to have emerged from the 
Dreamer himself, and because of this association, they are not much use: ―whatever 
Thought‘s and Wit‘s intrinsic capacities as faculties, the reader may at this signal 
justifiably begin to suspect that they resemble Will too much to do him any good‖ 
(Middleton, ―William Langland‘s Kynde Name: Authorial Signature and Social 
Identity in Late Fourteenth-Century England,‖ in Literary Practice and Social Change 
in Britain, 1380-1520, ed. Lee Patterson [Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993]: 39).  Sarah Tolmie has noted a different type of dissolution in the poem, 
arguing that Piers Plowman is less about the narrative construction of personhood 
than it is about attempting to get out of the person to experience the thingness of the 
world more intensely.  For her discussion of this self-effacing impulse, see  "The 
Book of the World as I Found It: Langland and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus." Exemplaria 20.4 (2008): 345-347.  David Aers responds to the 
allegories from a slightly different angle, noting that Langland creates ―an allegorical 
vision whose procedures makes it impossible to postulate individuals and their 
spiritualit independently of the polities and narratives within which they have life as 
determinate human beings‖ (Aers, "Visionary Eschatology : Piers Plowman." Modern 
Theology 16.1 [2000]: 3-17.) 
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of the distinctions between Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest, Thought directs 
the Dreamer to Wit: ―‘But Wit konne wisse thee.‘ quod Thoght, ‗where 
tho thre dwelle;/Ellis woot I noon that kan, that now is alyve‘‖ (8.112-
113).  Thought implies here that Wit, and possibly his animated 
allegorical fellows, is indeed alive.  Will does not seem surprised or at 
all unsettled by this allegation, nor does it bother him that his own 
faculties boast separate lives.  What does it mean to think thought and 
wit outside the mind?  How would these be gathered back in?  Or to go 
a step too far, is this something that only things, like the personified 
figures, can think about themselves?  Can they be allowed to think it?  
Sifting out a figure like Gluton or Repentance seems plausible enough, 
even salutary in the former‘s case, yet separating Wit from Will is a 
more striking division.  If Wit is ―the knowledge derived from 
experience, the understanding that comes from reflection on what we 
sense and are (informally) told by others‖14, then Will‘s experiences, 
capacity for reflection, and even senses can be divorced from him.  
This separability assigns a certain vital energy to mental faculties or 
modes of perception and calls into question one‘s mastery of these 
abilities as well as the knowledge they produce.     
                                                 
14 See Schmidt‘s explanatory notes, p439. 
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Ymaginatif warns against questions like these and against too 
much curiosity about what makes the natural world tick15: 
And so I seye by thee, that sekest after the whyes, 
And aresonedest Reson, a rebukynge as it were, 
And willest of briddes and of beestes and of hir bredyng knowe, 
Why some by alough and some aloft, thi likyng it were... 
And of the stones and of the sterres – thow studiest, as I leve, 
How evere beest outher brid hath so breme wittes 
 Clergie ne Kynde Wit ne knew nevere the cause, 
Ac Kynde knoweth the cause hymself, no creature ellis. (12.216-
225) 
 
Ymaginatif‘s solution to Will‘s queries about nature‘s workings, which 
Will had made not to Ymaginatif directly but to Clergie and Reason 
while Ymaginatif watched, is to berate him into abandoning his 
interest.  For Ymaginatif, Will‘s inquisitiveness counts as prying, 
perhaps even a lascivious form of meddling given his study of the 
breeding ―of briddes and of beestes.‖  This knowledge of breeding, 
species differences, and natural objects belongs only to Kynde, even 
the keen minds of Clergie and Kynde Wit fail to comprehend the 
motivations of the natural world.  Such admonitions about delving into 
the purposes of nature proliferate in the poem; as with close 
examination of the allegorical figures, the more Will interrogates and 
magnifies the subtleties of natural operations the more ephemeral the 
knowledge he gains.  His inquiries are interrupted, condemned, 
                                                 
15 Michelle Karnes argues that the Aristotelian concept of imagination, which would 
have circulated in Langland‘s time, works resolve the experiential with the revelatory 
or the theological.  It is a psychological space or presence that mediates between the 
sense perceptions and cognition, acting as a bridge between the material details of 
the world and the abstractions of thought.  See Karnes, "Will's Imagination in Piers 
Plowman." Journal of English & Germanic Philology 108.1 (2009): 27-58.   
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displaced, or dispersed entirely by a waking moment.  And still, 
despite the caveats, these questions about what animates nature as 
well as what living life entails refuse to go away.   
 The matter of living emerges first in the poem‘s prologue.  In this 
first sleeping vision, Will benefits from a panoramic view of the 
landscape which his subsequent dreams will revisit.  Although the 
Prologue passus spends time disparaging gluttonous beggars and 
outlining the poem‘s political concerns by introducing the King and his 
lunatic foil, it also indulges in surveying what this conjured 
community of human animals, allegorical figures, and nonhuman 
animals (the rat parliament in particular) is up to, its ―liflode.‖  A 
working life, perhaps that of a plowman or more broadly a person with 
tangible, productive crafts or skills, is deemed a ―trewe lif‖ (Prol.120)16; 
life also is understood, even by such luminaries as the King, the 
Commune, and Kynde Wit to assume various shapes and standards: 
―The Kyng and the Comune and Kynde Wit the thridde/Shopen lawe 
and leaute – ech lif to knowe his owene‖ (Prol.121-122).  And the ―fair 
feeld ful of folk‖ differentiates, at least discursively, life activities.  
Activity and demeanor, the work and show of living, seem applied to 
                                                 
16 These lines are heavily revised in the C-text.  ―Trewe lif‖ is omitted, and the section 
loses some of its ambiguity in favor of a specific valorization of agricultural work:  
Kynde Wytt and þe comune contreued alle craftes/And for most profitable a plogh 
gonne þei make,/ With lele labour to lyue while lif on londe lasteth‖ (C, Prol, 144-
146).  It is not just a true or honest life that Kynde Wit favors, but an economic one.   
William Langland, Piers Plowman: The C-Text, ed. Derek Pearsall (Exeter, UK: 
University of Exeter Press, 1978; 1994).  Further citations of the C-Text will refer to 
this edition and appear parenthetically, noting the version, passus, and line number.  
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the folk, something to put on as Will sees ―[s]omme putten hem to the 
plough...somme putten hem to pride...[i]n preieres and penaunce 
putten hem manye‖ (Prol.20-25)17.  But anchorites and hermits, who 
seem to be both part of the vision, the field, and detached from it by 
their very way of life are said to be living: 
Al for love of Oure Lord lyveden ful streyte 
In hope to have heveneriche blisse – 
As ancres and heremites that holden hem in hire selles, 
Coveiten nought in contree to cairen about 
For no likerous liflode hir likame to plese. (Prol.26-30) 
 
So those with the least investment in fleshly indulgence can claim, at 
this point in Will‘s development, to be living.  This living is still, rooted 
to a particular place in contrast to the swarm of people in the field 
―werchynge and wandrynge‖ (Prol.29).  This distinction reinforces 
Ymaginatif‘s counsel to avoid too much involvement in living, 
suggesting that the ―liflode‖ represents a burden, something to cast off 
or to eschew.   
As Ymaginitif explains, the key to natural wonders and 
banalities remains inaccessible; Kynde alone has the answers, tucking 
these away perhaps in the mysterious space of his allegorical 
characterization.  Nonetheless, Ymaginitif‘s claims cannot be taken as 
definitive.  And as hidden as natural causes may be, their powerful 
                                                 
17 Another way to think of this is to imagine life composed of particular postures or 
gestures, as a kind of rhetorical and devotional performance.  See Mary Clemente 
Davlin, " Devotional Postures in Piers Plowman B, With an Appendix on Divine 
Postures," Chaucer Review 42.2 (2007): 161-179; John Burrow, Gestures and Looks 
in Medieval Narrative (Cambridge, U.K., 2002). 
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energies give the dream its strange cast.  But the surfeit of vital energy 
that animates every idea also proves rather unruly and even divisive in 
the poem.  The partitioning of faculties, senses, ideas, souls, and other 
less categorizable things in Piers Plowman seems to dissect the living 
being, both the poet and the Dreamer; and to open up the living being 
in this way reflects a desire to generate insights into the forces that 
animate it.  In an influential essay that examines the ―occulted‖ 
signatory practices in the A-, B-, and C-versions of Piers, Anne 
Middleton argues that not only is the poem interested in exploring the 
mysteries of living, but it also endeavors to probe authorial and textual 
vitalities18.  Middleton traces, in the first part of her essay, the effects 
of Langland‘s erasure in modern critical approaches, which initially 
attempted to find Langland in the archive, to identify him through 
external references, to locate ―Langland as the producer of the text 
rather than its product‖19; this relationship is problematized by 
Middleton, for she suggests that discovering Langland even in external 
annotations does not definitively posit Langland as a producer.  In 
fact, just the opposite happens as the needs of those making the 
records decide the shape of the author.  But Langland does manage to 
assert, or at least to hypothesize, his own living presence by a series of 
                                                 
18 Anne Middleton, ‗William Langland‘s "Kynde Name": Authorial Signature and 
Social Identity in Late Fourteenth-century England‘, in Literary Practice and Social 
Change in Britain 1380-1530, ed. Lee Patterson, Berkeley, 1990, 15-82. 
19 Middleton, 22. 
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subtle and anagrammatic signatures.  These signatures take as ―their 
referent…not the absent maker but his confected presence; a living 
‗entente‘ animated and reproduced in the act of reading.  What the 
name inscribed in the poetic text proclaims is not the author‘s verbal 
fabrication, but an ethical fabulation of which he makes himself the 
center; the value signified is not that of his craft but that of his life‖20.  
This seems to suggest that by writing himself into the poem, Langland 
creates a live being in it; he is able to bring words to life; or at least 
this is the point and the desire of these inscriptions.  My aim is to take 
this even a step further to claim that the inscriptions are the mark of 
Langland‘s broader interest in animation, in what it takes to make 
something typically considered to be outside the frame of life – inert 
matter, the manuscript composed on dead skins and written with the 
dead juices of vegetal and animal beings – part of the living swarm.  
Can Langland‘s signatures go beyond a verbal pun?  Beyond the play 
of banners and badges and acrostics?  I think Middleton does suggest 
this inscription matters to Langland, but I‘m not sure she wants to 
acknowledge anything outside the rhetorical.  This is not to suggest 
that the rhetorical does not have its own animating reach, and 
Middleton implies that Piers Plowman creates an assemblage – a text, 
                                                 
20 Middleton, 28. 
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poet, reader connection as a source of vitality for all21.  Likewise the 
anagram produces an even more microscopic assemblage with words 
instead of text as the place of connection.  For Middleton, these 
assemblages point back to an animate entity behind the text: 
They encourage the reader‘s sense that the author‘s social, 
vocal, and even physical presence is also somehow ―in‖ the text, 
that the words on the page represent a person as well as his 
product, and that it is his coherence as intelligible actor and the 
paradigmatic and exemplary form of his life, rather than the 
formal properties of the work as artifact, that secure its value to 
the user.  They define a problematic of bodily presence and 
biographical integrity into the act of reading and specify the 
boundaries of meaning within which signatures are articulated 
as the literary career, the life-in-writing, not the single work.22  
 
This passage articulates precisely the tension that I investigate below: 
how this vitality, its representation and its implications, becomes a 
problem, an idea, and a presence in the text.   
In what follows, I will examine the implications of this 
ambivalent vision of the living being, a vision that seems intrusive and 
almost scientific but also resistant and evasive.  Like the examples 
addressed in chapters 2 and 3, Piers Plowman employs hagiographic 
forms – sometimes referring to saints‘ lives as in the encounter with 
Anima and sometimes implanting the life directly into the poem‘s 
                                                 
21 ―Occulted signatures induce in the reader a momentary high awareness of his 
operative arts of reading, a perception that is the counterpart of the bodily self-
consciousness that both heralds authorial self-reference and supports its use in 
indicating an operative poetics. By foregrounding for an instant the textual medium 
itself, forcing one to notice not only the arts of making and reading such disclosures 
but also the shared social space and physical circumstances within which that art is 
exercised they insist on the embodied social dimension of literary processes.‖ 
(Middleton, 33) 
22 Middleton, 36. 
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narrative (as directly as Langland ever does anything poetic) as in the 
salvation history in later passus – which sparks, it seems, a pervasive 
interest in vitality, in an animating force itself.   In fact, Langland‘s 
poem goes farther than Chaucer, the Pearl-poet, and the SEL-poet‘s 
works in interrogating the implications and attachments of an 
unensouled vital energy.  Piers Plowman is a poem that ―thinks big‖23, 
and the thinking of bigness is in part what opens the poem up to vital 
energies and more specifically to the forces and lives of its own 
circumstances, its own social, material, textual, and figural 
circumstances.  Its many, markedly different textual iterations, its 
cinematic perspectives, its multiple dreams, and its allegorical 
pretensions indicate the poem‘s universalist scope and ambitions.     
Both the promise and the horror of such a dizzying perspective 
result from the vision Will experiences when he encounters the 
personification of nature, Kynde24.  When Kynde catches up with Will, 
                                                 
23 This is Timothy Morton‘s phrase that measures the reach of his ―ecological 
thought.‖ Although I will return to Langland‘s version of big thinking in the section 
dedicated to Kynde below, Morton defends his shift away from the local, claiming: 
―We may need to think bigger than totality itself, if totality means something closed, 
something we can be sure of, something that remains the same.  It might be harder 
to imagine four and half billion years than abstract eternity.  It might be harder to 
imagine evolution than to imagine abstract infinity.  It‘s a little humiliating.  This 
‗concrete‘ infinity directly confronts us in the actuality of life on Earth‖ (Morton, 5).  
For a more extensive exploration of this notion, see Chapter 2, ―Thinking Big‖ in 
Morton‘s The Ecological Thought (20-58). 
24 Kynde is a figure who is intriguing and seemingly, appropriately endlessly 
productive.  For the history, permutations, and implications of this allegory, see 
Hugh White‘s Nature and Salvation in Piers Plowman. Cambridge [England: D.S. 
Brewer, 1988]; Mary C. Davlin, "Kynde knowying as a Middle English Equivalent for 
'Wisdom' in Piers Plowman B." Medium Aevum 50.1 (1981): 5-17; Masha Raskonikov, 
―Promising the Female, Delivering the Male: Transformations of Gender in Piers 
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he treats the Dreamer to a sublime trip to the ―mountaigne that 
Myddelerth highte‖ (11.323) where Will surveys a diverse collection of 
flora and fauna.  But the vision turns bitter when Will discovers what 
―thinking big‖ has led him to recognize – that human beings have been 
cut off from nonhuman beings:   
I seigh floures in the fryth and hir faire colours 
And how among the grene gras grewe so manye hewes, 
And some soure and some swete – selkouth me thoughte: 
Of hir kynde and of hir colour to carpe it were to long. 
Ac that moost meved me and my mood chaunged --    (11.354-
368) 
 
After marveling at the diversity of color, vegetal life, and even the odors 
of the landscape, Will realizes that ―Reson rewarded and ruled alle 
beestes/Save man and his make‖ (11.369-370); what seems a look at 
the teeming multitude of vital matter and, just before it, a glimpse into 
the instinctual patterns of animals (their post-mating habits in 
particular [11.336-343]), Will reads the scene as governed by Reason 
rather than Kynde, who has silently dissolved into the background25.  
That this perception moves Will, and moves him to anger and to 
demand answers from Reason, the latest interlocutor to appear, 
establishes the necessity and peril of thinking big.  From the 
                                                                                                                                            
Plowman‖ Body against Soul: Gender and Sowlehele in Middle English Allegory, 181-
188, and Gillian Rudd, "Thinking through earth in Langland's Piers plowman and 
the Harley lyric 'Erthe toc of erthe'." Ecotheology 8.2 (2003): 137-149. 
25 As Raskolnikov contends, ―The poem seems to take the view that ‗man‘ alone is 
constituted so as to be able to experience his own contingency, to know himself as 
needy and mortal in ways unavailable to beasts‖ (185).  This contingency becomes, it 
seems to me, the germ of ethical investment. 
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mountaintop, Will is able to see the scope of the corruption, the extent 
to which human animals have become unmoored, as well as to sense 
how important it is that humans get back into that milieu.  Life, or 
more specifically human vitality, is not something that can be isolated, 
discovered, or set apart – that is one of the points of Piers Plowman.  It 
is a poem that manages to think big and stay invested in things – in 
coats, armor, bodies, ploughs, dirt, and birds, among others.  It 
returns not just to political, social, or experiential immediacy but also 
to an intimate materiality.  Drawing out and drawing on a brand of 
vitality that balances between the material and the heavenly worlds, 
Langland portrays the living being as something fugitive, a moving, 
dismembering, and re-membering target, and something interlaced 
and dependent on this interlacing.  This depiction seems to allow, too, 
for rewriting the life of Christ, a kind of hagiographical crux, as a life 
with murky intentions and a life very much attached to a vivid, 
quivering vitality.  Although certain knowledge is hard to come by for 
Will or the reader, the importance of interconnectedness is never 
discounted26.  Even as certain knowledge of this vitality and its 
implications becomes more improbable, the call to acknowledge one‘s 
                                                 
26 This chapter‘s interest in Langland‘s theories about material, vital, and ethical 
connectedness owes much to Masha Raskolnikov‘s book chapter ―Promising the 
Female, Delivering the Male: Transformations of Gender in Piers Plowman‖ Body 
against Soul: Gender and Sowlehele in Middle English Allegory. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2009.  In this section, Raskolnikov claims that Piers Plowman 
posits the need for ―interdependence,‖ specifically homosocial interdependence, to 
achieve the answers which Will desires.   
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implicatedness in a present, material situation and to be responsible 
to and for human and nonhuman beings in this environment 
resounds.  The investigation that follows is divided into four parts, 
each of which attempts to look closely at some of the important 
encounters in the poem that take up the problem of vitality and its 
relationship to environments, places, beings, and things.  Addressing 
Will‘s meetings with Haukyn and Anima, and his participation in the 
life of Christ, I trace not only the treatment of the ideas of living (there 
are many in this very long work), but also the poem‘s move toward an 
intimate and ethically motivated understanding of the experience of 
living.   
In examining the models of vitality and living that emerge in the 
poem, I will draw upon the work of contemporary scholar, Timothy 
Morton, whose recent writing (and YouTube videos) about 
environmental philosophy offers a useful lens and vocabulary for 
considering the entanglements of the organic and inorganic.  Although 
Morton remarks that the ―ecological thought in its full richness and 
depth was unavailable to nonmodern humans‖27, likely because 
knowledge of evolution, microbiology, and cosmology play such an 
important role in the modern conception of this thought, Morton does 
imagine tribal cultures as particularly suitable to space travel and 
                                                 
27 Morton, 5. 
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―thinking big‖28 and he also tackles topics, like the figuration of 
Nature, interdependence, and the uncanny, that do not hang on 
awareness of Darwinian mutations and that are certainly relevant to a 
poem like Piers Plowman29.  Most germane to the moments in 
Langland‘s poem that I will discuss is what Morton calls ―the mesh.‖  
Appropriately enough, the mesh is a kind of allegory, an allegory with 
extra-rhetorical and material implications, of the relationship between 
living beings and things.  And this relationship is interconnectedness: 
―Each point of the mesh is both the center and edge of a system or 
points so there is no absolute center or edge…All life forms are the 
mesh, and so are all dead ones, as are their habitats, which are also 
made up of living and nonliving beings.‖30  Envisioning this mesh 
unmakes the idea of capital-N Nature because neither nature nor 
something like the environment is distinct from or a place set apart 
from living beings, human ones in particular31.  To ―see‖ this icon 
more accurately, Morton contends that the ecological thought 
demands a global perspective – the ―thinking big‖ mentioned above – 
                                                 
28 See Morton, ―Tibetans in Space,‖ 25-28. 
29 I think it is even possible that ―nonmodern‖ texts like Piers might add to Morton‘s 
theories and fit into his ideas about the importance of imagining bounded totality.   
30 Morton, 29. 
31 In a recent essay, Sarah Stanbury contends that Chaucer, and by extension his 
14th-century compeers did not imagine a nature as separate or over there, but rather 
a force that acted upon and within human animals.  That is, even in constructing an 
allegorical Nature, Chaucer never parceled out a wilderness or a ―nature‖ to which a 
person could get back or visit with a backpack.  Chaucer‘s nature, then, was more 
like that of the ecological thought than like contemporary rhetorical approaches to it.  
See Stanbury, "Ecochaucer: Green Ethics and Medieval Nature," Chaucer Review 
39.1 (2004): 1-16. 
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because a wide-angle view contests the validity of singular and 
anthropocentric judgments 32.   
The mesh, and conceiving of matter in this way, makes for 
strange bedfellows/meshfellows.  Much like a dream vision, one never 
can predict what or who will draw near in this mesh; Morton advocates 
for a brand of intimacy with other beings, living and not, that does not 
seek a secure understanding of the other being, which Morton names 
the ―strange stranger‖33 after Derrida‘s arrivant, that does not aim to 
dissolve differences into a blob-like wholeness, but rather to admit the 
strangeness.  ―They are strange, all the way down‖ (94). Although the 
strange stranger seems an almost too perfect fit for figures like Anima 
or Haukyn who march in and out of Will‘s field of vision, I am more 
interested in what Morton claims as the upshot of these meetings, a 
practice of intimacy.  Morton writes: ―the ecological thought is about 
warmth and strangeness, infinity and proximity, tantalizing ‗thereness‘ 
and head-popping, wordless openness‖ (12).  While Piers Plowman 
                                                 
32 This spaced-out outlook also takes into account the extent of the current climate 
crisis, which of course was not a concern for Langland.  Even so, it seems to me that 
Langland is sensitive to crises of scale, particularly spiritual and social ones, and 
attempts to feel out the implications of such emergencies.  Morton posits that just as 
we become aware of interdependence, just as we discover the environment isn‘t out 
there but is inside us too, the world is disappearing, ―melts into nothing in our 
hands‖ (31).  Langland seems finely attuned to the experience of having the rug 
pulled out from underneath his feet, at spiritual, epistemological, and ontological 
levels.  And surely, both Will and Langland‘s readers recognize the feeling of knowing 
less the more they learn: ―We are faced with the extraordinary fact of increasing 
detail and vanishing fullness. The ecological thought makes our world vaster and 
more insubstantial at the same time‖ (Morton, 37). 
33 Morton returns to the idea of the ―strange stranger‖ throughout, but see especially 
38-50. 
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often frustrates its readers by refusing clear answers in its concluding 
apocalyptic vision, it seems that the final encounters introduce a 
similar type of intimacy with things, with other living beings, with a 
whole network of ideas, beings, and matter. 
 
Activa Vita: Things on the Inside 
Through Will‘s encounter with Haukyn, who seems more like a 
being than most of his allegorical counterparts, we see again the 
dangers of isolation, of the exclusion, in this case through 
institutionalized confession, of the human being from the 
environment.  Although Activa Vita, otherwise known as Haukyn the 
Actif Man, certainly has the fugitive part of vitality down – he claims 
from the first ―al ydel I hatie‖ (13.226) – and seems more like a 
character than a personification, there is something decidedly 
unhealthy and lacking in vigor about him.  He sweats profusely (―al 
biswatte his cote‖ [13.403]) and is prone to sluggishness.  But the 
most disconcerting element of his character, both for the walking party 
composed of Conscience, Pacience, and Will and for the reader, is 
Haukyn‘s grubby coat34. 
                                                 
34 A. Robin Hoffman writes convincingly that Langland‘s interest in the material 
qualities of textile and weaving, both the conditions of production and the things 
produced, shows the poet‘s resistance of overly calcified boundaries between genders 
and classes.  See A. Robin Hoffman. "Sewing and Weaving in Piers Plowman." 
Women's Studies 35.5 (2006): 431-452.  Rosanne Gasse also notes Haukyn‘s 
attachment to the material world, focusing in her essay on Haukyn‘s medical 
treatments and his inability to move beyond his own bodily presence.  See Rosanne 
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He hadde a cote of Cristendom as Holy Kirk bileveth; 
Ac it was moled in many places with manye sondry plottes 
– 
Of pride here a plot, and there a plot of unbuxom speche, 
Of scorning and of scoffyng and of unskilful berynge... 
(13.274-277) 
 
This ―cote of Cristendom,‖ which refers to a baptismal dress35, has not 
done much to protect or purify the Active Man.  That Haukyn still 
wears this garb is perplexing.  It seems to imply either that he is a 
child, artless with regard to worldly temptations, or that he trusts a 
little too much in the rituals and promises of ―Holy Kirk.‖  In either 
case, the baptismal cloak has been all but blotted out by the traces of 
Haukyn‘s sins, reversing to a certain extent the process of baptism, 
which metaphorically cleans from the outside to the inside.  For 
Haukyn, the inside, the record and memory of his transgressions, has 
seeped out in splotches somehow identifiable by his peers.  It is even 
as if he has been opened up for scrutiny, but instead of discovering 
qualities like Conscience and Peace as Will encounters in his own 
inquests, Haukyn is found to be populated by rather specific and 
abundant indiscretions.  If Will‘s various visions of, discussions with, 
and reintegrations of the parts of his living being present the value of 
disarticulation, then Haukyn‘s inversions represent the nightmare 
scenario. 
                                                                                                                                            
Gasse. "The Practice of Medicine in Piers Plowman." Chaucer Review 39.2 (2004): 
177-197. 
35 See Schmidt explanatory note p.462.  
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In a potentially controversial move, Langland writes the ordeal of 
Haukyn‘s attempted conversion also as a performance of this 
inverting, this forcing to an outside what is believed securely tucked 
away inside.  Although Haukyn is set up from his first appearance as 
the weak link, the acute failure of the instruction provided by Pacience 
might also point out imperfections in the confessional methods 
themselves, the limits of relying on the perception of a rigidly divided 
inside and outside.  Haukyn‘s nearly total dissolution at the close of 
Passus XIV demonstrates an affective spiritual experience – sorrow at 
one‘s spiritual failings – but also reinvests this rupture in the material 
world.  After Pacience expounds upon the advantages of poverty for 
achieving heavenly bliss, Haukyn, who previously had proven resistant 
to, or at least too doltish to comprehend, the lesson, breaks down 
weeping.   
‗Allas,‘ quod Haukyn the Actif Man tho, ‗that after my cristendom 
I ne hadde be deed and dolven fo Dowelis sake! 
So hard it is,‘ quod Haukyn, ‗to lyve and to do synne. 
Synne seweth us evere,‘ quod he, and sory gan wexe, 
And wepte water with hise eighen and weyled the tyme 
That evere he dide dede that deere God displesed – 
Swouned and sobbed and siked ful ofte.... (14.320-26) 
 
This expression of grief, deemed a ―conversion‖ in Schmidt‘s notes36, 
does indeed appear to mark a turning point for Haukyn, at least as far 
                                                 
36 For a look at the implications of Haukyn‘s confession and contrition, see Lynn 
Staley. "The Man in Foul Clothes and a Late Fourteenth-Century Conversation about 
Sin." Studies in the Age of Chaucer: The Yearbook of the New Chaucer Society 
24.(2002): 1-47. 
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as the reader might imagine, since Haukyn awakens Will with his 
hysterics and then the Actif Man disappears from the poem.  Though 
perhaps only the first stage in his conversion, Haukyn‘s lament in this 
passage lacks any of the expected forward-looking promise.  In fact, he 
seems all too attached to his former sinful life, preferring to have died 
and been buried for ―Dowelis sake‖ than to disentangle himself from 
his errant past and the filthy garments which expose it.  Of course, 
conversion typically does entail a severe break with one‘s prior life 
which is often construed as a kind of spiritual death.  Yet, in Haukyn‘s 
case, a swift death offers more potential for escape than metaphor 
because he comes to realize the inevitability of sinning.  ―So hard it 
is…to lyve and to do synne‖ (14.322).  Despite Pacience‘s efforts to 
instruct Haukyn in a manner of living which might eschew 
transgression, Haukyn seems principally to have retained the negative 
elements of the lecture, and a dark vision of living emerges in which 
life cannot be purified and living does not reach for higher truths but 
lingers in the muck.  Even Pacience‘s detailed glossing of Vincent of 
Beauvais‘s endorsement of poverty misses the mark with Haukyn, who 
does not appear to have digested more than the opening paradox: 
paupertas…est odibile bonum (14. 275).  The poor man‘s overcoming of 
each of the seven deadly sins in Pacience‘s explication indicates to 
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Haukyn not the appeal of charity but the persistence of sin, which 
―seweth us evere.‖  
Haukyn‘s confusion translates into what looks to be his first 
deed as a converted man: to rid himself of his clothing.   
‗I were noght worthi, woot Good,‘ quod Haukyn, ‗to werien any clothes, 
Ne neither shert ne shoon, save for shame one 
To covere my careyne…‘ (14. 245) 
 
This Passus opens with the recommendation that Haukyn clean his 
foul coat – that is, launder his soul –, not that he strip himself of it 
entirely.  Haukyn‘s misjudgment further asserts the materiality of his 
confession.   In a way, he anticipates Anima‘s teachings about the 
―childissh‖ (15. 149) quality of a charitable soul by proposing to revert 
to a primal condition whereby Haukyn may wear his shame on his 
flesh rather than his ―hater‖ (14.1).  Alternatively, wishing to ―change 
his clothes‖ to array himself in shameful or humble attire might point 
to a desire to give up the active life in favor of a contemplative state.  
Moreover, that Haukyn refers to his body as his ―careyne,‖ corpse or 
carcass, presents a two-fold problem with his conversion.  On the one 
hand, this choice of vocabulary might hypostatize his renunciation of 
the active life, manifesting a nascent paralysis associated with his 
conversion.  On the other, Haukyn may be attempting to fulfill his 
earlier inclination toward dying rather than suffering the challenges 
inherent in leading a holy, active life.  Either way, we witness through 
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Haukyn‘s conversion an instance of dissociation from the self as 
opposed to a cleaving to the vita nuova.  Fortunately for Haukyn, it is 
not as if he remains too bound to his corrupt past to complete his 
transition into sanctity.  Instead, he seems frozen at the process of 
conversion, unable to consummate his transformation, perhaps, 
because he cannot envision it by any means other than the negative 
paradox Pacience tendered.  Haukyn‘s conversion is not only 
predicated on misunderstanding and failure, but also on extreme 
isolation and separation, questioning thereby the wisdom, the efficacy, 
and perhaps also humanity of such an inward turn. 
 Although the point is predictably lost on Haukyn, there is, 
tucked into the opening of Pacience‘s disquisition, a way out of the 
isolation of confession and pious living.   In an associative lecture 
about dietary temperance that moves from liflode to alimentary 
prayers to lechery born of gluttony and finally the superiority of oral 
confession (―shrift of mouthe‖ [14.90]), Pacience explains that the first 
step toward a wholesale restoration of Haukyn‘s besmirched soul 
demands more restrictive eating habits.   
‗And I shal purveie thee paast,‘ quod Pacience, ‗though no plough erye, 
And flour to fede folk with as best be for the soule; 
Though nevere greyn growed, ne grape upon the vyne, 
Alle that lyveth and loketh liflode wold I fynde, 
And that ynogh – shal noon faille of thyng that hem nedeth.   
We should noght be to bisy abouten oure liflode...‘ (14.30-34) 
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Subordinating the desires of the gut to the health of the soul seems to 
be Pacience‘s point, but even a figure defined by endurance 
acknowledges the alimentary needs of the body.  Yet, Pacience claims 
that food will be provided to those who need it; either Pacience will 
rustle something up or God might.  Haukyn, of course, the waferer 
believes this advice absurd, and when Pacience offers a bit of the 
Paternoster for a snack (14.49), one understands why.  But the 
implications of this somewhat commonplace (yet also potentially 
extreme) recommendation are important.  On the one hand, Pacience 
distinguishes between the mechanics that keep the being, birds and 
beasts included, alive and living itself.  Liflode in this context takes on 
multiple meanings: the business of life, the requirements of a living 
being, and a living separate from these categories, a life force that 
persists even in intense want.  This mutating sense of life affirms living 
as a process, and a surprising one at that.  Too much eating produced 
the ―meschief and the meschaunce‖ of Sodom, but, in ―Elyes tyme,‖ 
men were able to tolerate long winters of hard work without food and 
―Seven slepe, as seith the book, seven hundred wynter/And lyveden 
withouten liflode – and at last thei woken‖ (14.65-69).  There seems to 
be a range of responses people can and have had to food; further, the 
effects of too much or too little are shown to be deeply transformative, 
perhaps even in ways that the eaters or abstainers could not imagine 
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or control, clearly more transformative than confession.  Likewise, 
Pacience‘s offer of ―a pece of the Paternoster – Fiat voluntas tua‖(14.49) 
underscores the power of food to change he who consumes it.  Eating 
a prayer is a forceful and maybe even innovative act, yet the 
suggestion is that the will of God, of the prayer through digestion will 
replace the will of the eater37.  Haukyn might become what he eats, 
but it is also critical that he remember and accept that what he eats is 
not identical to him38. 
On the other hand, Pacience‘s command to expect care for both 
body and soul from an external source extends the passivity of 
digestion into a social space.  In response to Haukyn‘s disbelief, 
Pacience digs out of his pockets ―[v]itailles of grete vertues‖ and 
                                                 
37 This metonymic mix-up calls to mind Anne Middleton‘s description and reading of 
an instance of the ―mastery of improvisatory self-definition‖ during the 1381 
Peasants‘ Revolt.  Middleton retells the story of dispute over milling rights between 
tenant farmers and the Abbey of St. Albans recorded by Thomas Walsingham: 
―decades before the revolt an earlier abbot had confiscated the tenants‘ household 
millstones and used them as the paving-stones of the floor of the monastery parlor, 
then under construction. In the first days of the 1381 revolt, the people of the town 
of St. Albans and the surrounding countryside had heard rumor of the events in 
London…Besides invading the abbot‘s woods and fields in procession ‗with great 
pomp,‘ releasing his prisoners from jail, and demanding of the abbot a new charter of 
their liberties, the rebellious tenants now break into the abbey parlor, pull up the 
millstones form the floor where they had been ‗set as a memorial of the ancient 
dispute between the abbey and the townsmen,‘ and carry them outside and ‗hand 
them over to the commons breaking them into little pieces and giving a piece to each 
person, just as the consecrated bread is customarily broken and distributed in the 
parish churches on Sundays‘…‖ (Middleton, William Langland’s “Kynde Name,‖ 71).  
In turning prayers into food and stones in material expressions of doctrine (and into 
the semblance of food), agency is redistributed, but so is the relationship between 
semblance and matter.   
38 As Jane Bennett writes about eating, ―Eating appears  as a series of mutual 
transformations in which the border between inside and outside becomes blurry: my 
meal both is and is not mine; you both are and are not what you eat‖ (Vibrant Matter, 
49) 
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justifies his position: ―‘Lo! Here liflode ynogh, if our believe be 
trewe./For lent nevere was there lif but liflode were shapen,/Whereof 
or wherfore and wherby to libbe‘‖ (14.38-41).  According to Pacience, 
life is not created without associated sustenance – worms have their 
earth, fish have the sea, beasts have grasses and grains (14.42-45).  
Pacience represents the natural world as dependent on both a balance 
and a promise; life is never self-sufficient, never entirely alone.  More 
important for the likes of Haukyn, this balance establishes a necessary 
and wholesome connection to the outside.  Although Pacience does 
introduce the possibility of extended hibernation  or long-term 
abstinence, waiting for liflode, counting on sustenance, material and 
perhaps also metaphorical, spiritual, and psychological, imagines 
Haukyn as the outside (which explains to a certain extent the failure 
of his confession).  Building on readings of Haukyn as a figuration of 
the active life, the stage of human development associated with 
employment and desires, with worldly engagement and struggle, Stella 
Maguire has argued that Haukyn merges with the dream vision itself, 
dilating or atomizing into the poem‘s background: ―Haukyn does not 
merely belong to the world of the Visio rather than to the more 
abstract world presented in the rest of Dowel; he is, in his own person, 
the embodiment of that world‖39.  Though Maguire contends that this 
                                                 
39 Stella Maguire. "The Significance of Haukyn, Activa Vita, in Piers Plowman." 
Review of English Studies: A Quarterly Journal of English Literature and the English 
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fusion testifies to ―the fundamental wholeness and singleness‖ (109) of 
this section of the poem, I think it does more to reveal the poem‘s 
ecological thought.  Haukyn‘s blending into the atmosphere of the 
vision itself also implies that he has taken this world, like eating a 
prayer, into himself, yet neither Haukyn nor his ecosystem is fully 
absorbed in this exchange40.  Morton writes of the weather:  
We can no longer have that reassuringly trivial conversation 
about the weather with someone in the street, as a way to break 
the ice or pass the time.  The conversation either trails off into a 
disturbingly meaningful silence, or someone mentions global 
warming.  The weather no long exists as a neutral-seeming 
background against which events take place. (28) 
 
Weather is not a backdrop in the way that Will‘s dream-world is not a 
stage, not an ―over there‖ where animals know the rules, where Nature 
resides.  Haukyn‘s struggles – his efforts at contrition and getting 
clean – highlight this interconnectedness.  A recognition of this 
interdependence does not ensure salvation41, but it does help to 
develop an understanding of the investments of living. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Language 25.98 (1949): 99.  
40To a certain extent, this reading parallels the argument made by Anne Middleton 
that the ―Land of Longyng‖ Will sees in Fortune‘s mirror counts as the first signature 
of the B-text.  According to Middleton, the Land of Longyng is a representation of the 
desire for mastery, a desire to seize upon the middle of life, to enact the will (or to 
enact the Will), but she claims it is also a space of self, since this is Long Wille‘s land 
– the Longland/Langland.  This seems to suggest that Will not only identifies with 
the psychological faculty of the will but also with desire, longing.  Moreover, it 
imagines a spatialized, geographical body for the self, a topographical body, albeit a 
dreamy, possible one, which Will himself can traverse. 
41 According to Morton, ―Awareness of the mesh doesn‘t bring out the best in people‖ 
(31). 
 212 
Levels of Anima  
In his waking life, Will mirrors Haukyn‘s bewildered defiance, 
representing his endeavor to understand the ―Dowel‖ enigma as a 
journey into the domain of the holy fool. 
Ac after my wakynge it was wonder longe 
Er I koude kyndely knowe what was Dowel. 
And so my wit weex and wanyed til I a fool were… (15.1-3) 
 
Too much pondering of and questing after Dowel seem to have spun 
the poet-Dreamer to the social periphery.  To a certain extent, Will 
performs the outcome of Haukyn‘s flawed conversion, struggling to 
make sense of and to live with the inadequate knowledge imparted by 
Pacience, not to mention the various other figures who had previously 
defined this elusive category.  Nonetheless, this brief account of 
marginalization seems to imply a willful yet passive foolishness.  Not 
the kind of thinker content to hole himself up in his study, Will 
describes his public refusal to ―reverencen‖ his social superiors with 
blessings or bows.  This deliberate silence nicely doubles Will‘s 
tendency to sleep wherever the spirit moves him so long as it not be in 
his own bed.  (Until Passus XVIII, that is.)  Again, what is deemed 
―fool-like‖ by the community is Will‘s propensity to turn inward, which 
he at once critiques (for the poet himself admits he ―raved‖) and 
accepts as inevitable.   
That the troubles related to this inwardness penetrate even into 
the imagery of Will‘s dreams suggests the primacy of this issue.  One 
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might of course argue that some semblance of reflexiveness is bound 
to occur in a Passus involving a dialogue with Anima, even though this 
character does not stand in for the poet-Dreamer‘s own soul.  Yet the 
construct and style of Anima pushes Will‘s gaze and investment 
outward again.  By Will‘s fifth vision he has acclimated to a dream 
world populated by unlikely creatures, but Anima proves an organism 
without precedent or analogue in the text.  Even the toughened 
Dreamer at first believes the figure before him the product of 
―sorcerie,‖ so ―sotil thyng‖ it is (15.12).  The being Will encounters is 
not exactly human or even recognizable as a personification: 
Oon withouten tonge and teeth, tolde me whider I should 
And wherof I cam and of what kynde, I conjured him at the laste, 
If he were Cristes creature for Cristes love me to tellen.  (15.13-15) 
 
That the only visual description offered of Anima focuses on his 
missing oral elements is evocative.  Is the rest of his body equally 
decaying?  Is he all mouth, albeit a partial mouth?42  How does he 
manage to tell Will so much – where he came from, where he should go 
– without organs of speech?  Does he qualify as human or more simply 
                                                 
42 On Anima as body parts, see James Paxson‘s ―Gender Personified, Personification 
Gendered, and the Body Figuralized in Piers Plowman,‖ The Yearbook of Langland 
Studies 12 (1998).  Raskolnikov also remarks that Anima might be an orifice of 
another sort, perhaps a vagina (Raskolnikov, Body Against Soul, 190).  Imagining 
Anima an anus might offer a way for allegory to think about its own waste, since 
Anima not only is a figure of interconnectedness, but also of excess.  Even so, as 
with everything related to Anima, it is hard to know for certain what to name or how 
to define him.  I agree with Raskolnikov, though, that ―what is important to draw 
from any interpretations of Anima as some part of the human anatomy is that 
Anima‘s is a type of allegorical body or object that seems radically and challengingly 
open‖ (191).   
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a ―creature?‖  For a figure so defined by lack and omission and so 
emphatically identified as ―oon,‖ however, Anima rapidly evolves into a 
shimmering variety of names, concepts, occupations, and forces.  
Responding to Will‘s asking what he is called, Anima runs through a 
long list of his apparently associated names: Anima, Animus, Mens, 
Memoria, Racio, Sensus, Conscience, Lele Love, Spiritus43.  These 
appellations extend in a kind of widening gyre from the figure‘s 
nondescript center, and they apply in a given moment depending on 
the creature‘s role, his activity.  ―‘The whiles I quykke the cors,‘ quod 
he, ‗called am I Anima;/And whan I wilne and wolde, Animus ich 
hatte;/ And for that I kane and knowe, called am I Mens, 
―Thoughte‖‘...‖ (15.23-25).  Anima seems to move between names and 
actions at will, but not always his own will.  There is the sense in these 
lines that Anima is as much called upon (as he is repeatedly called 
different names) as he is free to perform his several roles.  His 
tendency to translate the Latin terms into English emphasizes this 
accommodating spirit.  But Anima goes beyond accommodation; this 
representation of a crowd of psychological and even biological 
functions, faculties, attributes does more than propose casual 
correspondences among the various entities.  In the figure of Anima, 
thought and sense perceptions, love and spirit, an animating life force 
                                                 
43 For an annotated list of Anima‘s names, see A.V.C. Schmidt ―Langland and 
Scholastic Philosophy‖ (Medium Aevum 38 [1969]: 134-56). 
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and the will are intimately related.  Although operationally, Anima 
seems to cycle in and out of these traits/personae, there is no denying 
that these all exist in the strange, little body of that ―sotil thyng.‖  
These capacities operate distinctly, like a molecular model, offshoots 
from a nuclear (perhaps unnamed) core, but intermingle, too.   
Anima‘s tangled model that combines the intellectual, 
psychological, spiritual, biological, and that other category that 
―quykke the cors‖ might be understood as a multiplied trinity, a triple 
trinity.  While the numbers and divisions may or may not be 
significant, this mode of thinking was undeniably widespread in 
fourteenth-century literature as well as fourteenth-century extra-
literary life.  Envisioning multiple entities as divided but united, as 
dependent and sovereign, that is, viewing spiritual and mundane life 
through a lens colored by Trinitarian principles extended from the 
esoterics of certain theological inquiries to the practices of everyday 
life44.  The compounded Trinitarian tone in this passage, like the 
eccentric body of Anima, proffers plentiful, possible resonances, but it 
is the form of thinking and personifying that seems most relevant both 
                                                 
44 See Andrew Galloway‘s article, ―Intellectual Pregnancy, Metaphysical Femininity, 
and the Social Doctrine of the Trinity in Piers Plowman." (Yearbook of Langland 
Studies 12.[1998]: 117-152) for a discussion of the relevance of Trinitarian 
psychology in vernacular poetry.  Alan J. Fletcher also addresses Langland‘s 
engagement with this structure in "The Social Trinity of Piers Plowman." Review of 
English Studies: A Quarterly Journal of English Literature and the English Language 
44.175 (1993): 343-361.  M. Teresa Tavormina examines the trinity as a foundation 
for imagining relationships in "Kindly Similitude: Langland's Matrimonial Trinity." 
Modern Philology: A Journal Devoted to Research in Medieval and Modern Literature 
80.2 (1982): 117-128. 
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to Anima‘s subsequent diatribe and to the problems of interiority.  
Anima seems to embody and to advocate ―transversal‖ thinking.    
Building on the work of Felix Guattari, Jane Bennett discusses the 
modern relevance of acknowledging the nonhuman in the human 
given advances in medical and micro sciences and uses a Trinitarian 
model, based on Guattari‘s ―three ecologies‖ to map a way of relating 
to the world of vibrant matter.45   So too the layered attachments, 
activities, and interests of Anima seem to have more to do with tracing 
pathways between inwardness and outer phenomena than with 
spiritual transcendence.  Or more simply, Anima seems to stand as an 
exemplar of the division and the union of the human and nonhuman.  
He collects sense data from the outside world and experiences the 
powerful inner churning of love and the inner journey of memory, but 
also is touched by and, at least in the B-text, becomes synonymous 
with a force that gives the body life, a force which is not represented as 
entirely one with the ―cors,‖ a force that must come from outside46.  
                                                 
45 Of Guattari‘s program, which theorizes both the corruption and disciplinary 
control of modern psychologies and the redirecting of our attention toward more 
sustainable habits for person and planet as trinities, Bennett writes: ―Guattari‘s 
rhetorical strategy here echoes that pursued by Roman Catholicism to express the 
mysterious unity of the three persons of God.  There are three ecologies, says 
Guattari, or, as the Baltimore Catechism says, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
three persons ‗really distinct from one another.‘  And yet, says Guattari, the three 
ecologies form a single whole, IWC [Integrated World Capitalsim], or, in the worlds of 
the catechism, ‗The trinity is One.‘  We must, says, Guattari, learn to think the 
three-in-one: to think ‗transversally‘ or fix our mind‘s eye on the interlacing of the 
mechanosphere, the social sphere, and the inwardness of subjectivity.‖ (Vibrant 
Matter, 114) 
46That Anima‘s parting thoughts encourage Will to find Charity, which turns out to 
be a tree, and that the figure metamorphoses into yet another figure Liberum 
 217 
Much of Anima‘s lecture, however, is concerned with notions of 
exempla and instruction.  Anima, a problematic type of guide given his 
ability to mutate into any number of interconnected entities, replies to 
Will‘s inquiry about the nature of charity – where to find it and how to 
recognize it – with a brief definition and an extended list of highly 
charitable humans.  Saints, especially those found in Voragine‘s 
Golden Legend, figure prominently in Anima‘s list.  Edmond and 
Edward stand for the possibility of charity in the face of temptation, 
since they were both kings who managed to lead devout lives (15.223-
224).  And Francis demonstrates that even friars, heavily reviled by 
Anima, have a liberal lineage.  But desert fathers in particular, those 
who ―suffrede/in hunger, in hete, in alle manere angres‖ (15.270-271), 
attract Anima‘s admiration, and he tells the stories of Antony, Egidius, 
and Paul the hermit, all of whom subsisted on food brought by 
animals. 
―..Egidie after an hynde cride, 
And thorugh the mylk of that mylde beest the man was  
sustened... 
Antony on a day about noon tyme 
Hadde a brid that broughte hym breed that he by lyvede... 
                                                                                                                                            
Arbitrium in the C-text underscores the importance of interconnections.  On the Tree 
of Charity and Liberum Arbitrium, see Ralph Hanna ―The Tree of Charity – again,‖ in 
Medieval Alliterative Poetry: Essays in Honour of Thorlac Turville-Petre, ed. J A. 
Burrow, Hoyt N. Duggan, and Thorlac Turville-Petre. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 
2010: 125-39). For the possible meanings, correspondences, and divergences of 
Liberum Arbitrium, see Schmidt, ―Langland and Scholastic Philosophy,‖ and 
Lorraine Kochanske Stock, ―Will, Actyf, Pacience, and Liberum Arbitrium: Two 
Recurring quotations in Langland‘s Revisions of Piers Plowmans C Text, Passus V, 
XV, XVI,‖ in Texas Studies in Literature and Language 30 (1988): 461-77, 472.   
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Poul primus heremita hadde parroked hymselve, 
That no man myghte hym se for mosse and for leves. 
Foweles hym fedde fele wyntres with alle...‖ (15.279-288) 
 
For Anima, these examples reveal the presence and efficiency of 
charity in the animal world.  Even animals appreciate true need and 
are ready to sacrifice their own well-being, their own time to respond.  
Anima extends this reading to condemn excessive donations to 
monastic organizations already flush with capital and property, 
suggesting that human mechanisms of discernment have degraded 
and concluding some lines later that the ―folk‖ suffer because 
humanity has lost touch with its earthy roots: ―Now failleth the folk of 
the flood and of the lond bothe—― (15.367).  In contrast, the habits 
and choices of the desert fathers present a model of connection to the 
world of nature.  Paul the hermit even camouflages himself in moss 
and leaves as a form of social distancing, but also, it seems, 
reconnection.  Moreover, the animals in these legends adopt postures 
and practices more akin to an ideal human community than to the 
realm of nature, bloodied in tooth and claw.  Whether Egidius‘ 
suckling deer or Antony‘s baking birds have been tainted by contact 
with human society or human charity springs from a not entirely 
human source, it is clear by these examples that a decisive 
partitioning of human and nonhuman cannot be sustained.  And when 
Anima explains that the significance of these exchanges is ―that meke 
 219 
thyng mylde thyng sholde fede‖ (15.306), it is difficult to be certain 
which is human and which not. 
Anima posits a more explicit form of connection, though, in 
response to the claims Will makes as to how he has come to know 
Christ.  Will confesses that he has learned Christ dwells in all ―places,‖ 
but never has he encountered him plainly except in his own reflection: 
―Clerkes kenne me that Crist is in alle places;/Ac I seigh hym nevere 
soothly but as myself in a mirour:/Hic in enigmate, tunc facie ad facie‖ 
(15. 161-63). This is a deceivingly complex statement which indicates 
both Will‘s penchant for misuse of scriptural convention and his 
heightened awareness of the misstep.  More importantly, however, the 
mirror image which confers such enlightenment upon Will generates 
the possibility of other connections, depending on what we take ―as 
myself‖ to mean: either Will meets in the mirror an image of himself 
that he recognizes as a distant relative, a derivative copy of Christ or 
he see an image of Christ as substitution of his own47.  Anima crafts 
his ―argument‖ based on the first possibility, clearly the more logically 
stable of the two, reiterating the imperative to look beyond the self for 
knowledge of virtue.  The lecture‘s devolving into a call to proselytize 
                                                 
47 For a reading that posits this episode as constitutive of subjectivity, see Anne 
Middleton‘s ―William Langland‘s ‗Kynde Name,‘‖ pp 44-46.  See also Middleton‘s 
"Narration and the Invention of Experience: Episodic Form in Piers Plowman." In 
Larry D. Benson and Siegfried Wenzel, eds. The Wisdom of Poetry: Essays in Early 
English Literature in Honor of Morton W. Bloomfield, pp 91- 122. Kalamazoo: Medieval 
Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1982. 
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the distant heathens languishing in a state of near-Christianity 
highlights the real topics of Anima‘s disquisition: the need for dialectic 
instruction, the call to efface the self, at least temporarily, in order to 
learn, the appeal to give one‘s self up to evaluation by another.  Or at 
the very least to see in the mirror something other than one‘s self, to 
realize through Anima‘s modeling and lessons that in the ―I‖ there are 
its and others,  to have a foundation for empathy.  Grounding this 
connection in the image of Will, in a moment when charity, a Christian 
project, becomes the Dreamer‘s own, renders self-interest multiple, 
other-interest, outside-interest.  There are dangers in privileging self-
interest, but for the previously disaffected Will, this reflection helps to 
provide a bridge between the inwardness of confession and conversion 
and the demands of the outside. 
 
“For we beth bretherene of o bloed…” 
By the end of Anima‘s seminar, the other put forth as suitable to 
judge is very curiously (and reflexively) Piers Plowman, the Dreamer-
poet‘s titular alter ego, who ―parceyveth moor depper/What is the 
wille…‖ (15. 199-200).  A more felicitous mirror, Piers seems also to 
hold the key to what is Will.  Although the poem never makes entirely 
clear what marks out Piers as so special or why in particular he has 
been chosen, that the vision ends with yet another quest to find Piers 
suggests that he is both indispensible but always elsewhere, rather 
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like Jesus, whose life Piers helps to narrate and dramatize in the final 
sections of the text. 
The lives of Christ that develop in Passus XVI, XVIII, and XIX in 
the B text are multivalent, disorienting, orienting, vital and ghostly, 
tangible and discursive, condensed and scattered.  These lives which 
do not always look like conventional vitae and are buried within 
discourses and visions which sometimes intend more than a life and 
sometimes draw power from the life, act like a kind of battery, a life 
force itself meant to keep the poem vital, moving, fugitive to the very 
end.  Like many a worthy devotional text, these lives operate on 
several imaginative levels, characteristically seeming more evocative 
than definitive.  But lives of Christ are different from other 
hagiography, at once less prevalent and more foundational.  After all, 
every saint‘s life in some way refers to the life of Christ, imitates its 
practices and embraces its teleology, yet perhaps because it functions 
as a source and is always expected to be kept in mind – and even more 
importantly it has been ―done‖ rather definitively or at least 
canonically in the Gospels – vitae Christi appear less frequently than 
the lives of saints that adopt it as model. This could, of course, be 
explained away as a product of numbers – there is only one Jesus, but 
there are crowds of saints. Even so, Langland‘s incorporation of 
salvation history, specifically the life and afterlife of Christ, into his 
 222 
poem is conspicuous and also presents a limit case for the literary use 
of the life insofar as salvation history seems to have so little to do with 
conventional saints‘ lives, to stretch, squeeze, and deform the fabric of 
the genre, but also to distill and encapsulate it, to provide of course 
the very foundation of hagiographic literature.  Moreover, Langland‘s 
literary and somatic revisions press the structural, temporal, and 
figural foundations of the life, which produces a number of effects, not 
the least of which is opening up the vita to a vitality rooted in 
ecological and communal attachments. 
Indeed rooting becomes a central metaphor in connection with 
the first instance of the vita Christi; the story of Christ‘s conception 
grows out of Will‘s witnessing Piers Plowman‘s rather mercurial 
tending to the tree of Charity.  And as the life gets underway, the tree 
image develops along with it: 
To a maide that highte Marie, a meke thyng withall, 
That oon Jesus, a justice sone, most jouke in hir chambre 
Til plenitudo temporis tyme comen were 
That Piers fruyt floured and felle to be rype.  (16.91-94) 
 
The ripening of the tree‘s fruit parallels that of the fetal Jesus, which 
suggests a kind of naturalness to the conception, the life as a thing of 
nature, despite its discursive, vaporous beginnings.  Piers even 
assumes, however obliquely, the role of midwife, cultivating the tree 
which has been conflated with the body of Mary.  Extending images of 
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tethers to nature and medical care, the life seems to gloss over Jesus‘ 
infancy, positing instead a newborn prepped for combat: ―And in the 
wombe of that wenche was he fourty woukes,/Til he weex a faunt 
thorugh hir flessh,  and of fightyng kouthe,/To have yfought with the 
fiend er ful tyme come‖ (16.100-102).  Childbirth here offers a training 
ground for a rather vigorous, soldier Christ, and it sounds even as if 
the infant Jesus will burst through Mary‘s body.  While much of the 
vision and poem has inured Will and the audience to the idea that life 
is a test, even a battle, the aggressive tone of Jesus‘s earliest moments 
(as a living human, that is) seems intent to overwrite the infancy, the 
humanity of the life‘s subject.  Langland gives us the non-affective 
Christ, the Christ his contemporaries would be less likely to expect, 
which makes this Jesus strange.  Not the Christ of the zeitgeist, but 
another Christ whom we are surprised to meet and who seems harder 
to get to know48.  Yet, along with the newborn as warrior motif comes 
the possibility of wounds and suffering, a vulnerability that prompts 
the perhaps quickly ageing Jesus to ―lered hym lechecraft‖ (16.104).  
This bodily vulnerability also informs Jesus‘ emotional state, since a 
few lines hence he cries real tears at his resurrection of Lazarus: ―And 
                                                 
48 David Aers writes, ―Langland‘s recapitulations of the stories about Christ is 
markedly resistant to the dominant representations of Christ‘s humanity in late 
medieval culture with their expansive, inventively detailed concentration on the 
tortured, bleeding, honeycombed body as a focus of devotion and imitation‖ (Aers, 
Visionary Eschatology, 9).  Likewise, Derek Pearsall puts it, Langland ―is not 
interested in the emotional poetry of affective devotion nor in identification with the 
human suffering of Christ‖ (―The Idea of Universal Salvation,‖ 272) 
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wepte water with hise eighen – ther seighen it manye‖ (16.116).  After 
establishing the human vulnerability of Christ, or at least the paradox 
of his propensity for warfare and his human defenselessness, the 
narrative picks up speed, sweeping through miracles, covenants, and 
betrayals.  The life is condensed and fragmented, not to mention a 
challenge to visualize for the audience and maybe also the Dreamer:  
is this a product of Will‘s liturgical memory, an outgrowth of his swoon 
upon meeting Piers?  A story told by Piers?  A series of skits, of 
mystery plays staged before the Dreamer?  Dislodging the life 
chronologically seems to free the narrative to be at once performed and 
narrated.  The life‘s subject himself simulates the role of narrator: 
countering accusations of witchcraft, Jesus justifies his various 
activities (16.121-136).   As speaker and hagiographer (even 
autobiographer), Jesus is both in and outside the text, able to narrate 
his own life but also, given the logic of the vita, live it simultaneously.  
While this double stature undoes to a certain extent the natural and 
rooted origins of the tale, it also extends to temporal and structural 
levels the idea of vulnerability, positing new ways of entering into and 
participating in a life-story, even so exalted a life as that of Christ.   
Both these points of contact and the vision of Jesus as vivacious 
and vulnerable in his living presence develop further in the 
subsequent retellings of the salvation history.  In the second life, in 
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which Jesus accomplishes both the Harrowing of Hell and the 
narration of a lengthy biblical history that amounts to a kind of family 
history in the voice of Jesus, the figure of Christ becomes exceptionally 
potent – a youthful knight donning spurs and Piers‘ armor for the first 
time, a body in pain whose sensible power renders him untouchable, a 
redeemer ready to destroy the foundations of hell – but at the same 
time is attached to Piers and even confused with him in the opening of 
the third attempt at a vita. 
I fel eftsoones aslepe – and sodeynly me mette 
That Piers the Plowman was peynted al blody, 
And com in with a cros before the commune peple, 
And right lik in alle lymes to Oure Lord Jesu. (19.5-8) 
 
Has Piers been anointed, or is it Jesus that the Dreamer encounters?  
This confusion goes deeper than problems of livery and performance.  
Here Will mistakes the resurrected Jesus for his own fiction, which 
seems to test the limits of dreaming and literary making alike.  After 
Conscience corrects Will‘s colossal misreading, it becomes clear that 
Christ has inherited, or at least borrowed, Piers‘s armor, but ―he that 
cometh so blody/Is Crist with his cros, conquerour of Cristene‖ 
(XIX.14-15).  Recognizing Christ by his blood, which is not painted or 
fabricated but quite real and differentiating,  Will realizes that Christ 
has not descended into his murky world to be transformed in any 
physical  or enduring sense, rather Will‘s poetic creation seems to have 
been adopted – albeit in fragments – into the spiritual hierarchy.  
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While dislocating Piers‘s earthly genealogy might be understood as an 
effort to authorize the poem (or dream), it also complicates the notion 
of the life.  Taken a step farther, Christ‘s appropriation of Piers‘s armor 
strips the plowman bare before the reader, exposing his nakedness 
and perhaps a vitality shared like his protective coverings.  Christ 
seems to be an example of the ―strange stranger,‖ a meeting with 
whom Will‘s heightening awareness of the mesh makes possible.  
Morton encapsulates his argument thus: ―The ecological thought 
realizes that the boundaries between, and the identities of, beings are 
affected by this interconnection.  This is the strange stranger.  The 
ecological thought finds itself next to other beings, neither me nor not-
me….The more intimately we know them, the stranger they become.  
The ecological thought is intimacy with the strangeness of the 
stranger.‖49  The exchange of armor and inspection of wounds breeds a 
tenuous intimacy with the Christ figure whose life story cannot seem 
to be completed adequately – the more it is repeated, the more 
schematic it becomes.  Mary Davlin argues that the shifting identities 
of Piers and Christ corresponds to the notion of ―the whole Christ,‖ the 
mystical coincidence of believers in the body of Christ and the body of 
Christ in the believers50.  Envisioning this cohabitation reveals the 
                                                 
49 Morton, 94. 
50 Mary C. Davlin, O.P. "Petrus, id est, Christus: Piers the Plowman as 'The Whole 
Christ'." Chaucer Review: A Journal of Medieval Studies and Literary Criticism 
6.(1972): 280-292. 
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historical stretch of Morton‘s strange stranger.  The ―whole Christ‖ 
image, along with the transactions and substitutions in Langland‘s 
salvation history, even implies that perhaps in this scenario humans 
tag along on the body of Christ, we are the microbes in Christ‘s elbow. 
The exchanges of uniform as well as narration emphasize that 
even in the life of Christ, which reshapes a whole cosmology and the 
very idea of the living human being, the hero does not pull off his great 
deeds alone51.  Jesus‘s intentions radiate into and emerge out of the 
commentary of witnesses, the spear of Longinus, the clattering, 
besmeared metals on loan from a farmer.  That salvific acts arrive 
through Jesus, but depend on causes, intentions, motivations outside 
even so forceful a figure becomes apparent through the communities 
assembled in the second and third attempts to tell his story, in which 
Jesus gallops about as a champion but is also often casually present, 
an average community man.  When the resurrected Jesus visible only 
as a blinding light knocks on the gates of Hell, an irreverent but 
petrified Lucifer calls out, in what one must imagine is a nonchalant, 
sing-song voice, ―Quis est iste?/What lord artow?‖ (18.314-315) – that 
is, ―Who iiiiiissss iiiiitttt?‖  And earlier, before Jesus does his 
                                                 
51 The flipside of this seems to be the possibility of universal salvation that is 
articulated by Christ himself in the C-text.  See Derek Pearsall, "The Idea of 
Universal Salvation in Piers Plowman B and C." Journal of Medieval & Early Modern 
Studies 39.2 (2009): 257-281, and Thomas D. Hill, "Universal Salvation and Its 
Literary Context in Piers Plowman B.18." Yearbook of Langland Studies 5.(1991): 65-
76. 
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harrowing, Truth and Mercy meet, apparently at the very edge of 
Lucifer‘s domain, to discuss the looming event: 
Whan thise maydenes mette, Mercy and Truthe, 
Either asked oother of this grete wonder –  
Of the dyn and of the derknesse, and how the day rowed... 
(18.121-123) 
 
It is as if Mercy, Truth, and later Righteousness and Peace, the Four 
Daughters of God, have gathered to discuss local gossip.  Can Jesus 
really do it?  Can he unlock hell?  There is a closeness and an 
informality – Pearsall labels this ―a mood of celebration‖52 – in the tone 
and posture of the figures who cluster around the Harrowing that 
seems to invite participation, to involve the reader – and maybe too 
Will as a witness – in an event that challenges the imagination.     
This welcoming party/witnessing party of allegories that seem 
more animate than usual presages Piers‘ agricultural cooperative 
cultivated from the vita’s final instantiation.   The third life begins with 
a debate about Jesus‘ name -- should he be called Jesus or Christ 
(19.69) -- and then parallels the experiences and explorations of Will 
by chronicling Jesus‘s movement through Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest.  
As the resident expert on these topics, Piers again is the terminus for 
this third vita.  Or possibly Christ‘s life does not end here, but 
transforms into a life of Piers, who becomes a saint, too, by receiving 
the holy ghost (19.202), and undertakes to rebuild the fundaments of 
                                                 
52 Pearsall, ―The Idea of Universal Salvation,‖ 272. 
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the Church, using the blood of Jesus as mortar to construct a living 
church (19.325).   Once Piers takes over this doubled life, doctrinal 
history merges with an agricultural, a green history: 
And yit Grace of his goodness gaf Piers foure stottes – 
Al that hise oxen eriede, thei to harewen after. 
Oon highte Austyn, and Ambrose another, 
Gregori the grete clerk, and Jerom the goode. 
This foure, the geith to teche, folweth Piers teme, 
And harewed in an handwhile al Holy Scripture 
With two [aithes] that hei had, an oold and a new... 
(19.269-275) 
 
With evangelists as a team of oxen and doctors as another, Piers‘ 
project seems to insist on the agricultural metaphor as essential to the 
church and to the new community fostered by Piers.  This view of a 
healthy church puts the most illustrious intellects of church history in 
touch with a plodding, dirty, demanding work.  And although the Barn 
of Unity deteriorates into a terrifying vision of the poisoned and 
commodified Church, Will resolves to stick it out.  Here environment –
nonhuman beings and the ecological materials –, community, and self 
commingle under the not-too-gentle guidance of Piers. 
The fragments and interruptions, the repeated beginnings of the 
lives of Jesus question intentionality, the teleology of the vitae Christi, 
suggesting that even so crucial a life is moved by bifurcating 
trajectories and is composed of myriad influences and things53.  
                                                 
53Pearsall describes this Langlandian tendency as ―the essentially additive and 
associational process of Langland‘s thinking, which I take to be the antithesis of 
dialectic‖ (272). 
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Further, the representations of the living being in these closing passus 
as variously attached and produced by ecologies outside a purely 
spiritual one sketches out ethical obligations.  The life is not just 
about exemplary living, about a contest (without pride) to distinguish 
oneself in hopes of salvation.  Instead, the living being is understood 
as constituted in a network, as patched together by materials, other 
beings, ideas, histories, narratives.  Langland‘s ecological thought is 
not about saving the planet, but about getting close to vital things, 
about not envisioning the self as outside of environments but as 
constituted by it, about treating strange bodies ethically.  Jane 
Bennett writes about the idea of ―life on man,‖ the realization that 
microorganisms populate the human body, ―The its outnumber the 
mes.  In a world of vibrant matter, it is thus not enough to say that we 
are ‗embodied.  We are, rather, an array of bodies…‖ 54  Piers Plowman 
is a poem that takes this outnumbering and this multiplicity seriously.  
The obligation, then, is not simply to tend to one‘s own eternal life, but 
to consider and care for the things that help to make and sustain that 
life and the lives of other beings and things.  Hence the discussion of 
provided food, but also the warning not to suck too much from the 
surrounding community a la the friars.  It‘s a delicate balance, a vision 
of an ecosystem.  Not simply because it is right or mandated, but 
because one‘s own life, the lived one, depends on it.   
                                                 
54 Bennett, 112-113. 
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Afterword 
 
I know when one is dead, and when one lives; 
She's dead as earth. Lend me a looking-glass; 
If that her breath will mist or stain the stone, 
Why, then she lives. 
 
(King Lear, Act V, Scene iii) 
There is quite a lot that could be said, and has been, about these lines 
from the final scene of King Lear.  It is a moment of desperation, 
madness, recognition, and elegiac beauty.  In connection with this 
project, Lear‘s lament both reveals something I have been trying to say 
about the problem of life and points to the limits of knowledge about 
vitality.  Though almost nothing else – not family, power, friendship, 
sensation, or nature – seems certain in the play, Lear knows that his 
daughter, Cordelia, whom he carries in his arms, is dead and even 
claims that his perception of this quality extends beyond Cordelia: he 
knows it about everything he might encounter.  Really, it ought to be 
that simple, and it is our persistent fantasy that the problem of life is 
no problem at all.  Like pornography, we know it when we see it or do 
not see it, as is the case here.   
In the same breath, however, Lear contradicts, or at least 
complicates, his announced certitude.  As soon as Cordelia is 
pronounced ―dead as earth,‖ Lear doubts his statement and asks for a 
better test of his daughter‘s condition.  It is as if the association of 
Cordelia with the earth prompts this possibility, as if Lear realizes his 
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error (or perhaps the whole host of his errors) in believing the earth 
itself inert matter.  For all the tragedy of this moment, there is a sliver 
of redemption in Lear‘s frantic reversal: although Cordelia is gone, 
there is a permanence in her connections to earth, mist, and stone.  
Through his desire to bring his child back to life, Lear seems to 
discover the interrelatedness of human lives – his life and his 
daughter‘s, his life and Kent‘s life – as well as the interrelatedness of 
human life and the outside, the natural world, the dead earth.   
Although this study does not aim to identify how it is that 
medieval hagiography and its posterities know with certainty ―when 
one lives,‖ it has, I hope, made the case that that the genre has 
something to say about vitality, about what makes living beings tick 
and twitch.  Medieval life writing is a flexible genre and a self-reflexive 
one, too.  Rather than the locus of unconsciously reproduced doctrine, 
legend, or pulp fiction, rather than a reliquary, a monument to a dead 
letter or to a static mode of worship or history, the medieval saint‘s life 
seems to invite experimentation and in particular to attract social, 
political, ethical, and ontological inquiries.  Some of the oddities and 
the estrangement of hagiographic materials might be understood 
through this lens.  What appears to be a gratuitous fascination with 
gore or danger or pain might be in part a result of an abiding concern 
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for a conceptual approach to life as well as the material messiness of 
it. 
Moreover, this interest in animating energies endures in later 
secular appropriations and revisions of hagiographic narratives, and it 
endures more than does attention to exemplarity or saintly 
personality.  Walter Daniel‘s question – where did his mentor and 
friend‘s life go? – evolves into Langland‘s ecological dispersals.  While 
Walter‘s vital energy is personal, attached not only to Aelred but also 
to the human being and its experience of grief, later poetic 
appropriations of the vita become increasingly impersonal in their 
explorations of ontology to include animals, stones, and vegetation.  
Pearl, for example, attempts to convince the dreamer of a more diffuse 
view of vitality in which landscapes and necklaces reflect and radiate a 
force that is at the very least reminiscent of something animate.   
This progressively inhuman vitality is especially evident in the 
crucifixion passus of Piers Plowman.  The relatively brief dream – a 
passus contained dream – begins rather dramatically and inexplicably 
with a half-naked Will: ―Wolleward and weetshooed wente I forth 
after/As a reccheless renk that of no wo reccheth,/And yed forth like a 
lorel al my life tyme‖ (18.1-3).  Without a shirt or shoes, Will has set 
out as a vagrant.  Where his clothes have gone and what it is he is 
doing out in the world is left unexplained, but this condition is not, I 
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think, irrelevant or a passing curiosity.  Will has been stripped down, 
perhaps even broken down, by his aleatory quest, and the image of a 
bare life, a ―recchelees renk‖ without companion or even the most 
basic necessities for social survival, introduces the issue of the outer 
limits of the living being into the passus.  Indeed, the dream is entirely 
dedicated to extreme forms of living, moments in a life, and figures of 
vitality as it not only depicts for Will Christ‘s crucifixion and the 
Harrowing of Hell, but also imagines a battle between Life and Death.  
Feith first explains this antagonism: ―Deeth seith he shal fordo and 
adoun brynge/Al that lyveth or loketh in londe or in watre./Lif seith 
that he lieth, and leieth his lif to wedde‖ (18.29-31).  Although the 
contest never takes place – a pregnant deferral, to say the least – in 
the passus, the enmity between Life and Death becomes a kind of 
backstory, an offstage subplot that at once adds to the drama of this 
apex of sacred history and also overcomplicates it, renders it exquisite 
in its totality and thereby dissolves some of the emotional impact of 
the scenario.  The emergence, or promised emergence, of Life and 
Death also reminds that lives are multiple in medieval life-writing; 
even in the original sacred life, the martyrdom of Christ, the narration 
of this vita opens up to other storylines.   
It illustrates, too, the reach of the animating force as the coming 
Life and Death confrontation is announced a second time by dead 
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bodies that are peeking out of graves that have burst open upon 
Christ‘s dying:  
Dede men for that dene come out of depe graves, 
And tolde why that tempeste so longe tyme durede. 
‗For a bitter bataille,‘ the dede body seide; 
‗Lif and Deeth in this derknesse, hir oon fofooth hir oother. 
Shal no wight wite witterly who shal have the maistrie 
Er Sonday aboute sonne-risyng‘ – and sank with that til erthe. 
(18.62-67) 
 
Giving the dead a voice, Langland gestures at the generative potential 
of this life in literary history, a literary history in which he is 
participating, but also at the reproductive penchant of the form, the 
genre itself.  Lives are spawned, and in this case, the figure of Life, 
―Lif‖ springs up, maybe even from the earth itself, in the throng 
crowding the base of the cross.   
Most importantly, though, Lif is not theological in Langland‘s 
scenario.  Although it certainly has a relationship with the divine and 
seems to be on Jesus‘ side, Lif is not a force that comes from Christ or 
from a heavenly place or even an earthy mire.  Langland here confirms 
that sacred biographies have the capacity to explore the life force, its 
shapes, its agency, its effects, and its countereffects and goes so far as 
to give life a say, albeit secondhand, in its own story. 
Lif here is not even especially biological either, if we assume that 
this figure is like most of the others in the poem which never quite 
constitute living entities.  In the fifteenth-century poem, ―Death and 
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Liffe,‖ an alliterative sequel to Langland‘s never-realized encounter, 
Liffe looks like a woman, but conspicuously exceeds human vitality.  
Liffe is bursting with animate radiance: ―Shee was brighter of her blee 
then was the bright sonn,/her rudd redder then the rose that on the 
rise hangeth…fflowers fflourished in the frith where she fforth 
stepedd,/& the grasse that was gray greened beliue‖1.  This is not a 
person, not a figure who lives a life, but rather an attempt to conceive 
the life principle itself.  Langland‘s Lif and the later poem it inspires 
reveal the medieval tolerance for such ontological configurations and 
suggest that the matter of life in medieval thought and medieval 
literary practice is far from settled.   
   
 
                                                 
1 James Holly Hanford, and John Marcellus Steadman, Jr.  ―Death and Liffe: An 
Alliterative Poem,‖ Studies in Philology, 15.3 (1918): 263, ll. 65-66, 72-73. 
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